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20 January 2010 
Abstract 
 
This dissertation seeks to investigate the experiences of South African Muslim women in 
relation to sexual dynamics and marital relationships. By using in-depth interviews as the 
main empirical research method, this feminist study foregrounds women‟s voices in the 
production of religious meaning.  
 
I explore dominant religious discourses that influence women‟s conceptualisations of 
sexuality and the related implications for sexual praxis in contemporary Muslim communities 
that are also characterised by living conditions of poverty and violence. Focusing on 
women‟s engagements with religious meaning as it relates to their intimate relationships, the 
dissertation engages these findings with relevant literature and theory proposed by Islamic 
feminists on issues of morality, ethics and agency.  
 
This study finds that while patriarchal religious norms powerfully influence and give 
meaning to the lives of many Muslim women, these same women also contest, subvert and 
reconstitute these norms in varying ways. The diversity and richness of women‟s narratives 
illustrate the multifaceted, paradoxical and ambivalent nature of religious discourses as it is 
embodied in everyday life. I conclude that religious systems of meaning as they are lived in 
this local context are marked by tensions between patriarchal and egalitarian perspectives 
that are imbricated and interwoven in a variety of ways. The dissertation contends that the 
inclusion of women‟s narratives is imperative in order to highlight the dynamic nature of 
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South African Muslim Women's Experiences: Sexuality and 
Religious Discourses 
 
This dissertation explores South African Muslim women‟s experiences in intimate, especially 
conjugal, relationships. I investigate some of the dominant discourses on sexuality, particularly 
as these relate to understandings of Islam that inform and are reflected in women‟s lives. I 
critically use analytical categories developed in feminist scholarship on the gendered nature of 
power relations, and examine the intersecting production of religious subjectivities in a South 
African context.   
 
Firstly, my research is informed by the feminist commitment of recognising and utilising 
women‟s experiences as a crucial component in contemporary knowledge production. Secondly, 
through extensive inclusion of women‟s narratives, I am responding to debates on the diversity 
of women‟s experiences in feminism. This includes the critique of early Western feminist 
anthropological scholarship as well as contemporary representations of Muslim women in 
popular media. Thirdly, I am engaging with a body of literature that is increasingly being called 
Islamic feminism, in order to highlight the nascent ways in which particular scholarly and 
activist endeavours resourcefully create empowering and egalitarian possibilities for many 
contemporary Muslim women. My research is particularly framed in relation to central questions 
emerging from this latter body of scholarship. 
 
Islamic feminist initiatives are mainly driven by Muslim women‟s active participation in 
meaning-making, often elaborating on women‟s subjective experiences when engaging with 
religious ideology and norms. The context in which Islamic feminism is played out, and its 
impact on societal norms and individual mindsets, varies depending on factors such as political 
milieu, geographical location, cultural heritage and also whether Muslims constitute a minority 
or a majority population in a particular context. Islamic feminism is not an insular or isolated 
establishment; quite the contrary; Islamic feminism positions itself as an international 













Morocco, Egypt and South Africa, to name a few. Thus, the articulation of multiple Islamic 
feminisms, in which heterogeneous groups of women interact and generate alternative modes of 
engaging with the Islamic tradition in relation to their lived realities, is salient within an Islamic 
feminist discourse.  
 
Within the particular context of South Africa, the emergence of Islamic feminism was set against 
the backdrop of the apartheid regime and the participation of Muslims in the anti-apartheid 
struggle. In the context of these Muslims engaging in political activism, ethical principles such as 
justice and equality, transcending racial and ethnic categories, formed an integral part of a shared 
human rights discourse. For them, it seemed futile to fight for a free South Africa, in which 
freedom from oppressive structures took centre stage, and at the same time not to engage in 
transforming sexist societal norms. The time was ripe for an Islamic feminist project to flourish.  
 
Islamic feminism in South Africa was also influenced by broader international trends, 
particularly the fecund production of literature in which re-readings of key Islamic texts were 
elaborated from a gender-sensitive perspective. These readings often emphasised the Qur‟an as a 
source of egalitarianism and gender equality. This more scholarly endeavour influenced the 
development of an academic milieu in which issues pertaining to gender and sexuality became 
fervently debated against the contextual realities of Muslim women in South Africa.  
 
It is imperative to note at the outset that religious discourses do not singularly determine Muslim 
women‟s experiences. Religion engages with a number of other contextual social forces which 
impact the broader South African population that includes Muslims amongst others. The 
prevalence of gender-based violence, including wife battery, is compounded by complex socio-
political dynamics of poverty, lack of education, and economic instability that affect a large 
segment of South Africans. Muslim women are not isolated from these broader social and gender 
demographics. In addition, their lives are impacted by a variety of cultural and religious norms 
that might reinforce gender power hierarchies. Feminist scholars seek to explore the varied, 














My empirical research based in Cape Town, seeks to examine the lives and experiences of local 
Muslim women. In particular, I explore the ways in which their understandings of Islam and 
responses to dominant religious norms might speak to some of the debates raised in Islamic 
feminism, and feminism more broadly. I am interested in the ways women embody specific 
religious systems of meaning and the manner in which they might contest, comply with, 
negotiate and/or reconstitute dominant norms through their lived experiences. The findings of 
this research contribute to the developing field of feminist empirical research in South Africa. 
Through the inclusion of contemporary Muslim women‟s narratives, women‟s voices and 
experiences are epistemologically prioritized, and brought into the mainstream for scholarly 
reflection on the dynamic nature of religious tradition. 
  
This thesis is organised around nine chapters: 
 
Chapter One critically engages with the notion of „women‟s experience‟, a central concept 
foregrounded in feminist theory. Furthermore, this chapter includes some of the ways in which 
feminist scholars have responded to and contested the notion of „women‟s experience‟ as it has 
been presented by Western feminist endeavours. The critique, offered by a number of feminist 
scholars, illuminates the importance of recognising women‟s diverse and multifaceted 
experiences, often stressing the salience of religious and cultural specificity. I highlight some of 
the Western assumptions that continue to contribute to the „othering‟ of Muslim women in 
particular. In the last section of this chapter I outline some of the key principles of feminist 
poststructuralism, a rich and resourceful intellectual framework that lends helpful insights to the 
analysis of contemporary empirical research.  
 
Chapter Two explores the emergence and progress of an Islamic feminist discourse. I pay 
particular attention to the multiple ways in which Muslim scholars employ and develop a variety 
of methodological and epistemological frameworks in order to advocate gender-inclusive and 
egalitarian Islamic perspectives that prioritise gender justice. Through examining the work of a 
few influential Muslim female scholars, I highlight key ideological constructs and hermeneutical 
approaches that are extremely valuable when analysing contemporary normative religious 













Chapter Three examines a number of empirical studies undertaken in a South African Muslim 
context that focus on gender relationships, marital dynamics, and sexual intimacy. In particular, I 
explore research findings that foreground Muslim women‟s experiences with divorce, polygyny 
and HIV/AIDS. I also present a number of surveys undertaken in South Africa on gender-based 
violence in order to illuminate some of the unique challenges encountered by my respondents. 
This chapter highlights specific social dynamics and normative religious perceptions that operate 
in local contexts, sometimes in very problematic ways.  
 
Chapter Four outlines the research methodology that I employed when conducting empirical 
research. I bring to light my own research positioning and discuss some of the scholarly debates 
on location and positionality in empirical research. I also describe some of the factors that might 
have influenced my research encounters and contributed to the dynamics of the many 
relationships formed with respondents during the course of the research. In addition, this chapter 
discusses the process of developing the interview guide, the ways in which the empirical data 
were analysed, and the socio-demographic profiles of the respondents participating in this study. 
 
Chapters Five to Eight constitute the central empirical component of this dissertation and 
foreground South African Muslim women‟s experiences in intimate relationships, and their 
understandings of sexuality and particular religious discourses that in varying ways inform 
marital and sexual dynamics. I made a deliberate choice in this dissertation to include fairly 
extensive excerpts from my respondents‟ narratives. This decision is informed by Clifford 
Geertz‟s ethnographical method of „thick description‟ (1973) that makes salient not only human 
behaviour or understanding, but also contextual factors and discursive frameworks through 
which individuals make sense of their own subjectivity and social relationships. By employing 
the notion of „thick description‟, Muslim women‟s voices come to the fore in their full richness 
in ways that include nuances, complexities, and ambiguities – illustrating the diverse and 
multiple dimensions of human experience.  
 
Chapter Five entitled “On Being a Muslim Woman in South Africa” explores respondents‟ 
reflections on issues of religious identity. This chapter also examines particular dominant social 













South African context. Here I explore the salience of particular religious practices and beliefs 
that open up spaces for diverse ways of asserting a Muslim identity.  
 
Chapters Six to Eight form a conceptual unit. In the chapter entitled “Islam and Sexuality: 
Understandings and Experiences” I focus on respondents‟ understandings of Islam as one of the 
primary ways in which they engaged with questions around sexuality. This chapter includes 
debates on Islamic ethical ideals related to sexual dynamics, particular parameters of sexual 
behaviour, as well as sexual taboos. I explore some of the ways in which specific 
conceptualisations of sexuality present salient ambiguities, particularly between religious ideals 
and lived experience.  
 
In the next chapter entitled “A Good Muslim Woman should not refuse her Husband Sex” I 
examine the dominant discourse concerning a wife‟s sexual availability and its implications for 
women‟s experiences in marital relationships. In this chapter I also focus on the various and 
contesting ways that one particular hadith was referred to by many of the respondents.
1
 What 
becomes clear in this chapter is the ways in which particular patriarchal understandings of 
religion remain a powerful influence on relationship dynamics in contemporary contexts. I also 
investigate particular ways in which some respondents creatively contest these dominant views 
on sexuality through employing alternative modes of understanding sexual praxis.  
 
In the last chapter of this unit, entitled “Understandings of Gender and Polygyny”, I explore how 
respondents‟ intimate relationships are informed by their perceptions of human nature, sexuality 
and assumptions on gender. I also explore the topical subject of polygyny among my 
respondents. In particular, I examine respondents‟ diverse views of and experiences with 
polygynous marriages, and the varying ways in which social norms and behaviours significantly 
impact upon women‟s experiences in polygynous unions.  
 
 
                                                 
1
 Hadith, plural, ahadith: detailed narratives reporting on the life and praxis of the Prophet, i.e. sayings and doings 
of the Prophet. Among other things, the ahadith have informed Muslim positions and opinions on issues of 













These three chapters, outlined above, incorporate themes that imbricate on various levels and 
present fluid and multifaceted dimensions of human experience. In all these chapters I pay 
particular attention to the multiple discourses that inform understandings and contribute to the 
construction of various subjectivities. I explore how dominant conceptualisations on sexuality 
might guide sexual praxis in intimate relationships and influence broader marital dynamics. I 
also investigate possible resonances between my respondents‟ narratives and the theoretical 
constructs on morality, ethics, and agency articulated by Islamic feminists.  
 
In the final chapter of this dissertation I reflect on some of my empirical findings. In particular I 
examine the multifaceted and sometimes ambiguous discourses that operate in local contexts. I 
explore some of the factors that contribute to a contemporary Islamic sexual ethics for the 
respondents participating in this study. I also investigate the varying ways Islamic feminist 
methodologies and central concepts can provide useful means through which to engage some of 
the inegalitarian relations of power that influence South African Muslim women‟s experiences 















Situating Islamic Feminism/s: Broader Feminist Theoretical 
Mappings 
 
Feminism, in its broadest sense, introduced gender as a key analytical concept.
2
 The increasing 
awareness of patriarchal discourses that undermine and limit women‟s capacities and humanity, 
led to the emergence of feminist activist initiatives and the development of feminist theory. 
Feminism as a social vision emerged as a socio-political movement that has largely been 
concerned with gender equality (Gross, 1996:21).
3
 The ways in which „normative practices‟ are 
constituted in political, economic, religious and social spheres have been challenged and 
contested and more gender-inclusive possibilities envisioned. The aim of social protest has been 
to transform androcentric structures and prioritise gender justice and equality as the guiding 
principles informing all dominant discourses.
4
  
                                                 
2
 In Simone de Beauvoir‟s seminal book, The Second Sex, published in 1949, she introduced the distinction between 
„sex‟ and „gender‟ through her renowned phrase: “One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman” (1993:281). 
Within various strands of feminist theory, „sex‟ is prediscursive and used to refer to biologically distinct features, 
whereas „gender‟ is used to refer to social and cultural constructions of femininities and masculinities.  
3
 Many feminist theorists divide the history of feminist movements into three waves (see for example Maggie 
Humm‟s The Dictionary of Feminist Theory, 1995). First wave feminism emerged around the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, and foregrounded the right of women‟s suffrage. Second wave feminism emerged around the 
1960s and 1970s and was primarily involved with questions of gender equality. „The personal is political‟, a term 
coined by Carol Hanisch (1969), is reflective of the feminist struggles and initiatives during this period and 
continues to be important for many contemporary feminist movements. Third wave feminism, from the 1990s to the 
present, is characterised by a diversity of feminist expressions including critical responses to second wave feminist 
engagements.  
4
 This is not to say that feminism introduced an awareness of gender imbalance or gendered practices. Historically, 
there have been different contestations of gender within various social discourses. See for example Gerda Lerner‟s 
The Creation of Feminist Consciousness (1993), in which she documents more than 700 years of women‟s 













Feminist theorists have thoroughly analysed and critiqued the androcentrism underlying 
historical and contemporary understandings of what it means to be a human being. The 
conflation of maleness with humanness, an ontological marriage that permeates traditional 
knowledge systems, discursive practices and socio-religious consciousness, has been singled out 
as the key entry point for feminist intervention.
5
 The assertion of women‟s humanness has been 
vital in light of prevalent understandings of maleness as the yardstick through which humanness 
is measured. Feminist theorists have directed their focus towards assumptions about universal 
human normativity. In essence, what is understood to be the human norm in any given society is 
situated in male experience, language and understandings of social reality. This androcentric 
model of humanity and reality excludes women from the locus of formal knowledge production. 
  
One of the major conceptual and analytical interventions of feminist theory is the focus on 
women‟s experiences as a salient category of contemporary knowledge production. Women‟s 
experiences have become vital in the development of feminist epistemologies and 
methodological strategies for feminist empirical research.
6
 Rita Gross argues that “feminism 
begin[s] with experience…and move[s] from experience to theory, which becomes the 
expression of experience” (1993:130). The importance of uncovering or discovering women‟s 
realities and their experiences derives from the understanding that traditional paradigms of 
knowledge are in fact premised on and situated in male experiences and understandings of 
reality. Judith Grant outlines in the Encyclopaedia of Feminist Theories (2000:189) that: 
 
                                                 
5
 For a thorough engagement on particular constructs of sex and gender that espouses relationships of dominance 
and gender polarisations, see for example Sandra Lipsitz Bem, The Lenses of Gender: Transforming the Debate on 
Sexual Inequality (1993).  
6
 See for example Gayle Letherby, Feminist Research in Theory and Practice (2003); Nancy A. Naples, Feminism 
and Method: Ethnography, Discourse Analysis and Activist Research (2003); Helen Roberts (ed.), Doing Feminist 














…all institutions, theories and political perspectives, indeed, reality itself…were reality 
and truth only as told from the male perspective. In order to get a more „objective‟ 
truth…a truth that incorporated the full range of human perspectives, women‟s point of 




Thus, dominant discourses represent partial gendered experiences that are often understood to be 
universal accounts of human experiences. Feminist theorists argue that all experiences inform 
knowledge, however, thus far women‟s experiences have largely been marginalised in formal 
operational and acknowledged discourses. Letherby distinguishes between “authorized 
knowledge” and “experiential knowledge” in which authorised knowledge is equated with true 
knowledge and represents male-defined systems of knowledge (2003:20-24). Experiential 
knowledge, on the other hand, is only deemed true knowledge if it is situated in male experience 
(24). Thus, Letherby argues, “…ways of knowing have been made for women, not by women” 
(30). Consequently, one of the objectives of feminist qualitative research is to redress the gender 
imbalance created by patriarchal frameworks and male-defined epistemologies by focusing on 
women‟s experiential realities.  
 
1.1  A Critical View of Western Feminism as a Dominant Feminist 
Discourse 
 
A number of feminist scholars have critiqued the imperial and insular nature of Western feminist 
discourses.
8
 In particular, the various ways in which Western feminists have often ignored 
broader questions of pluralism, context-specificity, and distinct embodied realities have become 
                                                 
7
 For similar understandings of the importance of women‟s experiences in light of patriarchal epistemological 
dominance, see for example, Humm, The Dictionary of Feminist Theory (1995:84-85); Kramarae and Treichler, A 
Feminist Dictionary (1985:146).    
8
 In this section I draw extensively on Shaikh‟s article “Transforming Feminisms: Islam, Women and Gender 
Justice” (2003a) as it addresses particular contested understandings that are embedded within Western feminist 
discourses. Shaikh‟s article also provides useful insights in light of the development of an Islamic feminist 













increasingly challenged by a growing body of feminist literature in which the diversity of 




The publication of Betty Friedan‟s The Feminine Mystique (1963), a book that universalised 
sexist oppression as the major mode of oppression for all women, reflected broader Western 
feminist trends of generating theories that assumed universal truths with regard to women‟s 
experiences, bodies and sexualities. The Feminine Mystique created a backdrop for multifarious 
feminist theories that contested Friedan‟s unilateral presentation of an ethnocentric „woman‟ and 
by extension a monolithic homogenous „women‟s plight‟.  
 
The highlighting of sexism as women‟s „common oppression‟ largely overshadowed other forms 
of oppressive structures that women experience, such as racism and classism, and thus revealed 
the biased nature of the producers of a Western feminist discourse (read: college-educated, 
married white, middle- and upper-class women). The Western feminist discourse became the 
self-proclaimed (enforced) yardstick through which women‟s liberation should emerge and, by 
extension, took it upon itself to speak for all women regardless of their particular contextual and 
embodied realities.  
 
African-American scholar bell hooks, whose main critique of the Western feminist movement 
concerns its overriding ignorance of suppressive discourses like racism and classism, agrees with 
the initial goal of feminism: to eliminate sexist oppression. However, she argues that for this to 
happen, we must engage in “a struggle to eradicate the ideology of domination that permeates 
Western culture on various levels” (1984:24). Thus, the inclusion of issues pertaining to race and 
class is of utmost importance in combating discourses of domination in order to acknowledge the 
diversity of women‟s experiences. Audre Lorde argues in her open letter to Mary Daly that 
                                                 
9
 See, for example, A. Lorde, Sisters, Outsiders: Essays and Speeches (1984); Kemp and Squires, Feminisms 
(1997); Stanley and Wise, Breaking Out Again: Feminist Ontology and Epistemology (1993); Spelman, Inessential 
Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought (1988); Mohanty, Russo, and Torres (eds.), Third World 
Women and the Politics of Feminism (1991); Moraga and Anzaldúa (eds.), The Bridge Called My Back: Writings by 
Radical Women of Colour (1983). For a discussion related to a critique of the Western feminist discourse from a 













“oppression of women knows no ethnic or racial boundaries, true, but that does not mean it is 
identical within those differences” (1984:70). The universal and reductionist way in which early 
feminist anthropological scholarship represented and categorised women‟s experiences, and 
„woman‟ as a analytical category, received similar critique to that of male heteronormativity. 
Elizabeth Spelman argues that “the phrase „as a woman‟ is the Trojan horse of feminist 
ethnocentrism” (1988:13). 
 
The development of feminist theories from the „Third World‟, in which particular context- 
specific experiential realities were emphasised, e.g. religious expressions, local customs and 
practices, surfaced as a response to the debilitating despotism and extensive generalisations 
produced by Western feminism.
10
 Chandra Mohanty offers an elaborate critique of the ways in 
which the Western feminist discourse have generated theories and stereotypes of „Third World 
women‟. In her luminary essay “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial 
Discourses” (1991b) she undertakes a critical analysis of Western feminist writings on Third 
World women. Mohanty argues that the goal of these writings has not been to provide empirical 
research on Third World women‟s experiences, but rather to “colonize the material and historical 
heterogeneities of the lives of women in the third world, thereby producing/re-presenting a 
composite, singular „third world woman‟” (1991b:53). 
 
In particular, Mohanty highlights the ways in which Western feminist writings on Third World 
women are premised on the assumption that all women are the same. This illusion of sameness 
relates to the understanding that women share a common oppression that characterises our social 
relationships with men. This means that „women‟ as a group are a priori victims of misogyny. It 
is this assumption that precedes Western feminists‟ approach to the analysis of Third World 
women‟s realities. The case studies analysed by Mohanty bear testimony to unrepresentative and 
                                                 
10
 „Third World‟ and „Third World feminism‟ exist as analytical categories and must not be seen as homogenous 
constructs. „Third World feminism‟ is often used to describe a common context of struggle, such as racism, 
classism, colonialism and sexism, while acknowledging the particularities and diversity of „Third World women‟ 
and their lived realities. For a more elaborate discussion with regard to defining „Third World‟, „Third World 
Women‟, and „Third World Feminism‟, see Chandra Mohanty, “Cartographies of Struggle: Third World Women 













reductionist approaches, as well as a methodology filled with sweeping generalisations.
11
 The 
ways in which these Western scholars engage with religio-political contexts and cultural norms 
are not grounded in meticulous investigation to highlight various underlying structures of power 
that can influence women‟s experiences. Quite the contrary, the „scholarly analysis‟ undertaken 
by these Westerners centres on providing illustrations of women that are passive, subservient, 
without agency or voice, in order to confirm their (Western) preconceived premise – that all 
women are oppressed (1991b:55-74).  
 
In addition, Mohanty argues that the underlying objective that derives from universal 
assumptions about „women‟ and the corrupt methodology utilised to prove these generalisations 
can be seen as expressions of communicating a „new‟ Western dominance. Mohanty asserts:  
 
[by] contrasting the representation of women in the Third World with…Western 
feminisms‟ self-representation in the same context, we see how Western feminists alone 
become the true „subjects‟ of this counterhistory. Third World women, on the other hand, 
never rise above the debilitating generality of their „object‟ status. (71) 
 
Thus, on the one hand, the colonial mission of the Western feminist discourse is shaped by 
elucidating the common theme of sexist oppression, reflecting a shared female identity and 
context, and on the other hand, emphasising the unbridgeable chasm between Western women 
(read: liberated and in control) and „Third World women‟ who are without agency and trapped in 
traditional patriarchal dogmas.  
 
Within the context of Western (mis)representations of Muslim women, I argue that Western 
dominant discourses continue to impose universalised „normative‟ standards within which 
Muslim women are portrayed as victims of patriarchal oppression. The contemporary political 
reductionist discussions concerning the status of Muslim women and the assumed misogyny 
espoused by the Islamic legacy are at the epicentre of this debate. However, this debate is also 
interlinked with broader geo-political forces within which the Islamic ideology often is presented 
                                                 
11
 The work of, for example, Fran Hosken, “Female Genital Mutilation and Human Rights” (1981), Beverly 
Lindsay, (ed.) Comparative Perspectives of Third World Women: The Impact of Race, Sex and Class (1983), and 
Maria Rosa Cutrufelli, Women of Africa: Roots of Oppression (1983), can be seen as illustrative with regard to 


















Sa‟diyya Shaikh argues that “current debates on feminism, gender, and women‟s rights in Islam 
are ideologically charged, since they are embedded in a history of larger civilizational polemics 
between the Islamic world and the West” (2003a:148).
13a
 In essence, colonial encounters, the 
history of orientalist scholarship
13b
, and the more recent post-9/11 Islamophobia
13c
, are all 
realities that have contributed to the incessant „othering‟ of Muslim women.  
 
One of the main symbols utilised by Western discourses to assert the misogynist and suppressive 
nature of the Islamic ideology is the hijab.
14
 The hijab, often translated in popular literature to 
mean a head-scarf or veil that some Muslim women wear, has become epitomised as the symbol 
of oppression. The neo-colonial mission of liberating Muslim women, residing both in Western 
secular contexts as well as outside of these Western cartographies, has been partly premised on 
this visual symbol that largely diverges from the normative Western appearance in public space. 
Thus, the parameters of liberation per se have firstly been measured against broader Western 
discourses, within which the hijab is understood to be a suppressive symbol, and by extension a 
symbol that represents the Islamic structures of oppression. Secondly, the Western way of life, 
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including how to dress in public, has been the normative referent by which levels of liberation 
can be determined. Hence, a Muslim woman wearing the hijab expresses inferiority and 
subjugation as opposed to emancipation. Thirdly, the project of „liberating Muslim women‟ has 
been undertaken without any real wide-ranging conversations with Muslim women.
15
 
Consequently, opportunities for self-identification and self-representation have been eclipsed in 
favour of Western ethnocentricity.  
 
Furthermore, representations of Muslim women in popular media create a supportive backdrop 
to this enterprise. Portrayals of „Muslim practices‟ such as female genital mutilation, forced 
marriages, honour killings, spousal abuse and rape, as well as newly liberated unveiled Muslim 
women, who testify to these misogynist practices in Western media, are all narratives that 
contribute to the legitimisation of „free the Muslim women‟ campaigns. I am not arguing against 
the sad fact that some Muslim women experience these kinds of atrocities, be it in the name of 
Islam or under the guise of cultural conventions. However, I am disputing the universality of 
these experiences, the underlying methodology that leads to the construction of these stereotypes 





I argue that secularism and secular ideals, like the laicisation of public space, underpin much of 
Western dominant discourses. Thus, secularity is the yardstick by which „the other‟ (read: 
Muslim women) is being measured. Through this „ideology of domination‟, to apply hooks‟s 
terminology (1984), Western discourses that advocate the feminist project of liberating Muslim 
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women not only assist in the marginalisation of Muslim women through aborted dialogues, but 
also explicitly partake in religious intolerance and discrimination. Coercive prohibition of 
religious symbols, such as the hijab, is sometimes justified under the guise of integration and of 
the preferred projection of a unified secular majority.
17
 The „ideology of domination‟ that 
saturates Western geo-political discourses must be critically contested in favour of self-
representations that can be expressed through alternative discourses within which plurality of 
religious identities and subjectivities are encouraged.  
 
The homogenised feminism initially presented by the West has since the late 1980s incorporated 
some of the critiques related to questions of diversity and multiple subjectivities.
18
 Underlying 
reasons for this shift, and the expanded development of feminist theories that mirror diverse 
female experiences, can possibly be found in the critique from feminists that have previously 
been marginalised by Eurocentric attitudes. Secondly, the increasingly pluralistic religious and 
cultural landscapes growing within Western contexts open up possibilities for diverse feminist 
expressions and fruitful interactions between women from various backgrounds. In addition the 
development of new interpretive frameworks, such as feminist poststructuralism with its 
emphasis on self-reflexivity, plurality and multivocality, presents valuable resources for scholars 
engaging in empirical research. In the following section I will outline some of the principles of 
feminist poststructuralism, as it highlights useful methodological keys that I employ in the 
analysis of the empirical component of this dissertation.  
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1.2 Feminist Post-Structuralism as a Methodological Lens 
 
Feminist poststructuralism, with its emphasis on complexity, plurality, ambiguity and fluidity, 
offers a theoretical framework for understanding various relations of power that are produced 
through and within discourses. As such, feminist poststructuralism presents valuable 
epistemological principles for feminist research and practice. According to Chris Weedon:  
 
Feminist poststructuralism…is a mode of knowledge production which uses 
poststructuralist theories of language, subjectivity, social processes and institutions to 
understand existing power relations and to identify areas and strategies for change. 
(1987:40-41) 
 
As opposed to liberal-humanist assumptions regarding subjective experiences as reflecting some 
kind of untainted and essential reality, feminist poststructuralism is premised on the assumption 
that there is no such thing as absolute truth or subjective authenticity. This is due to the 
understanding that “all meaning and knowledge is discursively constituted through language” 
(Gavey, 1997:53). For Weedon, it is “language in the form of conflicting discourses which 
constitutes us as conscious thinking subjects and enables us to give meaning to the world and to 
act to transform it” (1987:32, my emphasis). This means that subjective experiences are never 
produced or understood in isolation but always constituted in relation and are thus inherently 
dependent on being expressed through a particular language which is part of a broader discursive 
paradigm. Hence, subjectivity, subjective experiences and subject positions are understood to be 
produced and constructed through language and are therefore always situated within particular 
discourses that operate within and through changing social relations (Baxter, 2007:25-28).  
 
Since current social meanings can be seen as temporary and continuously changing, as is the 
social landscape, subjectivity is also fluid and relational. Amina Mama (1995), through 
investigating the construction of subjectivity among black women in Britain, developed a theory 
of subjectivity that elucidates fluid and often ambiguous subject positions that are continuously 
produced and in process. Mama found that her research participants occupied subject positions 
within various discourses. The participants‟ multiple positioning depended on varying social 













were often moving between different available discourses and asserted various subjectivities that 
were informed by social relations and varying relations of power. Due to the processual nature of 
interpersonal relationships and broader contextual surroundings, subject positions were 
continuously changing and sometimes incongruous. This reflects feminist poststructuralist 
understandings of subjectivity as manifested through plurality and as dependent on/relational to 
the multiple discourses available to individuals.  
 
According to Baxter (2007:10), one of the aims of feminist poststructuralist discourse analysis 
(FPDA) is to reveal the multiple subject positions taken up by women, and to analyse the various 
workings of power that exist within these positions. As subjectivity is understood to be multiply 
positioned, and since individuals often move between discourses and participate in various 
discursive practices, the quest of the FPDA approach is to highlight the discourses in which 
women have been structurally marginalised and provide a space in which transformative social 
change can take place.  
 
Similarly, miriam cooke (2001) employs the concept of „multiple critique‟ to illustrate the 
varying ways in which Islamic feminists move between various subject positions. The existence 
of dominant patriarchal religious discourses that inform gendered practices, Western neo-
colonial discourses that espouse particular derogatory representations of Muslim women, as well 
as a number of local contextual discourses that convey specific assumptions related to gender 
and sexuality, creates possibilities for resistance and various forms of subjectivation.
19
 Islamic 
feminists position themselves within and through these operating discourses, often in ways that 
reveal ambiguity and ambivalence through these multiple positionings. However, cook stresses 
the assumption that Islamic feminists are subject to a “difficult double commitment”, pointing to 
the difficulty of embodying a feminist identity while simultaneously being religiously committed 
(2001:59). Sa‟diyya Shaikh (2003a) further explores this concept of „multiple critique‟ and 
suggests that there might be limitations with cook‟s binary distinction between feminist 
commitment on the one hand, and religious identity on the other. Shaikh argues that “many 
Muslim feminists...see their feminism as emerging organically out of their faith commitment” 
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(2003a:155). Thus, in light of Shaikh‟s argument, while coining a concept within which plurality 
and diverse speaking positions are available for the individual subject, cook fails to acknowledge 
the possibility of women‟s liberatory discourses as intrinsically embedded within broader 
discursive religious frameworks.  
 
The feminist poststructuralist emphasis on the existence of plurality of discourses, within which 
subjectivities are produced, is also intimately linked to relations of power. Michel Foucault‟s 
analysis of discourse and power is influential in how feminist poststructuralists conceptualise and 
analyse the relationships between subjectivities, discourses and possibilities for resistance.  
Foucault‟s The History of Sexuality Volume One (1981) in particular elucidates on the 
“polymorphous techniques of power” that operate within and through discourse (1981:11). In the 
work of Foucault, discourse refers to institutions and social practices that together with 
knowledge systems, inform and create subjectivities. Discourses can be seen as overarching 
networks in which knowledge is constituted and produced through relations of power.  
 
The notion that power is relational means, among other things, that power arises and is 
constituted within and through interpersonal relationships, social institutions, and in contexts 
where social interaction among various groups of people takes place. In addition, power is 
understood to be nonsubjective. This does not mean, however, that individuals cannot exercise 
power, but rather that individuals do not have ownership over power or intrinsic power. Rather, 
individuals partake in power and in the construction of relationships of power (McLaren, 
2002:37-41). According to Foucault, power is understood to have both negative and positive 
aspects. Power as negative is in Foucauldian terms referred to as “the juridico-discursive model” 
(McLaren, 2002:37), which implies applying authoritarian measures like rules and regulations 
(often enforced by the state) to prohibit, punish, restrict and control behaviour and 
alternative/opposing ideas/views. Power understood in the positive sense often implies resistance 
to oppressive dominant discourses and various forms of alternative empowerment. What these 
positive aspects of power often have in common is their noncoercive and plural nature, as 
opposed to negative power which is more likely to manifest unilateral and often forced relations 













Drawing on Foucauldian understandings of power and discourse as primary in structuring 
societal mechanisms and subjectivities, feminist poststructuralism seeks to develop 
comprehensive studies with regard to the functions of power, particularly with regard to 
changing oppressive gender relations. Coming back to the question of subjectivity and subjective 
experiences, much critique has been directed towards the feminist poststructuralist proclivity to 
decentring the individual and the absence of an intentional subject (e.g. Barbara Epstein, 1995). 
Particularly in liberal humanism and radical feminism, in which a unified subject together with 
subjective experiences is given priority and autonomy, there is suspicion of the perceived anti-




On the other hand, although feminist poststructuralism sees subjectivity as an effect of discourse, 
this does not necessarily mean that subjective experiences are devalued or that individual 
subjects are without agency. McLaren (2002) argues that Foucault‟s analysis of subjectivity, 
knowledge and power is extremely beneficial to feminist theory and practice, and that Foucault 
does provide useful ways in which to think about agency and resistance. 
 
According to Foucault, discourses are not only apparatuses of power but also sites for 
contestation and resistance:  
 
Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it, any more 
than silences are…discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a 
hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing 
strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines 
and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it. (Quoted in McLaren, 
2002:90) 
 
Hence, within feminist poststructuralism much attention is given to the particular discourses in 
which subjective experiences are constructed in order to contextualise and analyse the existence 
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of power relations. Hence, it is only through “a contextualization of experience and an analysis 
of its constitution and ideological power” that the „agent of change‟ can successfully transform 
or resist patriarchal dominating discursive systems (Weedon, 1987:125).  
 
Weedon, drawing on Louis Althusser‟s theory of interpellation (1971), which suggests that an 
individual is born into an already existing ideological framework which then becomes 
internalised by the individual, argues that individuals can be understood to be “agents of change, 
rather than its authors” (Weedon, 1987:25). Consequently, she partly agrees with Althusser in 
that subjectivity is constituted through discourse or particular ideologies. It is within this 
paradigm that an individual can mistakenly conflate her subjectivity with authorship of the 
ideology which generates her subjectivity and as such create an imaginary autonomy and sense 
of self. However, Weedon does not claim that the individual is a passive recipient of this 
ideology, but rather an „agent of change‟.  
 
The decentring of the autonomous liberal-humanist self/rational self generates possibilities for 
the individual to occupy several subject positions, which means that change, ambiguity and 
contradictions are all potential elements of the fluid, relational and ever-changing subject. The 
belief that subjectivity is constituted through multiple cultural and societal discourses is related 
to the understanding that subjectivity is produced in history and is therefore also subject to 
continuous change. Consequently, feminist poststructuralism argues that “the individual is 
always the site of conflicting forms of subjectivity” (Weedon, 1987:33, my emphasis). Thus, 
feminist poststructuralist theory places particular emphasis on the deconstruction of the subject 
as constant and coherent, and opens itself up to new ways of understanding that acknowledge 
multiplicity, contradictions, fluidity and ambiguity. 
 
With regard to individual agency, or being an „agent of change‟, possibilities of resistance and/or 
rejection of particular subjectivities produced by dominant discourses can take place when the 
individual becomes conscious of the sometimes-conflicting subject positions she possesses and 
expresses within varying social contexts. Hence, it is the existence of multiple discourses, and in 













For instance, I would argue (as does Weedon, 1987:110-111) that many feminist discourses, 
although marginal, can represent discourses of resistance in light of the production and 
manufacturing by dominating discourses of culturally „sanctioned‟ gender relations and/or 
constructions of femininity. Although institutional transformation or social impact can be 
limited, these discourses of resistance still provide alternative discursive spaces within which 
women (and men) can defy governing hegemonic discourses that subjugate or are non-accepting 
of other subjectivities. Drawing on Foucault‟s principle of reverse discourse, Weedon argues that 
it is through a continual resistance to dominant discourses that the emergence of new discourses 
can take shape. Through developing novel epistemologies that facilitate alternative subjectivities, 
new discourses can blossom and gain social power depending on broader relations of power 
within which these discourses of resistance are being constructed (110-111).   
 
Sherry Ortner (1996), drawing on practice theory as developed by Pierre Bourdieu (1977), 
Anthony Giddens (1979), and Marshall Sahlins (1981), questions and critiques the „limited‟ 
understanding of agency in both feminist poststructuralism as well as in liberal humanism. She 
offers a „middle way‟ through retaining a notion of an intentional subject/agent. Ortner argues 
that practice theory, in which agency is understood to be “both a product and a producer of 





Ortner develops and applies the term “serious games” to exemplify her position. The presence of 
discursively produced subjectivities, following the rules of particular games, can be seen as 
similar to the feminist poststructuralist understanding of the construction/production of 
subjectivity within various discourses. However, Ortner also argues that the agents are not 
passive recipients of discourse, but rather perform agency with “skill, intention, wit, knowledge, 
[and] intelligence” (12). Thus, although agents are not seen as autonomous, they do indeed 
perform (conscious) agency within particular games that can affect change.  
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Ortner‟s elucidation on the seriousness of the games can be understood as the relations of power 
and the ways in which power is structured within the various games. Hence, the existence of 
oppression, exploitation, and inequality amongst actors participating in a game is a significant 
feature of the power dynamics in a game (12). In a study of the development of a Sherpa 
nunnery, Ortner investigates how subaltern agency can be constituted in already existing games 
as well as developing alternative games with new rules and goals. Of particular importance to 
Ortner, in light of her critique of feminist poststructuralism and liberal humanism, is to “retain an 
active intentional subject without falling into some form of free agency and voluntarism” (19). 
 
I would argue that Weedon‟s concept of „agents of change‟ in feminist poststructuralism and 
Ortner‟s practice theory model „serious games‟, which outlines the positioning and workings of a 
subject within broader ideological frameworks, are not completely dissimilar. Both scholars 
reject the existence of an autonomous subject, hence, it is the discursive practices/rules of the 
games and the power relations permeating all social interactions that generate available 
subjectivities to be performed by individuals. In addition, both scholars argue that the agent is 
not a passive recipient of subjectivity. For Weedon, it is the existence of multiple discourses and 
a plurality of available subjectivities that produces conflicting discourses and 
fragmented/contradictory subjectivities that create the „agents of change‟ who can resist and 
facilitate change and social transformation. Hence, it is subjectivity as a contested site within 
multiple discourses that separates feminist poststructuralism from other feminist projects. In 
addition, I would argue that contrary to feminist critiques of Foucault‟s notion of subjectivity as 
reflecting deterministic characteristics due to its produced nature, Foucault‟s fecund 
understandings of subjectivity as interdependent and relational offer feminist poststructuralism 
valuable ways in which to analyse subjectivity without falling into the trap of determinism/free 
will dualisms.  
 
For Ortner, although acknowledging the structuring influence of discourses in constructing 
subjectivities, it is the intentional subject that is manifested through the ways in which the agent 
plays the game that creates potential subaltern agents – not the existence of conflicting 
discourses and in effect, conflicting subjectivities. I will argue that Ortner‟s insistence on 













relationship between intentionality and action, and that the removal of this intentionality (by 
making subjectivity a product of discourse) is seen as limiting to the possibility of change. 
However, as McLaren argues in her thorough analysis of Foucault‟s conceptualisation of 
subjectivity:  
 
...Foucault‟s genealogical writings offer a powerful account of the process of how norms 
constitute subjectivity. But feminist critics worry that a subject thoroughly constituted 
through social norms lacks a basis for resistance to those norms. Foucault‟s later work 
offers a view of the self that is socially constituted and capable of autonomy and 
engaging in practices of freedom…[Foucault] offers an account of subjectivity that is 
both socially constituted and capable of resistance. (McLaren, 2002:54) 
 
In conclusion, feminist poststructuralism, largely inspired by Foucauldian analysis of the ways in 
which the human subject is constituted, facilitates valuable epistemological keys for ways of 
thinking about subjectivity, power and discourse. For Weedon, the key to change/resistance lies 
within the critical analysis of the subject‟s experiences in light of the operating discourses. It is 
this exploration that can create space for and generate reverse discourses, however, it is also 
important to keep in mind that the development of alternative discourses and subjectivities of 
resistance too are permeated with relations of power. Consequently, it is a salient aim for many 





With regard to religious and cultural specificity, Saba Mahmood (2001) has offered an important 
critique of feminist poststructuralist discourse regarding the ways in which agency is defined 
singularly in terms of resistance. Saba Mahmood explores the concept of agency within the 
context of Islam through investigating the women‟s mosque movement in Egypt. The mosque 
movement has empowered Muslim women in Egypt by way of increased access to mosques and 
the emergence of newly established mosques, as well as to the field of Islamic pedagogy, an area 
previously dominated by men. However, the mosque movement is situated within a traditional 
Islamic framework in which particular pietistic ideals such as subservience and patience (sabr) 
are being reiterated (Mahmood, 2001:203-204). Within this context, Mahmood investigates the 
concept of agency and challenges the underlying assumptions regarding the liberal humanist 
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subject presented by (Western) feminist scholarship as well as the ways in which agency is 
defined in feminist poststructuralist discourse. Mahmood argues that cultural and religious 
specificity must be thoroughly engaged with in any feminist project in order to more accurately 
represent women‟s diverse and multilayered realities. Mahmood expounds that agency as 
presented by feminist scholarship, with its roots in liberalist traditions, “sharply limits our ability 
to understand and interrogate the lives of women whose desire, affect, and will have been shaped 
by nonliberal traditions” (Mahmood, 2001:203). Thus, agency as presented by liberalist feminist 
scholarship is simply seen as one particular conceptualisation of agency, and Mahmood argues 
that other forms of agency exist within particular Islamic discourses. 
 
Mahmood argues that the liberalist notion of agency as active resistance is too narrow and 
suggests that we should rather think of agency as “a capacity for action that historically specific 
relations of subordination enable and create” (Mahmood, 2001:203). Mahmood particularly 
draws on the work of Judith Butler (1990, 1993, 1997a, 1997b and 1997c) to provide a critique 
of the autonomous subject of liberal feminism, but also disputes Butler‟s notion of agency as 
resistance.  
 
According to Butler‟s theory of subjectivation, relations of power within discourses do not only 
subject and dominate the individual according to norms and regulations particular to a discourse, 
but these self-same relations of power provide the capacity for agency and by extension 
resistance to discourse (Butler, 1997a; Foucault 1980, 1983). Mahmood agrees with Butler in 
that the capacity or possibility of resistance is produced within discourses, and not by an 
autonomous subject. However, she argues that this particular understanding of agency, agency as 
active resistance, is still intimately linked to liberatory politics and is thus related to the liberalist 















Through investigating the discourse of piety present within women‟s mosque movement in 
Egypt, Mahmood argues that: 
 
if the ability to effect change in the world and in oneself is historically and culturally 
specific…then its meaning and sense cannot be fixed a priori, but allowed to emerge 
through an analysis of the particular networks of concepts that enable specific modes of 
being, responsibility, and effectivity. (Mahmood, 2001:212)  
 
Providing there is no such thing as a universal truth or definite reality, the meaning of particular 
concepts and ways of engaging the world is always dependent on context in which religious and 
cultural specificity can present salient forces for the construction of the subject. Consequently, 
concepts can take on multiple meanings that are contingent on religious particularity, which is 
what Mahmood explores in the context of an Egyptian Islamic resurgence movement that 
upholds traditional Islamic ideals of religious piety.  
 
The particular Islamic discourse of piety that is embraced by women who participate in the 
Cairene mosque movement holds specific religious ideals that might possibly not be palatable to 
many feminist scholars. Ideals such as modesty, shyness, perseverance, patience and docility are 
all behavioural traits that can be seen as going against (Western) feminist ideals, and particularly 
against assumptions underlying the „active‟ concept of agency advocated in much Western 
feminist scholarship (Mahmood, 2001:205). Mahmood asserts that it is the cultivation of these 
religio-specific normative female characteristics that underlie the Islamist discourse of piety. By 
extension, by embracing these ideals as ways of engaging „agentival capacity‟, the parochial 
definition of agency as proposed by much feminist scholarship is subverted and indeed expanded 
in ways that also encourage and appreciate “continuity, stasis, and stability” as opposed to 
resistance and change (212).   
 
For example, a social practice such as hijab, which normally in Western feminism is touted as a 
patriarchal practice, is constructed in very different modes by Egyptian women in this piety 
movement. One of the respondents in Mahmood‟s empirical study, reflecting on the importance 
of shyness, asserts that veiling is integral to the cultivation of this religious virtue. Hence, veiling 













realised. Once inner shyness is attained, the veil is intricately linked to the sustenance of this 
“modest deportment” (Mahmood, 2001:214). In this way, the veil means “both being and 
becoming a certain kind of person” (215). Through viewing the self as continuously in process 
and produced through particular bodily practices, Mahmood departs from Butler‟s 
conceptualisation of agency as singularly outward resistance. Rather, agency in the context of an 
Islamic discourse of piety is inward action that highlights cultivation and embodiment of 
particular religious ideals. Hence, agency as illustrated by the disciplinary practice of veiling 
contributes to the making of the pious female self, which is a process of becoming and a way of 
being. The cultivation of the pious self can be seen as a continuous trajectory within which the 
preservation and strengthening of achieved levels of modest deportments is the main aspiration 
for practitioners involved in this piety movement. Consequently, it is continuity and stability, as 
opposed to resistance, that motivates agentival capacity. 
 
Furthermore, Mahmood expands the notion of agency to include “the capacity to endure, suffer, 
and persist” (217). As opposed to much feminist scholarship that argues that these concepts 
might signify female passivity and submission to male authority, Mahmood argues that these 
qualities, within the framework of traditional Islam, signify living out the virtue of sabr. Sabr 
can be understood to mean “to persevere in the face of difficulty without complaint”, and is 
conceived of by many Muslims as one of the ideals of the virtuous self (220). One of 
Mahmood‟s respondents asserted that “sabr allows one to bear and live hardship correctly as 
prescribed by one tradition of Islamic self-cultivation” (221). Hence, by embracing sabr as a way 
of living one does not necessarily reduce pain or injustices inflicted upon one‟s person, 
nonetheless, sabr engenders the ability to endure difficult circumstances and painful experiences. 
Living with sabr illustrates one way of asserting agentival capacity that foregrounds a religious 
identity and commitment, and simultaneously, presents a notion of a virtuous self that creatively 
wields a certain consistency in social interactions regardless of situation or circumstance.  
 
Nonetheless, another respondent in Mahmood‟s study, who was not involved in the Cairene 
mosque movement, employed a very different mode of engagement in order to deal with 
personal challenges. Although she acknowledged sabr as a central religious principle, for her 













relations of power. By contrast, she expressed agentival capacity through foregrounding the 
importance of cultivating self-confidence that in effect allows for making empowering individual 
decisions (221-222).  
 
Mahmood‟s expanded analysis of agency allows for very interesting ways of thinking through 
different notions of human self and particular subject positions that are relational to religious and 
cultural context-specific discourses. The conceptualisation of agency as a way of cultivating 
individual virtues that are concomitant with religious beliefs is particularly interesting. At the 
same time, the Egyptian mosque movement described by Mahmood represents a specific kind of 
formation that does not necessarily reflect the aspirations of piety movements across the world. 
Also, the conflicting voices included in her study illustrate the particularity of this piety 
movement and show that also within the Egyptian context these religious discourses are quite 
specifically structured.  
  
One of the main critiques of this notion of agency, provided by Egyptian secularists as well as in 
feminist scholarship, is the potential reinscription of patriarchal norms and privilege. In other 
words, women reproduce their own subordination through, for example, the cultivation of 
religious ideals such as perseverance, patience and docility. In this way, women believe in and 
accept relations of inequality and structural oppression under, for example, the guise of religious 
persuasions. Nonetheless, Mahmood argues that the cultivation of virtues, understood to have 
religious legitimacy, is an active engagement and “it is integral to a constructive project, a site of 
considerable investment, struggle and achievement” (222). The women Mahmood are engaging 
with are not the passive recipients of a patriarchal religious discourse, but rather express 
agentival capacity through embracing and cultivating what they believe to be religious ideals that 
contribute to living with God-consciousness (taqwa). Emphasising the salience of religious and 
cultural specificity, Mahmood argues that, 
 
the liberatory goals of feminism should be rethought in light of the fact that the desire for 
freedom and liberation is a historically situated desire whose motivational force cannot be 
assumed a priori, but needs to be reconsidered in light of other desires, aspirations, and 














In other words, the ways in which women who participate in the mosque movement in Egypt 
engage with particular ideals of being, testify to alternative modes of living, ways of living that 
do not necessarily correlate with emancipatory feminist ideals. These alternative modes of living 
are situated within particular religious constructs and persuasions that give meaning to 
individuals who hold the cultivation of piety as fundamental to their existence in the world. This 
embodied existence is driven by a commitment to a faith tradition and illustrates, through the 
examples provided by Mahmood, the multiple meanings inherent in the concept of agency. 
 
Nonetheless, I argue that Mahmood‟s scholarly intervention, within which she provides an 
alternative and useful conceptualisation of self and agency as intrinsically related to and realised 
through religious discourses, must be increasingly problematised in light of women‟s broader 
experiential realities. Clearly, women are situated in various social contexts within which 
experiences of different forms of marital abuse, sexual violence, and infidelity inform their 
agentival capacities. Thus, although for example the virtue of sabr is regarded as a highly 
esteemed religious quality, often providing women with the strength to endure and indeed 
survive difficult situations and experiences, sabr is also relational to context. Within the context 
of the Egyptian piety movement sabr is conceptualised as a religious ideal that women strive to 
cultivate. In other contexts, the very concept of sabr is utilised to maintain particular precarious 
relations of power and domination that effectively and perniciously curb agentival capacity and 
render the virtue of sabr ambiguous. Thus, sabr can be seen as a site of diverse meanings that is 
reflective of the discursive nuances present within social realities. In addition, by foregrounding 
a particular religious subjectivity, Mahmood does not address the possible multiple and 
sometimes ambivalent subjectivities that can operate simultaneously within any one social 
context.    
 
During the process of empirical analysis I will draw on feminist poststructuralist approaches to 
knowledge. In particular the methodological framework, within which subjectivity, positionality, 
discourse and power function as key concepts, will be utilised in making sense of competing 
subject positions within the course of various research encounters. According to Weedon 
(1987:33), subjectivity is seen as “precarious, contradictory and in process, constantly being 













various subject positions will be analysed with particular attention to existing webs of social 
power relations, real and perceived. In this way, the existence of subject positions enacted by the 
respondents together with subjective experiences, will serve as a way of analysing the ways in 
which relations of power are produced/reproduced, the possibilities for change/resistance, and 
the existence of reverse discourses.  
 
In addition, I will employ Mahmood‟s broadened understanding of agency to my analysis of 
women‟s narratives. Hence, agency is not only perceived as active resistance to particular 
discourses, but is also the embodiment of a religiously and culturally specific moral praxis. 
Consequently, the exploration of Muslim women‟s ways of living and responses to relations of 
power in intimate relationships is guided by an awareness of the multiple operations of agency.  
 
The next chapter of this dissertation places emphasis on the development of an Islamic feminist 
discourse and the ways in which scholars highlight particular key concepts, deriving from 
religious textual sources, in order to address issues of gender and relations of power from within 















Defining Islamic Feminism/s and the Production of an Islamic 
Feminist Discourse   
 
What is Islamic feminism? Scholar-activist Margot Badran is one of the key commentators on 
Islamic feminism documenting its emergence and development. She has published numerous 
articles that highlight the complexities of the term itself as well as the underlying methodology 
of this particular feminist project. According to Margot Badran (2007:51), “Islamic 
feminism…is a particular form of feminism that locates itself, as both discourse and as a mode of 
activism, within the Islamic framework”. As such, Islamic feminism can be distinguished from 
other forms of feminisms by positioning itself within the context of a specific religious ideology. 
Islamic feminism incorporates both theoretical and methodological debates that challenge 
existing patriarchal understandings of Islamic ideology, and creates space for the development of 
a more gender-sensitive discourse. The emergence of an Islamic feminist discourse fosters 
nascent expressions of gender consciousness and influences various activist approaches. Activist 
initiatives address questions around equality and gender justice in contemporary contexts and 
contest the existence of patriarchal discourses that inform women‟s lived realities in a number of 
ways.  
 
Numerous critical debates have surfaced as a consequence of the application of the term „Islamic 
feminism‟. Mahnaz Afkhami, a self-proclaimed Muslim feminist, asserts that “The epistemology 
of Islam is contrary to women‟s rights…I call myself a Muslim and a feminist. I am not an 
Islamic feminist – that‟s a contradiction in terms” (in Moghadam, 2002:1152). Afkhami‟s 
position expounds the belief that „Islamic feminism‟ is an oxymoron. This understanding is 
supported by other scholars like Valentine Moghadam (2001) and Haideh Moghissi (1999). 
Moghissi argues in her book Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism (1999:140) that “…no 
amount of twisting and bending can reconcile the Qur‟anic injunctions and instructions about 
women‟s rights and obligations with the idea of gender equality”. She continues by stating that 
“she [an Islamic feminist] cannot believe in both the Islamic and feminist concepts of equality. 













emphasising the antagonistic nature of the concept „Islamic feminism‟. This position also echoes 
cooke‟s (2001) notion of having a “difficult double commitment”, discussed in the previous 
chapter, in which a religious identity is understood to be problematic for feminist commitments. 
Concentrating on Islamic feminism in Iran, Moghadam argues that the development of policies 
and regulations pertaining to, among other things, family laws, should not gain its momentum 
from a religious framework (2001:43).
23
 She asserts:   
 
I fear that as long as they [Islamic feminists] remain focussed on theological arguments 
rather than socioeconomic and political questions, and their point of reference remains 
the Quran rather than universal standards, their impact will be limited. Their strategy 
might even reinforce the legitimacy of the Islamic system and undermine secular 
alternatives. (44-45)  
 
Through critically analysing the growing body of literature that is increasingly being called 
Islamic feminism, the arguments raised by Afkhami, Moghissi and Moghadam can be contested 
on at least two accounts. Firstly, part of the way in which Afkhami, Moghissi and Moghadam 
seem to conceive of religion, as a closed and singular homogenous discourse, ironically 
strengthens and perpetuates the very traditional and patriarchal formulations of religion that 
Islamic feminists are contesting. This static understanding of religion is problematic in that it 
marginalises the dynamic ways with which believers inform and impact upon religious 
traditions. Hence, the various ways in which religion is continuously co-created in specific 
historical, political and geographical contexts by believers, a view highlighted by Islamic 
feminists, is absent in Afkhami, Moghissi and Moghadam‟s conceptualisation of religious 
discourse. 
 
In addition, the underlying assumption permeating their arguments is that the religion of Islam is 
in essence patriarchal. This understanding points to a monolithic understanding of Islam as 
fundamentally built on androcentric and gender hierarchical principles that have little to offer 
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discussions related to secular responses, including the critique of Islamic feminism in Iran, see Moghissi (1999 and 
1993), and Shahidian (1994). For a comparative analysis of gender politics in Iran and France respectively, see Hoel 













Muslim women in the quest for equality. Many prominent Islamic feminists acknowledge the 
traditional (and patriarchal) heritage of the Islamic religious discourse. However, they critically 
engage with Islamic history, textual sources, and normative practices that reflect male privilege. 
Simultaneously, they creatively draw on egalitarian ethics also found within the Islamic tradition 
in order to provide liberatory alternatives. In this way, they take seriously their role as co-
constructors of religious meaning, providing Muslim women with empowering religious 
identities and constructs of self. 
  
Secondly, the postulation that Islamic feminism cannot denote a principle of equality that can 
match the understanding of equality in „feminism‟ is problematic. First of all, whose feminism 
are we talking about here? The way in which the concept of feminism is presented and 
understood by Afkhami, Moghissi and Moghadam can be viewed as narrow and limited. By 
subscribing to essentialist definitions of what feminism means, where it comes from, and how it 
is played out in society, Afkhami, Moghissi and Moghadam‟s engagement with feminism 
mirrors their conceptualisation of Islam in that feminism is viewed as an already constituted 
unchanging corpus of meaning.  
 
By making the assumption that feminism is intrinsically distinct from Islam, Afkhami, Moghissi 
and Moghadam are paying homage to a particular universalised conceptualisation of feminism, 
more particularly, the prioritisation of secular feminism as the normative and determining 
discourse which is fundamentally incompatible with Islam. However, the mere existence and the 
increasingly transnational character of the Islamic feminist discourse should be „proof‟ enough to 
contest assumptions related to a „universal feminism‟ that often espouse reductionist biases.  
 
Despite these contestations, increasing numbers of Muslim scholars are recognising the existence 
of an Islamic feminist discourse. The need for a holistic approach that incorporates religion as an 
integral part of the overall struggle for gender justice might be an underlying reason for why 
many scholars accept „Islamic feminism‟ as a descriptive term. Thus, the distinction between 
Islamic feminism as a discourse being produced, rather than „feminist‟ as an intrinsic aspect of 













refuse the feminist label.
24
  Examples of Islamic feminist endeavours where an Islamic feminist 
identity is explicitly asserted can be found in the women‟s journal Zanan in Iran (founded by 
Shahla Sherkat in 1992), “Sisters in Islam” in Malaysia, and (scholarship) activism in South 
Africa (Badran, 2009:244).  
 
It is important to note that what is increasingly being called Islamic feminism is not a static 
analytical category, nor is it the sum of literature produced by Muslim women. Islamic feminism 
incorporates a variety of subject positions in particular contexts and is also continuously 
developing and manifesting itself in a range of ways which cannot be captured by reductionist 
understandings. Islamic feminism as a discourse cannot be pinned down to represent specific 
geographical areas or particular political agendas, nor does it singularly embody truths that are 
meaningful for all „producers‟ of this discourse at any one given time. As a consequence we 
might speak of multiple feminisms. Shaikh (2003a) applies the term “Islamic feminisms” in the 
plural to elucidate the diverse ways in which different groups of Muslim women engage and 
interact with their religious tradition.  
 
I define Islamic feminism/s as an emerging epistemology that speaks to Muslim women as 
subjects and prioritises gender justice as a central ontological concept in Islam. The emergence 
of various expressions of Islamic feminism/s is in part a critique of patriarchal understandings, 
norms, and constructions of Islam. Islamic feminism/s more generally also contests neo-colonial 
definitions of women. Bearing these definitions in mind for the rest of this chapter, I would like 
to point out that I do not intrinsically link the producers of an Islamic feminist discourse with the 
assertion of an Islamic feminist identity. I agree with Badran (2009:244) who argues that: “The 
producers and users of Islamic feminist discourse include those who may or may not accept the 
Islamic feminist label or identity. They also include religious Muslims (by which is typically 
meant the religiously observant), secular Muslims (whose ways of being Muslim may be less 
publicly evident), and non-Muslims.”  
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2.1  The Emergence of an Islamic Feminist Discourse 
 
There are a number of approaches and trends that form part of the Islamic feminist discourse. 
From the beginning of the 1980s much of the scholarly work centred on the Qur‟anic text as the 
source of equality. Gender equality was understood to be an axiomatic principle embedded 
within the revealed text. Many Islamic feminist scholars elucidate that current dominating 
interpretations and understandings of the Qur‟anic text have been elicited through male lenses. 
Androcentric understandings of ontology and epistemology, together with the development of 
patriarchal norms, emerged as a result of these male endeavours (Hassan, 1996:382-383).
25
 This 
unassailably influenced, and continues to influence, the way in which women experience the 
sacred and articulate their identity as Muslims. Riffat Hassan argues that women‟s involvement 
in intellectual scholarship, particularly in the sphere of the sacred, was traditionally and 
historically non-existent due to the lack of (or prohibition of) female participation in what was 
viewed as male matters.
26
 As a consequence, she argues, the classical exegetic canon was largely 
developed through an aborted dialogue between the sexes (1990:95-96).  
 
The belief that gender equality is intrinsic to the Qur‟an was expressed by scholars through 
contextual gender-sensitive and liberatory re-readings of the Qur‟an. By using, among other 
approaches, classical Islamic interpretive methodologies and holistic hermeneutical principles, 
many scholars developed various frameworks for the recuperation of what they believed to be 
the egalitarian Qur‟anic message. These endeavours communicate understandings that are 
situated in contemporary women‟s experiences and needs. Examples of work of this nature are: 
Qur‟an and Woman: Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman‟s Perspective (Wadud, 1999, 
originally published in 1992), Riffat Hassan‟s “An Islamic Perspective” (1990) and “Muslim 
Women and Post-Patriarchal Islam” (1991), The Rights of Women in Islam (Engineer, 1992), and 
“Believing Women” in Islam, Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of the Qur‟an (Barlas, 
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 For a discussion on particular male interpretive trends that effectively developed rigid gender hierarchies, seen as 
contrary to Qur‟anic instructions, see Hassan, “Feminism in Islam” (1999) and “An Islamic perspective” (1990). 
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 Nonetheless, more recent scholarship has challenged this notion. For example, Omaima Abou-Bakr presents, in 
her article “Teaching the Words of the Prophet: Women Instructors of the Hadith” (2003), a number of female 













2002). Although Barlas‟s book came out in 2002, she follows the trend of focusing on the Qur‟an 
as the primary source of gender justice. However, her approach is more nuanced in that she 
acknowledges other possible readings that can be derived from the Qur‟anic text. This 
engagement differs slightly from the other works published in the 1990s, when scholars were 
more likely to place emphasis on their reading as the reading.  
 
From the late 1990s and onwards, scholars offered a more nuanced approach to interpretations of 
the Qur‟an in particular, and to textual hermeneutics more broadly. Though ethical ideals such as 
gender justice and social equality remained paramount, the writings of these scholar-activists 
both challenged and questioned the underlying egalitarianism of the Qur‟an itself. Most will 
agree that the Qur‟an contains some significant egalitarian teachings; however, this does not 
mean that the Qur‟anic text per se brings about equality and preaches equality in contemporary 
terms. Thus, much scholarship tended to include a critique of earlier scholarly writings, 
particularly related to the latter‟s more apologetic approach to Qur‟anic text and contending that 
the sole problem is with the misogynist interpretive tradition.  
 
Some scholars, such as Kecia Ali (2006) and Sa‟diyya Shaikh (2007), note the ambivalences and 
potential contradictions embedded within the Qur‟anic text. In addition, the various ways in 
which individuals approach the text, for instance with individual levels of human critical 
awareness, self-reflexivity, attentiveness to positionality, etc., are stressed as a key factor that 
intricately relates to the possible religious meanings that can be produced in interaction with the 
religious canon. Furthermore, the question has been asked whether we can overlook or discard 
certain passages or verses that, depending on the reader, can convey unjust meanings that will 
transcend the world of the text and be implemented in society in very real ways. Scholars like 
Amina Wadud (2006) and Khaled Abou El Fadl (2001) have presented some very creative 
responses on how to contest unjust meanings embedded in religious texts, which I discuss in 
more detail in the next section. Esack argues that: 
 
I believe that it is justified to utilize a host of hermeneutical devices ranging from 
contextualization and reinterpretation to abrogation in order to arrive at an interpretation 













text and textual legitimization of violence against real people, then I would be 
comfortable to plead guilty in the former. (2001:191-192) 
 
Examples of scholars who engage with the ambiguity and ambivalences implicit in the Qur‟an 
and the potential influences that patriarchal readings can have on women‟s experiences are Kecia 
Ali (2006), Farid Esack (2001), Laury Silvers (2007), Amina Wadud (2006) and Sa‟diyya Shaikh 
(2007). It is interesting to note the shift that has taken place in Amina Wadud‟s scholarly 
approach by which her previous assertion regarding the gender egalitarian basis of the Qur‟an is 
moderated through her acknowledgment of potentially harmful verses that necessitate a more 
active engagement with the text.  
 
Thus far I have dealt with various approaches to the Qur‟an as a source of liberation and as a 
catalyst in the quest for gender justice. However, the Islamic feminist discourse also incorporates 
other important sources of engagement. The hadith literature has undergone close scrutiny by 
scholars like Fatima Mernissi (1991), Khaled Abou El Fadl (2001) and Sa‟diyya Shaikh (2004). 
While some scholars historicise and contextualise the existing authoritative ahadith, others 
challenge and question the authenticity of particular ahadith and offer counter-narratives that 
form the backdrop for more expedient narratives in the pursuit of gender justice.  
 
Islamic law, the Shari‟a (revealed law), as well as the fiqh tradition (Islamic jurisprudence), are 
increasingly becoming major areas of examination with regard to gender rights. The underlying 
philosophical assumptions embedded in Islamic jurisprudence particularly regarding women‟s 
ontology and sexuality are critically examined in order to make way for the construction of a 
new gender-egalitarian jurisprudence. Examples of scholars who have undertaken the enormous 
task of re-interpreting the law in favour of more gender-sensitive understandings are Ziba Mir-
Hosseini (2007a and b, 2006, and 2003), Kecia Ali (2006 and 2003), and Azizah al-Hibri (2000).   
 
The emphasis on questioning and re-reading the Islamic textual canon as a medium for 
promoting gender justice is a highly fertile endeavour. However, there are also other strategies 
that can illustrate the richness of religious expressions and contribute to the decentralisation of 
male scriptural history and dominance. The inclusion of women‟s lived Islam as a source of 













and connecting with the sacred, is an important dimension of rethinking tradition. The 
privileging of the textual corpus as the principal source of religious knowledge and consequently 
largely ignoring the influence of oral and experiential Islamic discourses on women‟s identities 
is dealt with by Leila Ahmed (2000). Other scholars that engage in the production of empirical 
studies and analysis in order to highlight women‟s lived Islam in a South African context are 
Sa‟diyya Shaikh (1996 and 2007), Sindre Bangstad (2007, 2004a and 2004b), and Abdul Kayum 
Ahmed (2003).  
 
The scholarly initiatives presented above incorporate a host of methodological, strategic and 
activist approaches that nurture the development of an Islamic feminist discourse. The main 
commonality that can be derived from these scholarly initiatives is that Muslim women‟s 
experiences and subjectivities are seen as an essential part of knowledge production. The Islamic 
feminist discourse can as such be seen as a movement that places women‟s understandings and 
realities on the agenda. In the book Windows of Faith (2000), Gisela Webb refers to this type of 
scholarly engagement as “scholarship activism.”  
 
In the next section I present a selected review of central theoretical debates and key concepts that 
are conveyed through an Islamic feminist discourse. This is done through presenting selected 
work of particular scholars that largely contributes to the production of an Islamic feminist 
discourse. Particular attention is paid to analytical practice, application of key concepts and 
broader hermeneutical strategies that in various ways provide socially relevant responses and 













2.2  Engaging with Islamic Feminism/s:  Key Analytical Concepts and 
Debates  
 
Mohammed Arkoun, one of the foremost influential contemporary scholars within the field of 
Islamic studies, has developed an analytical strategy that he calls a “progressive-regressive 
method” (2002:218). In essence, this method elaborates on the valuable knowledge attained by 
reverting to the past (regressive method) in order to understand the historical underpinnings of 
particular discourses and epistemologies that paved the way for various genealogies of the 
sacred. The creative engagements with the past can be used in the present to break away from 
current monolithic constructions of meaning-making and develop more flexible ways of dealing 
with contemporary issues. The progressive-regressive method can be seen as one of the ways in 
which an Islamic feminist hermeneutics operates. An Islamic feminist hermeneutics is critical of 
rigid ideological constructions and often combs the historical legacy to open up multivocal and 
alternative strategies.  
 
The re-reading and contextualisation of core texts and interpretations that guide Muslim thought 
and practice are important hermeneutical strategies in order to understand various subject 
positions of the past that still shape the present. Islamic feminist hermeneutics interrogates male 
interpretations of Islamic texts – particularly those focusing on gender power relations – that 
have been used to justify male superiority.  
 
Furthermore, many Islamic feminist scholars often make a distinction between universal or 
eternal teachings/commands and teachings/commands that are understood to be subject to a 
particular historical context. The texts espousing clear historical specificity are questioned as to 
their validity for contemporary societies. Islamic feminist hermeneutics also deals with 
foregrounding Islamic texts that address notions of equality and reciprocity between women and 
men, thereby challenging misrepresentations of women as inferior beings. Texts that specifically 
point to inherent differences between women and men, and foster understandings of gender 
hierarchy, are deconstructed and measured against broader Qur‟anic principles of justice 
(Badran, 2006 and 2002). The aim of Islamic feminist hermeneutics is thus to develop and 













The work of the following scholars illustrates central debates within an Islamic feminist 
discourse. Contentious issues, particularly related to constructions of sex/uality, complexities in 
dealing with authoritative sources, and the importance of lived experiences will be highlighted.  
 
2.2.1  Amina Wadud and Gender Jihad 
African-American Muslim theologian, Professor Amina Wadud, has devoted her scholarly life to 
the reading of the Qur‟an. Her „gender-jihad‟ was inspired by the commitment to recuperate the 
egalitarian spirit of the Qur‟an.
27
 In her book Qur‟an and Woman (1999), she explores the 
various constructions of gender and gender-relationships found in the Qur‟an. She arrives at the 
conclusion that the Qur‟an is the primary source of gender equality but that the problem lies with 
traditional tafasir (interpretations of the Qur‟an), which were historically exclusively a male 
privilege. Including women‟s perspectives and experiences in the process of interpretation is 
crucial in order to challenge androcentric interpretations and forms part of Professor Wadud‟s 
gender-jihad.  
 
Amina Wadud utilises a holistic approach when engaging with Qur‟anic meaning. She 
incorporates classical Islamic methodologies, a greater emphasis on the context of Qur‟anic 
revelation and the broader moral guidelines outlined in the Qur‟an, as well as the grammatical 
and semantic composition of the text. In attempting to develop a more gender-inclusive 
interpretation of the Qur‟an, the underlying questions driving Wadud‟s book Qur‟an and Woman 
are: “what the Qur‟an says, how it says it, what is said about the Qur‟an, and who is doing the 
saying…[as well as]…what is left unsaid: the ellipses and silences” (1999:xiii).  
 
In her critically astute study, Wadud also stresses the importance of self-reflexivity. Hence, the 
various ways in which the subject interacts with the text, the experience of the text, as well as the 
understanding of the text are all influenced by a range of different subject positions and are 
contingent on each reader‟s social reality. For this reason, Wadud points out that one must be 
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attentive to the impact of a reader‟s prior text, i.e. that the socio-cultural imprinting carried by 
each reader influences how one may understand a text. No interpretation occurs in a historical 
vacuum where the reader is removed from social and political realities.  
 
In Inside the Gender Jihad (2006), Wadud continues her journey to demonstrate that Islam 
embraces principles of gender-justice. However, she moves slightly away from her previous 
assertion that the Qur‟an advocates gender equality. Wadud explains: “Personally, I have come 
to places where how the text says what it says is just plain inadequate or unacceptable, however 
much interpretation is enacted upon it” (2006:192). 
 
Wadud argues that the re-reading of the Qur‟an from a woman‟s perspective is not enough to 
adequately challenge patriarchal structures embedded within various societies that negatively 
impact upon the lives and experiences of Muslim women (2006:188). In a chapter on the 
interpretive possibilities of the Qur‟an, she critically engages with one of the verses in the Qur‟an 
that has caused a lot of debate and controversy among classical Muslim scholars and 
contemporary Islamic feminists. Verse 4:34 can be, and has been, understood to condone the 
physical chastisement of wives by their husband. It reads: 
 
Husbands should take full care of their wives, with [the bounties] God has given to some 
more than others and with what they spend out of their own money. Righteous wives are 
devout and guard what God would have them guard in their husband‟s absence. If you 
fear high-handedness [nushuz] from your wives, remind them [of the teachings of God], 
then ignore them when you go to bed, then hit them. If they obey you, you have no right 
to act against them: God is most high and great. (Haleem, 2004) 
 
Amina Wadud has suggested, with regard to this particular verse, that it is possible to say “no” to 
its literal application. Firstly, she supports her argument through illustrating various forms of 
“textual intervention” that can be, and have been, employed to restrict the potential violence that 
this verse seems to suggest (2006:192). Wadud argues that some of the pre-modern scholars of 
Islam opened up a range of ways to interpret away the possibility for violence seemingly 
condoned by this verse. For example, some classical jurists specified that if a husband needed to 
strike his wife (seen as the last resort in the three-step conflict resolution outlined in verse 4:34), 
he should do this without hurting her or causing her any injury. Other jurists suggested that 












Yet others advocated that it is better not to hit women and interpreted the sanctioning of violence 
against women in purely symbolic terms.
28
 Consequently, Wadud shows that her more recent 
assertion of saying “no” to this particular verse in contemporary exegetical projects in fact 
follows a long tradition of scholarship that has provided interpretive responses that mitigate and 
indeed restrict some of the potential violence legitimised by verse 4:34. Thus, the possibility of 
saying “no” to a particular verse in contemporary societies is not different from some of the 
interpretive approaches exercised by classical exegetes (2006:192).    
 
Secondly, Wadud states that a Muslim‟s responsibility to act as a moral agent, khalifah, is 
intrinsically linked to the ways in which she/he engages in interpretations and the application of 
textual commands. This argument is also mirrored in the work of another contemporary scholar, 
Khaled Abou El Fadl. In his book Speaking in God‟s name (2001), he also opens up for critical 
interaction and intervention with a text. He uses the concept of a „conscientious-pause‟ to refer to 
moments where a Muslim feels the “unsettling or disturbing of the conscience” when engaging 
with normative traditions. In dealing with misogynist ahadith, e.g. ahadith regarding a wife‟s 
sexual availability and complete obedience to her husband even if he is in the wrong, and 
ahadith portraying women as inferior to men in reason and faith, Abou El Fadl argues that:  
 
…if a Muslim‟s conscience is disturbed, the least that would be theologically expected 
from thinking beings who carry the burden of free will, accountability and God‟s trust, is 
to take a reflective pause, and ask: to what extent did the Prophet really play a role in the 
authorial enterprise that produced this tradition? Can I, consistently with my faith and 
understanding of God and God‟s message, believe that God‟s Prophet is primarily 
responsible for this tradition? (2001:213)  
 
Hence, the human ability to reflect, challenge and ask questions when engaging with ahadith is 
deemed absolutely essential in relation to the human quest for religious meaning. The possibility 
of saying “no” to a religious text or to take a „conscientious-pause‟ advocates the unassailable 
connection between human critical awareness and our interaction with a religious canon.  
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Wadud engages with the textual core of Islam to reform attitudes towards Muslim women, as 
well as advocating the inclusion of Muslim women‟s experiences to transform patriarchal 
understandings of human nature in Islam. She embraces the ideal of being God‟s khalifah, a title 
that reflects divinely delegated moral agency given all humans, which further entail the human 
responsibility to act in accordance with the Qur‟anic principles of justice and equality. According 
to Wadud, “One cannot stand on the sidelines in the face of injustice and still be recognized as 
fully Muslim, fully khalifah” (1999:xix).  
 
In the empirical component of this dissertation I focus specifically on the ways in which the 
Islamic feminist notion of being khalifah might engage with some of the realities that define 
South African Muslim women‟s intimate relationships.  
 
2.2.2   Asma Barlas and Egalitarian Qur‟anic Ethics 
Asma Barlas, another Muslim scholar committed to the recuperation of gender justice in Islam, 
looks at the broader gender politics in the Qur‟an. In her book Believing Women in Islam 
(2002:1) she starts her enquiry by positing two key questions: “does Islam‟s Scripture, the 
Qur‟an, teach or condone sexual inequality or oppression? ... Does the Qur‟an permit and 
encourage liberation for women?” Barlas presents her reading of the central hermeneutical 
principles of the Qur‟an, and through these various interpretive strategies she focuses specifically 
on a liberatory reading of the Qur‟an to answer the questions outlined above (13-21).  
 
Barlas contests the patriarchal interpretations of the Qur‟an, and aims at promoting an ethical 
awareness required by both men and women that reflects the Qur‟anic principles of justice and 
equality (2-3). In line with this, Barlas advocates gender-sensitive readings of the Qur‟an that 
promote ijtihad (independent investigation of religious sources). While her interpretive strategies 
and methodologies resonate with the approaches employed by Riffat Hassan (1990) and Amina 
Wadud (1999), she further develops and refines these approaches. By focusing on particular 
ethical principles in the Qur‟an, Barlas argues that the singular criterion for distinguishing 













Of particular interest is Barlas‟s investigation and systematic analysis of gender, sexuality, and 
morality in the Qur‟an. She argues that the ways in which the Qur‟an depicts sex/uality, renders 
both men and women equally „sexualized‟. Thus, she advocates the idea of a „sexual sameness‟ 
as a key concept to promote an egalitarian reading of the Qur‟an, as well as to refute the 
derogatory ways in which women‟s natures have been understood (152). Barlas challenges the 
traditional exegetical construction of gender binaries and hierarchy in which women‟s sexuality 
is seen as „dangerous‟ and needs to be controlled. By elucidating the egalitarian underpinnings of 
a Qur‟anic sexual ethos, Barlas contests conservative views that proclaim women‟s bodies as 
both awrah and sources of fitna.
29
      
 
Barlas also argues in relation to the Qur‟anic prescription of bodily modesty, that the Qur‟an 
understands the body for men and women alike as fundamentally erotic. Subsequently, the 
implementation of a modesty ideal does not mean that the Qur‟an “de-eroticizes or de-sexualizes 
the body” (159). Rather, the Qur‟an introduces the principle of modesty to regulate sexual 
desires, hence establishing a mode of correct behaviour. From this analysis the Qur‟an does not 
measure the body in relation to pure/impure dualities but in terms of decency and dignified 
behaviour (159). The Qur‟an encourages sexual activity, not only as a means of procreation, but 
as a pleasant and enjoyable encounter between men and women within the boundaries of a 
religiously sanctioned union. Barlas argues that the moral-social principles of sexual sameness, 
sexual modesty, and the insistence of sexual morality for both men and women, embedded 
within the Qur‟an, are compatible with feminist commitments of gender equality.  
 
Barlas‟s book, Believing Women in Islam (2002) opens up for alternative understandings of 
embodiment, sexuality and gender in Islam. In the empirical component of this study I 
investigate the ways in which South African Muslim women understand Islamic views on 
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 Awrah – lit. nakedness, referring to aspects of the self that should be publicly concealed. It includes a range of 
referents from the „genitals‟ or „pudendum‟ for men and women alike in some perspectives; to women‟s hands, face, 
and voice in the view of others.  
Fitna – lit. „temptation,‟ „trial‟; commonly used to indicate chaos. Fatima Mernissi (2003) also suggests that fitna 













sex/uality, ethics of sexual behaviour, and broader understandings of being a gendered and 
sexual human being.    
 
2.2.3   Fatima Mernissi and Women‟s History 
Moroccan sociologist Fatima Mernissi is particularly interested in challenging the authenticity of 
authoritative ahadith that support rigid constructions of gender roles. In her book The Veil and 
the Male Elite (1991), she utilises traditional ways of authenticating ahadith to delegitimise 
ahadith that claim to be sahih (sound, authentic). She applies critical methods developed in the 
„science of hadith‟ by pioneers such as al-Bukhari (b. 810CE) and Imam Malik Ibn Anas (b. 8
th
 
century CE) in her deconstructive project (1991:42-61).Through her critical engagement with 
ahadith, Mernissi unveils the various constellations of power that were at play at the time of the 
Prophet to illuminate the impact of context on the production of ahadith. In so doing, she renders 
hadith a site for the contestation of power, to be creatively engaged within contemporary 
contexts.    
 
In The Forgotten Queens of Islam (1993), Mernissi presents examples of women that historically 
held important political positions in countries like Turkey, Mongolia and Indonesia. These 
women represent counter-narratives in the myriad of recorded androcentric leadership-narratives 
in the history of Islam. She argues that the lack of narratives recording women that held powerful 
political positions reflects the biased documentation of history in the hands of patriarchy 
(1993:110-111). 
 
Mernissi‟s scholarship offers contemporary Muslim women powerful female role models that 
can influence alternative modes of feminisms. Through the representation of women‟s 
marginalised history in Islam, Mernissi challenges assumptions of religiously sanctioned societal 
gender roles and norms and attempts to resuscitate the lost gender egalitarian spirit of Islam.  
 
In Mernissi‟s earlier work she is critical of traditional constructions of male-female sexuality. In 
Beyond the Veil, Male-Female Dynamics in Muslim Society (2003:8), first published in 1975, she 
argues that sexual inequality is a prominent feature of both Western and Islamic societies. As 













due to the influence of dominant Christian dogmas, Mernissi claims that Islam is a religion in 
which sex is encouraged, and the spiritual value of sex is seen as an important part of human 
existence. Nonetheless, despite this view many prominent Muslim male scholars have presented 
women‟s sexuality as a “symbol of disorder” (44). Mernissi asserts that this patriarchal position 
on female sexuality (as dangerous) is reflected in various established social practices, like 
polygyny and a husband‟s easy access to divorce, that were largely aimed at regulating women‟s 
sexuality (46-50). Although these practices are contested in a range of ways, and the exercise of 
these male „rights‟ are contingent upon various factors, the social currency of classical views on 
sexuality has led to acceptance of pejorative gendered power relations.  
 
In Women‟s Rebellion and Islamic Memory (1996), Mernissi continues to investigate 
understandings of women‟s sexuality, and women‟s ownership over their own bodies in relation 
to conceptions of virginity (and the emergence of the surgical replacement of the hymen), family 
planning, and family honour. Mernissi argues that within dominant Muslim discourses “the 
concepts of honour and virginity locate the prestige of a man between the legs of a woman” (34). 
Thus, the levels of a woman‟s pure and controlled sexuality can be seen as the yardstick by 
which male status is measured. Mernissi also refers to the sexual division of labour as a crucial 
component of the woman‟s role “as a sexual agent and man as provider…” (69). The social 
construction of gender roles, while believed to be divinely ordained, reflects particular skewed 
male assumptions about the nature of women.  
 
Mernissi‟s scholarship is important in relation to the exploration of Muslim women‟s 
subjectivities and their understandings of sex/uality and „ascribed‟ gender roles. Muslim 
women‟s understandings of Islamic perspectives on sexuality and sexual culture are important 
sources of knowledge that speak to the ways in which relations of power are mediated. The 
empirical component in this dissertation highlights these aspects and explores the ways in which 














2.2.4   Ziba Mir-Hosseini and Islamic Jurisprudence 
Ziba Mir-Hosseini, an Iranian Islamic feminist scholar, investigates gender rights as outlined in 
classical fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). She explores the underlying philosophical assumptions and 
patriarchal epistemologies embedded in the fiqh canon that espouse particular conceptualisations 
of women‟s sexuality. Mir-Hosseini stresses the importance of developing a new egalitarian 
jurisprudence that is based on the principles of justice and equality embedded within the Shari‟a 
(revealed law). 
 
In her article “Classical Fiqh, Contemporary Ethics and Gender Justice” (2007b), Mir-Hosseini 
explores the legal rulings in relation to marriage and hijab.
30
 I concentrate on her analysis of the 
underlying philosophical underpinnings related to the legal rulings on marriage to show how the 
jurists rationalised particular views on women‟s sexuality. Mir-Hosseini explains that the 
principal idea of “ownership and sale” is central to the jurists‟ understandings of marital 
relationships (2007b:7). Many Islamic feminist scholars have argued that slavery and 
concubinage arrangements chiefly influenced classical jurists‟ conceptualisations of women‟s 
sexuality, marital relations and relations between the sexes more broadly.
31
 Within the fiqh 
literature, mimicking the principles of ownership and sale, women‟s sexuality became an article 
for sale in which mahr (dower) is the price to be paid for a woman‟s expected sexual favours. 
Consequently, men are in control over, and own, women‟s sexuality. Mir-Hosseini argues that it 
is this logic that further guides broader marital dynamics within the classical fiqh works (7).  
 
In addition, Mir-Hosseini argues that the central gender assumptions underlying this “marriage 
of dominion” are the following: “women are created of and for men, God made men superior to 
women, [and] women are defective in reason and faith” (13). These clearly patriarchal 
assumptions have been dealt with by numerous other feminist scholars who embrace principles 
of equality and justice, and who include in their scholarship various hermeneutical principles to 
delegitimise these misogynistic assumptions.
32
 Mir-Hosseini argues that despite absolutely no 
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 See also Mir-Hosseini, “Islam and Gender Justice”, 2007a (in Voices of Islam, edited by Vincent Cornell and 
Omid Safi) for a more elaborate discussion around gender inequalities embedded within the fiqh canon. 
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 See for example, Leila Ahmed (1992) and Kecia Ali (2006 and 2003). 
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Qur‟anic material that enshrines these phallocentric perspectives, the classical jurists embraced 
these assumptions in ways that elevated men as the sole sacrosanct custodians of God‟s 
intentions and God‟s will. And, as Mir-Hosseini argues “they [these assumptions] became the 
main implicit theological assumptions determining how jurists discerned legal rules from the 
sacred texts” (13).  
 
The nature of woman‟s sexuality, and how a woman‟s sexuality differed from man‟s sexuality, 
was also widely debated by the classical jurists. The understandings deriving from these 
discussions further justified women‟s inferiority, and consequently, a woman‟s duty to obey the 
superior species – man. Mir-Hosseini argues that women‟s subjugation was a natural 
consequence of the belief that “God gave women greater sexual desire than men” (13). The 
necessity of taming and thus controlling women‟s sexuality became concomitant with the 
sustenance of Islamic society. In fact, she illustrates how classical jurists‟ arguments were 
underpinned by the view that a woman‟s obedience to her husband is not only emblematic of the 
power relations in the domestic sphere, but is an important signifier of the harmonised sacred 
balance of the universe. This implies that women must embrace their predetermined role as 
passive and subservient members of the Muslim community. If women rebel against this 
sacrosanct feminine ideal, the Islamic world order will be in danger, and disorder will triumph. 
 
The rulings on marital law are informed by these particular phallocentric interpretations of the 
Shari‟a view on women‟s sexuality and constructions of gender more broadly. Thus, fiqh rulings, 
through claiming support from sacrosanct sources, justify a divinely sanctioned patriarchy. 
However, as mentioned above, Mir-Hosseini argues that these conceptualisations of women‟s 
sexuality do not correlate with a Qur‟anic ethos. Her methodological approach to fiqh is based on 
challenging the patriarchal bias of fiqh through unveiling the egalitarian nature of Shari‟a as it 
incorporates the “spirit of the Qur‟anic revelations” (4). In her work, Mir-Hosseini makes a clear 
distinction between Shari‟a and fiqh. She claims that Shari‟a is the revealed law that is reflected 
in the Qur‟an, whereas fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) is human interpretation of these divinely 













with Shari‟a. Consequently, fiqh, which is a result of human fallible understandings of Qur‟an 




So what is the way forward? Firstly, Mir-Hosseini suggests that the emerging “Feminist voices 
in Islam herald the coming of an egalitarian legal paradigm that is still in the making” (16). The 
emergence of gender-sensitive readings of divine scripture, the critique of Islamic jurisprudence 
and the inclusion of Muslim women‟s narratives reflect a challenge towards the unsatisfying 
status quo. These initiatives can contribute to a paradigm shift within the legal tradition. Mir-
Hosseini‟s valuable contributions to Islamic scholarship in Iran have made transparent some of 
the various ways in which women actively and creatively confront religious authoritative courts 
in matters of divorce as well as in husbands‟ failings to fulfil marital obligations (see Mir-
Hosseini, 2000, 1999, 1996a, 1996b, 1994). By including women‟s lived experiences and 
realities as a basis for her endeavour, Mir-Hossini has paved the way for establishing the Islamic 
feminist discourse as a salient force in the Iranian context. 
 
The new paradigm shift, advocated by Mir-Hosseini, should incorporate the egalitarian ethics 
embedded in Shari‟a in ways that speak to Muslim women‟s realities in contemporary societies. 
Mir-Hosseini argues that “when social reality changes, then social practice will effect a change 
in the law” (2007b:16). The influence of Islamic feminism in women‟s realities, for instance in 
Iran, brings about new, arguably more egalitarian ways of engaging with the Islamic textual 
legacy. This will influence the current articulations of Islamic jurisprudence and bring about a 
more gender-sensitive legal discourse.  
 
Of particular interest to the empirical component of this study are the ways in which South 
African Muslim women speak about sexual dynamics and the various relations of power that 
might inform their sexual relationships.   
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2.2.5  Kecia Ali and Laury Silvers: Questioning the Egalitarian Nature of the Qur‟an  
Kecia Ali has also explored the roots of Islamic jurisprudence, especially related to marriage and 
divorce law. In Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender and Pluralism (2003), her chapter on 
“Progressive Muslims and Islamic Jurisprudence” elucidates the crucial aspect of a critical 
engagement with Islamic jurisprudence and also the need for a contextual understanding of 
current and past interpretations. Ali argues that our contemporary context is in need of a new 
jurisprudence (2003:166). The patriarchal bias underlying the Islamic laws of marriage and 
divorce must be rejected altogether to make way for a jurisprudence based on justice. She 
explains that a new judicial discourse cannot be developed through a patchwork methodology, in 
essence, applying “acceptable rules from different schools”, nor can it be developed by solely 
elucidating on the divine scripture (166).  
 
Ali critiques scholars like Riffat Hassan, Asma Barlas, and Amina Wadud for their exclusive 
focus on a Qur‟anic gender-sensitive re-interpretation. Ali argues that the Qur‟an, as a single 
authoritative scripture, does not “provide explicit regulations covering all possible 
circumstances” (2003:181-182). In this context, this means that the fight for egalitarianism and 
gender justice cannot be based solely on the Qur‟an. Islamic jurisprudence constitutes one 
important corpus of text that must be critically engaged with by Islamic feminists in order to 
achieve human equality.  
 
In her latest book Sexual Ethics & Islam (2006), Kecia Ali engages with Qur‟an, hadith and 
jurisprudence when exploring conceptions of various sexual expressions related to gender power 
relations. She writes that “an egalitarian sexual ethics cannot be constructed through 
pastiche…We need, instead, a serious consideration of what makes sex lawful in the sight of 
God” (2006:151). As such, Ali continues her critique concerning the patchwork methodology, 
and as an alternative solution emphasises the importance of holistic hermeneutics.  
 
Ali echoes arguments raised by Leila Ahmed (1992) and Ziba Mir-Hosseini (2007b) regarding 
the influence of slavery and concubinage as key components in the ways that medieval jurists 
conceptualised women‟s sexuality and the nature of sexuality more broadly. She argues that the 













to a significant number of Muslims” (2006:xvi-xvii). The continuing validations of certain sexual 
mores, through various understandings of Islamic scriptures, have detrimental consequences for 
Muslim women. As a matter of fact, Ali argues, sexual ethics based on principles of justice is a 
priori unattainable if one engages with the ways in which Muslim scholars conceptualised 
sexuality in the legal canon (151).   
 
Consequently, Ali asks the question: “If I do not accept the sole interpretive authority of the 
juristic and exegetical heritage – which is strongly patriarchal and sometimes misogynist – why 
not bypass it entirely, and turn to the Qur‟an alone as a guide?” (xix-xx). However, Ali 
recognises the importance of the Muslim scholarly contributions, especially in relation to the 
standards of their methodological meticulousness, the recognition of a range of – sometimes 
conflicting – views, and, most importantly, the ways in which their assumptions directly 
influence today‟s ethical environment (xx). This latter point is salient as it speaks to the various 
ways in which contemporary Muslim women are informed by particular Islamic discourses (of 
the past) within which suppositions regarding sexual natures and marital sexual dynamics are 
pronounced. Arguably, these discourses contribute to the formation of particular subjectivities 
and ways of embodying a lived reality in contemporary contexts. Hence, Ali continues her 
insistence on the inclusion of several scriptural sources that must be engaged with in order to 
debate and inspire developments of new discourses around ethics, and especially, a just ethics of 
sexuality.  
 
Many feminist scholars of Islam, e.g. Asma Barlas, foreground the egalitarian basis of revelation. 
Kecia Ali distinguishes herself more radically from this view by subtly suggesting that the 
Qur‟an is not only egalitarian. Through her detailed engagement with slave concubinage (“what 
your right hand possesses”), Ali posits the question: “where is God‟s justice in permitting slavery 
in the first place, if slavery constituted an injustice and wrong in the seventh century, just as it 
would and does in the twenty-first century?” (2006:54). If the core foundational principles in the 
Qur‟an are justice and equality, divinely justified slavery and slave concubinage present us with 
axiomatic conflicting ideals. This indicates that there are underlying meaning systems in the 
Qur‟an that potentially reiterate a hierarchical echelon between human beings, given the 













as human beings, then the fact that they were not individuals in their own right but were always 
bound within a relationship of power where they were owned by another human being, might 
justifiably be understood to be an injustice condoned by the Qur‟an.  
 
Ali further argues that “if it [slavery] did not constitute an injustice and a wrong in the seventh 
century in God‟s eyes, then on what basis may anyone subsequently declare it unjust without 
rendering divine justice subordinate to the vagaries of human, and therefore inherently flawed, 
moral sensibilities?” (54). Ali‟s question reflects that any form of human apologetic reasoning 
for why slavery is unjust and thus must be outlawed, is, according to the superiority of the divine 
intent, equal to acting against the will of God. If God understood slavery to be just, then we, as 
human beings, cannot transgress the power of the divine will. According to Islamic sources, God 
is omnipotent as well as omniscient. This implies that all meanings conveyed through human 
interactions with the divine text are intended by God. However, the ontological nature of human 
beings, and the embedded assumption that they act as God‟s khalifas on earth, presents moral 
dilemmas that have to do with the nature of free will. This suggests that even though the Qur‟an, 
and as such, divine will, present to us various articulations that potentially can convey unjust 
meanings, the nature of free will leaves the decision of whether or not to act upon these 
articulations up to us. The plethora of meanings subtly embedded within the Qur‟an itself leaves 
the responsibility of moral decision-making to human beings who are, by nature, morally fallible. 
This also implies that not all meanings potentially conveyed in the interaction with the Qur‟an 
are equally just, or equally good.  
 
Laury Silvers‟s unpublished paper “In the Book We have left out Nothing” (2007) deals with the 
complexities and difficulties confronting believing women when having to deal with the 
existence of verse 4:34.
34
 Silvers engages with the nature of free will and human responsibility in 
light of the possible interpretations and understandings of this verse. The fact that this verse can 
legitimise wife-battery raises questions with regard to gendered power relations and (divinely) 
constructed gender roles. Given that the Prophet is understood to be the ultimate source and 
purveyor of Qur‟anic ethics, Silvers argues that “because the Prophet rejected violence against 
women, we would be justified in accepting the reading of non-violent separation as that which 
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was intended by God and be done with it” (2007:2). Nonetheless, the verse exists, which means 
that all possible meanings are intended by God.   
 
Consequently, Silvers engages in an ethical analysis where she employs traditional theological 
methodologies to shed some light on the purpose of this particular revelation. Drawing 
extensively on the work of Ibn al-„Arabi (d. 1240), she argues that although all potential 
meanings are intended by God, “the purpose of the existence of the verse would be to remind 
human beings of the extraordinary burden of freedom” (2007:3). Thus, if we did not have a 
plethora of possible understandings at hand, we would not be able to exercise our responsibility 
as khalifah, moral agents, and challenge our own ethical consciousness when making challenging 
decisions. 
  
In line with Kecia Ali‟s arguments regarding moral decision-making and the possibility for 
unjust or unethical understandings (and applications) of divine text, Silvers argues that although 
the text can be used to legitimise abuse towards women, this does not imply that we should 
prefer this understanding. She includes El Fadl‟s „conscientious-pause‟ and Wadud‟s „saying no‟ 
as possible methodological options when dealing with difficult verses in the Qur‟an. The human 
ethical responsibilities that came with the acceptance of God‟s „Trust‟ and consequently our 
primary function as God‟s khalifah, requires critical awareness when engaging with the Qur‟an. 
Our responsibility as khalifah means that we have the right to say “no” to Qur‟anic verses and to 
critically engage with various religious meanings that make us uncomfortable. Thus, one can 
argue that the Qur‟an conveys a variety of meanings, ranging from the most morally flawed to 
ethical perfection, patriarchal expressions as well as egalitarian constructions; nevertheless, 
depending on the moral capacity or the ethical lenses through which the human subject interacts 
with the divine, these meanings become realised in various human interactions reflecting justice 
as well as injustices.   
 
Silvers explicates the distress that the Prophet reportedly experienced when he received the 
revelation of verse 4:34. According to classical sources, the Prophet never acted out the 













wanted one thing, I wanted something else” (2007:11).
35
 Thus, if we follow the Prophet‟s 
example we must accept the existence of verse 4:34, however, we can choose not to act upon this 
divinely given permission. Silvers argues that “the purpose of its [Q4:34] existence is to inspire 
the crisis of conscience that would lead us to prohibit beating” (2007:12). In conclusion, we 
cannot change what is revealed, nevertheless, our human responsibility to be fully khalifah 
compels us to speak up against societal injustices, emulate the example of the Prophet, utilise the 
methodologies applied by classical scholars, who largely subverted the meaning of „beat‟, in 
support of our decision not to act upon the permission given in verse 4:34, and apply our 
consciousness in ways that correlate with broader Qur‟anic ethical principles and moral 
guidance.  
 
The discussion above indicates alternative ways of social engagement with divine text that 
elucidate our capacity as thinking and responsible human beings. In the empirical component of 
this study I investigate the ways in which South African Muslim women can suffer from unjust 
understandings of divine text that bear direct relevance on their lived realities. I explore the 
respondents‟ understandings of moral responsibility and the ways in which they contest, mitigate 
and subvert unjust meanings that are rooted in religious scriptures and employed in lived reality.  
 
2.2.6  Sa‟diyya Shaikh and “tafsir of praxis” 
South African scholar Sa‟diyya Shaikh foregrounds Muslim women‟s experiences in order to 
make sense of Islamic ethics, as well as the human responsibility and obligation to act as moral 
agents (khalifah). She is also deeply committed to the recovery of the full humanity of women 
and conducts empirical research in order to enshrine women‟s polymorphous narratives in ways 
that specifically inform discourses on gender relations and sexuality. Shaikh advocates a theory 
of gender-justice, which she understands to be inherently intrinsic to Islam. In her article 
“Knowledge, Women and Gender in the Hadith: a Feminist Interpretation” (2004), she employs 
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 Although most classical scholars agree as to the Prophet‟s treatment of his wives, asserting that he never beat his 
wives prior to nor after the revelation of this verse, it is reported in Muslim that the Prophet slapped or pushed his 
favourite wife Aisha due to her behaviour (spying on him) while he was with one of his other wives (Silvers, 
2007:9-10). This incident was reported to have taken place before the revelation of Q4:34, and can hence be seen as 













feminist hermeneutics to critique traditional views that espouse divisions between body and 
mind. She examines the ways in which these understandings have associated men with 
rationality and spirituality while linking women‟s natures with the sphere of sexuality and 
emotions. By stereotyping gender according to this „logic‟, Shaikh argues that the traditional 
understandings of gender explicate a divided human self and dualistic notions of human 
experience. She contests this split between sexuality and spirituality, body and intellect, and 
argues that distorted assumption like these imply that knowledge is man‟s prerogative. As such, 
women, who make up half of the population, are often excluded from the realm of knowledge 
production. Shaikh advocates for the inclusion of Muslim women‟s experiences, realities, and 
understandings into the realm of “authorized knowledge”, to apply Letherby‟s terminology 
(2003), in order to complete human experience.  
 
In her chapter on “Family planning, Contraception and Abortion in Islam: Undertaking 
Khilafah” (2003b), Shaikh investigates the diverse Islamic legal texts on family planning, 
contraception, and abortion. Despite the resistance amongst some traditional ulama (religious 
scholars), she claims that “family planning is in fact a legitimate and Islamic priority” (113). In 
particular Shaikh highlights the importance of women‟s moral agency (khalifah) in decisions 
concerning their sexuality, bodies and fertility management. Shaikh argues that “Family 
planning, including contraceptive usage, may be seen as extension of the human capacity to plan, 
to respond to, and to actively make choices in terms of contextual needs and emerging realities” 
(114). Shaikh interrogates structures of social and economic injustices that restrict women‟s 
khalifah in various contemporary contexts. 
 
In her groundbreaking article “A Tafsir of Praxis: Gender, Marital Violence, and Resistance in a 
South African Muslim Community” (2007), Shaikh presents women‟s experiences as a way of 
engaging the lived meaning and interpretation of Qur‟anic teachings, what she calls an 
“embodied tafsir” or a “tafsir of praxis”. Interviewing Muslim women in South Africa, who have 
all been victims of violent physical abuse, Shaikh takes the application of feminist hermeneutics 
to a new level. The inclusion of women‟s real-life experiences, and their embodied 
understandings related to Qur‟anic revelation and Islamic ethics illuminate and challenge the 













questions about a purely textual approach to gender ethics as represented in much of the 
contemporary Islamic feminist scholarship. Hence, women‟s experiences become the epicentre 
of engagement and reflect a social world of the text as an important site of knowledge 
production. This notion of a „social world of the text‟ means that religious texts have a „life‟ in 
social contexts. Religious texts are being recited and enacted and significantly influence 
women‟s lives to varying degrees. A „social world of the text‟ also includes the manner in which 
women reiterate, perpetuate, contest and challenge texts through their lives. In this way, Shaikh 
challenges traditional as well as contemporary ways of defining and engaging tafsir through 
opening up alternative ways of addressing Islamic ethics in light of women‟s experiential 
realities.  
 
In her most recent article “In Search of al-Insan” (2009), Shaikh presents a mapping of the ideal 
human self as reflected in Sufi discourse, particularly drawing on the works of the 13
th
 century 
mystic Ibn al-Arabi. In her article she foregrounds a gender-inclusive ethical ideal for men and 
women alike and prioritises certain forms of individual characteristics and social interactions. 
Particular individual virtues that should be cultivated and embodied so as to guide and nurture 
interpersonal relationships and social networks are love, compassion and mercy. One of the 
central issues that Shaikh critiques are patriarchal power relationships, which she argues are 
disempowering for men and women alike, both spiritually and in social terms.  
 
In the empirical component of this dissertation, Shaikh‟s notion of a different ethics of 
engagement – within which particular virtues are refined and lived out – is of significance in 
regard to the various ways in which South African Muslim women might draw strength from 
religious ideals of self in empowering ways in order to deal with difficult marital relationships 
and other social conditions.  
 
This chapter has dealt extensively with existing debates in Islamic feminism/s and highlighted 
key concepts. Clearly, Islamic feminists‟ work is both deconstructive and reconstructive. They 
re-read foundational texts and challenge negative representations of women that have been used 
to justify male superiority. They also retrieve marginalised teachings and legacies of power for 













constructs and social injustices, the recent developments in Islamic feminism that suggest textual 
intervention in the form of saying “no” or taking a „conscientious-pause‟ are noteworthy. This 
creative approach allows for alternative interpretive possibilities that are informed by human 
critical awareness when engaging with religious meaning.  
 
The dominant politics of gender and sexuality within the Islamic framework bear witness to 
various patriarchal assumptions guiding sexual behaviour. Androcentric constructions of 
women‟s natures, illustrated by authoritative regulations of female sexuality, undermine 
women‟s sexual autonomy and embodiment of moral agency. The importance of empirical 
research to place women‟s experiences in a more prominent position is salient in order to redress 
Islamic ethics and reinforce discourses that embrace the principle of gender-justice in a social 
reality.  
 
The empirical component of this study is largely framed through the debates outlined above. Of 
particular relevance to my research are the various ways in which relations of power are 
negotiated within sexual relationships. Secondly, the discursive shift from textual engagement to 
the social world of the text is emphasised. I pay particular attention to the various ways in which 
some South African social structures might facilitate or inhibit women‟s agentival capacities and 
also what types of “embodied tafsir” might be reflected in my respondents‟ narratives. Lastly, the 
experiences articulated by Muslim women represent counter-narratives to the dominant 
discourses that prevail in male-privileged social, cultural and political structures. As such, 
contemporary women‟s lived Islam contributes to the recovery of women‟s histories.  
 
In the next chapter of this dissertation I explore empirical studies that have been conducted in a 
South African Muslim context. Of particular interest are studies that highlight gender relations, 
specifically related to sexual relationships and marital dynamics. The research findings that 
emerge from these studies inform the empirical component of my study and assist in delineating 
broader trends within the Muslim community with regard to questions around sexuality and 















Exploring Muslim Women‟s Realities in South Africa: Empirical 
Mapping 
 
This chapter explores a number of empirical studies relating to Muslim women‟s realities and 
experiences in South Africa.
36
 I present some of the main findings emerging from these studies 
as they relate to key issue arising in my own research project. Firstly, I investigate the existence 
of Islamic feminism/s in South Africa in order to illustrate the ways in which some Muslim 
women have actively engaged with local contexts in order to work towards a more gender-
inclusive and egalitarian society. Secondly, I examine research reports focussed on empirical 
data concerning Muslim marital and sexual dynamics within the South African context. These 
studies are intrinsically related to the empirical component of this dissertation in two major 
ways.  
 
Firstly, Na‟eem Jeenah‟s study (2001) outlines the emergence of Islamic feminism/s in South 
Africa. Through his exploration of the development of Islamic feminism/s, Jeenah highlights 
dominant debates and struggles that are particular to the South African Muslim context.  I 
include Jeenah‟s investigation of a few grassroots initiatives to show the ways in which some 
Muslim women have participated in the construction of a South African Islamic feminist 
discourse. The empirical component of this dissertation, within which Muslim women speak 
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 There are very few empirical studies that examine Muslim women‟s experiences in a South African context. The 
scarcity of empirical studies pertaining to this area of research is also emphasised by Na‟eem Jeenah (2001) and 
Sindre Bangstad (2007). Thus, the continuing contribution of empirical research is salient in order to address, 
amongst others, dominant discourses on sexuality that espouse particular hierarchical relations of power, discourses 
that guide broader marital dynamics, the existence of spousal abuse, drug/alcohol abuse, marital infidelity, and the 
influence of HIV/AIDS in Muslim communities. The existing literature on Islam and Muslims in South Africa is 
largely related to the history of Islam in South Africa, Islam and questions of identity in post-apartheid South Africa, 
and reinterpretations of texts embedded within the Islamic canon (e.g. Esack, 2001, 1997 and 1993; Mukadam, 
1990; Vahed, 2000; Tayob, 1999). There are also a number of studies dealing with specific topics within a Muslim 
South African context, such as the development of Muslim Personal Law and Civil rights discourses (Badat, 2000; 













about issues on gender and sexuality as it relates to their lived experiences, is thus situated 
against a broader historical context in which initiatives related to gender justice advocacy have 
been proclaimed. I pay particular attention to the possible resonances between the respondents‟ 
narratives with the varying intersections of gender power relations debated amongst Muslim 
activists and the theoretical constructs proposed by Islamic feminists on issues of morality, ethics 
and agency.  
 
Secondly, I examine some of the results emerging from three empirical studies that focus on 
divorce, polygyny and HIV/AIDS respectively. I have chosen these empirical studies due to the 
fact that they interlink with my own empirical research in a number of ways. In particular, 
women‟s experiential realities are highlighted. The studies presented reflect women‟s actual 
experiences with regard to sexual relationships and marital dynamics more broadly. The studies 
illustrate particular constructions of gender and sexual norms that exist within Muslim 
communities. Moreover, the studies demonstrate the complexities of existent gendered practices 
that can influence women‟s intimate relationships in various ways.  
 
(1) Mogamat Yoesrie Toefy (2001) investigates divorce in the Muslim communities of the 
Western Cape. Of particular interest are his findings concerning the underlying reasons related to 
the instigation of divorce. The empirical data emerging from his findings highlight spousal 
infidelity, drug abuse and spousal abuse as major causes for women seeking divorce. Thus, 
Toefy‟s study indicates particular problematic contextual realities that form part of a South 
African Muslim context.  
 
(2) Sindre Bangstad (2007) explores the occurrences of Muslim polygynous marriages in the 
Cape Flats. Bangstad‟s study examines the various complexities related to the ways in which a 
polygynous union is brought about, and ambiguous discursive trends related to the acceptability 
of polygyny in local communities. I include some of the research findings in Bangstad‟s study in 
order to illustrate some of the existing discourses and contextual factors that contribute to 













(3) Abdul Kayum Ahmed (1999 and 2003) examines the impact of HIV/AIDS on Muslim 
communities in the Western Cape as well as women‟s lived experiences with the disease in Cape 
Town. Among his findings I find particularly alarming the fact that Muslim women in marital 
relationships are increasingly prone to HIV-infection due to spousal infidelity. I explore 
Ahmed‟s research findings as they relate to broader narratives on infidelity in my research 
sample, as well as the lack of preventative measures taken by respondents who are exposed to 
their husband‟s adultery in their marital relationships.  
 
The research findings revealed through these three empirical studies reflect particular existing 
discourses on gender and sexuality that inform Muslim women‟s lives in a number of ways. The 
focus in the empirical component of this dissertation is placed on, amongst other things, 
discourses involving particular religious understandings that can regulate and influence sexual 
and marital relationships. The research findings emerging from the three abovementioned studies 
provide a complex background against which the empirical component of this dissertation can be 
analysed. Before I go on to explore these abovementioned studies in greater detail, I will briefly 
outline the status of Muslim Personal Law (MPL) in South Africa in order to familiarise the 
reader with the local context pertaining to Muslim legal discourses on the family.   
 
3.1   Muslim Personal Law in South Africa 
 
According to Na‟eem Jeenah, “Muslim Personal Law has been a term given to a package of 
provisions within Islamic law (or Shari‟ah) that relate to family law” (2001:37). Thus, rules and 
regulations pertaining to matters of divorce, marital unions, custody of children and inheritance 
are articulated through MPL. MPL was not officially recognised during the apartheid regime in 
South Africa. Consequently, after 1994 the Muslim Personal Law Board (MPLB) was 
established in order to review the possible integration of MPL in light of the new South African 
Constitution of 1996 (Jeenah, 2001:37-38; Bangstad, 2007:57-58).  
 
However, the establishment of the MPLB (dismantled as early as 1995) as well as the subsequent 
committees created in order to develop a South African MPL, have up until today not been 













authorities (Jeenah, 2001:38). This is due to various points of disagreement within Muslim 
communities in South Africa, as well as specific aspects of the proposed MPL that do not 
necessarily correlate with the South African Bill of Rights. In particular, issues related to Muslim 
women‟s rights as well as polygynous marriages have been hotly debated.  
 
Nevertheless, particular aspects regarding Muslim marriages have been recognised, as seen 
through court decisions related to dissolving Muslim marital unions. The infamous case of 
Ryland v Edros, 1997, in which “the contractual consequences” of a Muslim marital contract 
were recognised, was seen as a milestone with regard to the protection of Muslim wives in the 
case of marital dissolution (Rautenbach, 2004:10). Despite this victory, Muslim marriages are 
still not officially recognised by South African Law. Nonetheless, Christa Rautenbach explains 
(1999:15) that “The 1996 Constitution makes provisions for the recognition of traditional and 
religious marriages and traditional and religious personal law systems by means of legislation”. 
Consequently, the existence and authority of the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC), the largest 
body of religious authority in the Cape, cater to the needs of the Muslim population with regard 
to contracting marriages (including polygynous unions), matters of divorce, and inheritance 
(Abdullah, 2002:159).   
 
Although many Muslim women get married according to South African Law as well as through 
Muslim Rights, difficulties arise for women who become part of a polygynous marital union –  
due both to its lack of validity in light of South African Law, as well as to the complex process 
of obtaining divorce solely through Muslim authorities. In my empirical research, several 
respondents (some of whom were married according to Muslim Rights only) experienced great 
difficulty with regard to obtaining divorce as well as with the lack of aid offered by Muslim 
juridical authorities when initiating divorce procedures. Complicating factors that can influence 
women‟s experiences with regard to divorce are men‟s unilateral right to divorce through the 
application of talaq (a divorce formula that can only be pronounced by a husband and will have 
immediate effect for the dissolution of the marital union if pronounced three times), and the 
resistance of religious authorities to granting women fasakh (a divorce granted the wife by a 













findings of Toefy‟s study (2001) on matters of divorce in Muslim communities. I now turn to 
Na‟eem Jeenah‟s exploration of Islamic feminism/s in South Africa.  
 
3.2   The Emergence of Islamic Feminism in South Africa 
 
Na‟eem Jeenah (2001) investigates the various articulations of Islamic feminism/s in South 
Africa in the 1990s. The roots of Islamic feminism can be traced back to a few salient key 
organisations that largely contributed to the existence and the development of a South African 
Islamic feminist discourse. The Muslim Youth Movement (established 1970) and the Call of 
Islam (established 1983) played formative roles in emphasising women‟s rights and gender 




I examine two central developments that advanced an Islamic feminist agenda in the 1990s. 
Firstly, the „women in mosques‟ campaign, launched by the Muslim Youth Movement (MYM), 
was directed at increasing Muslim women‟s involvement and participation in mosques. This 
campaign sparked activist initiatives and debates and became a contested issue within the South 
African ulama (13-14). Secondly, the emergence of Muslim media, Al-Qalam (newspaper acting 
as the mouthpiece of the MYM) and The Voice (radio station set up by the MYM), became 
important sites for debating gender issues and served as channels to increase gender-sensitivity 
(43-47).  
 
The „women in mosques‟ campaign was particularly significant in the Northern provinces where 
women‟s access to mosques was more restricted than in the Western Cape. Jeenah argues that 
this distinction derives from the differing practices of gender-mixing in the Indian and Malay 
culture respectively (30). One of the activist initiatives took place in 1993 when a group of 
MYM members, led by feminist-activist Shamima Shaikh, decided to enter 23
rd
 Street mosque in 
                                                 
37
 However, according to Sa‟diyya Shaikh, the Muslim Youth Movement did not engage issues of gender equality in 
ways that fully embraced women as equal subjects to men. She argues, among other things, that gender issues were 













Johannesburg to take part in the Tarawih.
38
 Their „intrusion‟ was met with resistance and ended 
in expulsion by means of accommodating these women under a marquee behind the mosque. 
Later that year, MYM established a Gender Desk in which the claim for women‟s “space in 
mosques” became replaced by the slogan “equal access to mosques” (30-32). The Gender Desk 
proclaimed the importance of an equally shared space in the mosques, as opposed to access to 
mosques where women were relegated to basements, mezzanines and backyards.  
 
The right to “equal access to mosques” was obtained in Claremont Main Road Mosque (Cape 
Town) in 1994 when the Friday sermon was delivered by Amina Wadud. During this occasion 
the normative „male space‟ was divided by a rope into two parallel parts. Women occupied the 
one side of this space. The incident received national and international media attention with 
regard to two issues. Firstly, the fact that a pre-khutba talk was given by a Muslim woman, and 
secondly, that shared gendered space was given to the mixed congregation. This is the way it has 
remained ever since (33-34).  
 
The second feminist development relates to Muslim women‟s involvement in Muslim media 
such as the MYM‟s newspaper Al-Qalam and the radio station The Voice. These were important 
channels through which women‟s issues found a voice and a forum in which this voice could be 
expressed. Al-Qalam provided space for women to discuss and challenge normative patriarchal 
customs and understandings of foundational sources (e.g. exclusively male leadership). In 
particular, debates were raised around the development of Muslim Personal Law (MPL) in which 
women‟s involvement was seen as vital in bringing about an MPL that incorporated gender 
equality as a guiding principle. The pre-khutba delivered by Amina Wadud also received much 
coverage and sparked debates related to women‟s religious leadership. Consequently, Al-Qalam 
became a platform for women to articulate thoughts and opinions reflecting issues relevant to 
their lived realities (44-45).  
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 During Ramadan the Tarawih prayer proceeds after the Isha prayer, which is the last prayer to be recited before 
the sun ascends again. Traditionally, Tarawih is to be performed in a mosque as it is used to conclude a complete 













The Voice challenged the more traditional Muslim radio station Radio Islam by employing a 
female anchor as well as female radio presenters. The position taken by Radio Islam was that a 
woman‟s voice was awrah, thus female presenters were prohibited. The Voice, on the other hand, 
encouraged the participation of women and broadcast shows entitled „Saut al-Nisa‟ (Women‟s 
Voice), „Lifting the Veil‟ (re-readings of foundational scriptures from a gender-sensitive 
perspective), „Breaking the Silence‟ (a program focusing particularly on spousal abuse) and 
„Women Today‟ (interviews with contemporary South African women often perceived to be 
powerful female role models) (45-46). The inclusion of the abovementioned programmes 
introduced new ways of engaging with foundational scriptures and an increased awareness of 
gender issues. Through the existence of these programmes Muslim women were able to 
participate in live discussions and bring their own experiences to the public.  
 
Through looking at the „women in mosques‟ campaign and Muslim media, I have shown 
examples of particular grassroots initiatives that contributed to the development of an Islamic 
feminist discourse in the 1990s. Jeenah argues that the existence of Islamic feminism in South 
Africa was most vibrant between 1990 and 1998; from 1998, however, he asserts that feminism 
has been decreasing and that it is currently in need of a revival (102). He bases his argument on 
several facets within the South African context. Firstly, organisations like the Muslim Youth 
Movement and the Call of Islam have not asserted themselves as dominant actors in relation to 
women‟s empowerment, as they did in the beginning of the 1990s. Thus, on an organisational 
level there is currently a lack of initiatives that advocate an Islamic feminist agenda (105-106). 
Secondly, there has been a drastic decrease in women‟s involvement in Muslim media such as 
Al-Qalam and The Voice. Al-Qalam‟s silence on feminist issues seems to reflect the broader 
trends within the MYM, whereas The Voice has closed down some of the programmes that 
largely centred on Muslim women‟s experiences. Jeenah argues that “Saut al-Nisa…seems to 
deliberately evade feminist issues” (107-108). 
 
With regard to the „women in mosques‟ campaign, the Claremont Main Road Mosque is still 
active in challenging normative patriarchal customs by letting women speak from the pulpit and 
allowing „equal access‟ to the mosque. Nonetheless, on a national level, the „women in mosques‟ 













From my understanding, Jeenah seems to provide an implicit critique of the Claremont Mosque 
for not going far enough in encouraging the formal establishment of women‟s religious 
leadership.  
 
Lastly, Jeenah critically assesses what he calls the academicisation of Islamic feminism in South 
Africa. He argues that “the pulse of Muslim women by Islamic feminists has been missing...” 
(114). This assertion assumes a growing gap between what is happening on the ground and what 
is being produced in academic circles. Thus, the focus of Islamic feminism has arguably shifted 
from activist initiatives, reflecting the needs and wants of women, to an academicisation of 
Islamic feminism that relocates Muslim women‟s experiences to a theoretical, rather than a 
practical sphere and hence being sidelined to the peripheral outskirts. In particular, Jeenah 
highlights the need for empirical studies within Islamic feminist scholarship in order to more 
realistically and accurately reflect Muslim women‟s lived realities. Thus the need to speak to 
Muslim women, not about Muslim women will relocate women‟s lived experiences to the centre 
(113-124).  
 
The challenge of bringing Islamic feminism back to women‟s lived realities, as posed by Jeenah, 
is a requirement for the revival of a pulsating feminist discourse. Engaging with women at a 
grassroots level and developing new strategies that promote gender equality are salient 
prerequisites for advancing an Islamic feminist agenda. I argue that the current empirical 
research undertaken is conducive to shifting the focus from the academicisation of Islamic 
feminism to situating Muslim women‟s experiences at the centre of knowledge production. This 
endeavour will by extension subtly unfold as a way to develop various strategies that can assist 
in the empowerment of Muslim women from within their local communities and from within a 
gender-sensitive Islamic framework. As such, the Islamic feminist discourse can find its way 
back to the local communities and become an embodied discourse that reflects Muslim women‟s 
experiential realities.  
 
In the next sections I explore the abovementioned empirical studies that foreground the lived 













women instigate divorce, women‟s experiences with polygynous marriages, and the complexities 
faced by Muslim women living with HIV/AIDS.  
 
3.3  Divorce in Muslim Communities in the Western Cape  
 
M. Y. Toefy (2001) investigates the issue of divorce in the Muslim communities of the Western 
Cape. He examines the reasons for marital dissolution in a sample of 600 divorce records filed 
between 1994 and 1999. Toefy‟s main sources of information are the Muslim Judicial Council 
(MJC) in Athlone and the National Ulama Council (NUC) in Grassy Park. Of particular interest 
are the underlying reasons for initiating divorce, which reflect salient gendered differences.  
 
Toefy‟s research shows that the majority of applicants filing for divorce are female (76.2%, 
N=457). This percentage, however, is comparable to other international studies related to the 
gender of the divorce applicant (2001:41). Women‟s primary reasons for initiating divorce were: 
infidelity of spouse (20.8%), drug abuse of spouse (17.7%), and thirdly, physical abuse (12.3%). 
For men, the primary reasons were: incompatibility (21.5%), and wife‟s infidelity (17.5%) 
(Toefy, 2001:130). The secondary reasons for women were: basic unhappiness (21.7%), 
financial support difficulties (15.0%), incompatibility (12.0%), and physical abuse (10.3%). For 
men, the secondary reasons were: basic unhappiness (32.9%) and incompatibility (20.3%) 
(Toefy, 2001:131).    
 
Similarly, Ashraf Mohammed‟s study (1997) within which he examines 3 959 client counselling 
sessions at the MJC, between 1 January and 31 December 1993, reveals related findings. The 
primary reasons for which Muslims approached the MJC for counselling reflect the following: 
“297 (8%) cases of alcohol abuse, 569 (14%) cases of drug abuse, 25 (1%) cases of incest, 412 
(10%) cases of physical abuse, 371 (9%) cases of verbal abuse, 781 (20%) cases of lack of 
maintenance, 216 (5%) cases of desertion and 441 (11%) cases of illicit sexual activity” 
(1997:36). These research findings broadly reflect Tofey‟s data in relation to primary causes for 
initiating divorce for women. However, Mohammed‟s study does not distinguish the percentage 
male to female ratio. Nevertheless, in a later report (2003), he argues that the illicit sex cases 













physical abuse, verbal abuse, incest, desertion, drug and alcohol abuse, as well as lack of 
financial maintenance, were all perpetrated by men.  
 
Correspondingly, Somayya Abdullah (1998 and 2002) explores the role of Islamic counselling in 
South Africa and clients‟ experiences of Islamic counselling. She reports that 80% of the 
caseload at the Islamic Social Welfare Association (ISWA) reflects marital problems.
39
 Of these, 
90% are cases of physical, sexual and psychological abuse of women. The caseload related to 
cases of marital problems is increasing and the majority of clients seeking counselling at ISWA 
are women (Abdullah, 2002:162). Abdullah also reports that at the MJC, experiences of spousal 
extra-marital affairs is the main reason for seeking counselling, and women primarily initiate 
these consultations (163). Abdullah‟s findings also broadly reflect the data reported by Toefy 
(2001) and A. Mohammed (1997 and 2003). 
 
If we take the statistical data revealed in the studies conducted by Mohammed (1997 and 2003) 
and Toefy (2001) into consideration, the high frequency of spousal infidelity coupled with 
physical abuse among Muslims in the Western Cape are areas of particular concern. In Toefy 
(2001), infidelity of spouse made up 20.8% of women‟s primary reason for initiating divorce, 
whereas 12.3% of women seeking divorce stated physical abuse as the primary reason. In 
addition, 10.3% stated physical abuse as the secondary reason for initiating divorce (2001:130). 
This means that 22.6% (N=103) of all women who instigated divorce had experience with 
physical abuse and as such, physical abuse is a key contributing factor for women seeking 
divorce. 
 
While the link between gender violence (including sexual violence) and religious beliefs cannot 
be inferred from these statistical data,
40
 Abdul Kayum Ahmed (2003) refers to a few books in 
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 The Islamic Social Welfare Association is the only registered Islamic Welfare organisation in the Cape (Abdullah, 
2002:159). 
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 However, the possible intersections of spousal abuse with particular religious convictions or norms have been 
problematised by a few scholars and researchers within the field of Islamic studies. For example, in a study on 
domestic violence conducted in 1993, Maha B. Alkhateeb found that 10% of American Muslims had experience 
with domestic violence (Alkhateeb and Abugideiri, 2007:15). Keilani Abdullah (2007:70) argues that the known 













which the author supports the view that violence against women is permitted by the Qur‟an in the 




The findings in Toefy‟s research sample (2001), in particular, illustrate that women‟s primary 
reasons for initiating divorce are mainly linked to spousal behaviour. However, for men, the 
primary and secondary reasons for initiating divorce (with the exception of spousal infidelity) 
can be traced to intrinsically self-perceived states of consciousness, i.e. the feeling of 
unhappiness, the feeling of irreconcilable differences, and subsequently, the impossibility of a 
continued coexistence due to these understandings of status quo.  
 
Toefy argues that these apparent gendered differences underlying the instigation of divorce, as 
revealed by the data, can be understood by looking at the ways in which Muslim men and 
women traditionally can obtain divorce. Talaq, the divorce formula that can be pronounced by a 
husband, will have immediate effect for the dissolution of the marital union. Hence, talaq will 
conclusively end in a divorce decree; however, it is unilaterally a man‟s privilege. For a Muslim 
woman, on the other hand, the process towards obtaining a divorce decree is longer and more 
complicated. When initiating a divorce a Muslim woman can apply for a fasakh. However, the 
process of divorce resulting in a fasakh is often time-consuming and prolonged, particularly if 
                                                                                                                                                             
cultural and religious persuasions, such as the importance of family honour, socially accepted practices of wife 
beating, patriarchal interpretations of certain segments of religious scripture used to justify wife beating, and the 
social stigma of divorce experienced by many Muslim women. Correspondingly, a study conducted by Abugideiri 
(2007) on domestic violence among Muslims seeking mental health counselling in the U.S, shows that religion plays 
a significant and decisive role in the various ways in which Muslim women deal with domestic violence. The ideal 
of remaining in a marital relationship interrelated with the unacceptability of divorce in various social and religious 
contexts, leads to prolonged suffering for many women. In particular, Islamic ideals such as patience and 
perseverance are advocated by religious leaders and may influence many women‟s decisions to stay in abusive 
marriages. Similarly, the qualitative study conducted by Sa‟diyya Shaikh (1996) among South African Muslim 
women who had experienced spousal abuse, showed that the broader Muslim community as well as religious 
leaders, to a large extent, did not actively support these women in resisting their husbands‟ violence or in being 
explicitly critical of such behaviour. Furthermore, existing discourses that express particular religio-cultural ideals of 
a „good Muslim woman‟ are sometimes perpetuated by religious leaders, who emphasise female virtues of patience 
and perseverance. This contributed to women staying in violent marriages. 
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based on the primary and secondary reasons given by men. Divorce initiatives that are based on 
grounds of marital abuse or lack of financial support, on the other hand, reasons perceived to be 
more „legitimate‟ by religious authorities, are more likely to result in an immediate fasakh 
(2001:145).  
 
These structural dynamics reflect particular gendered discourses that are legitimised through an 
Islamic legal framework. The fact that men have absolute right of repudiation eclipses notions of 
mutual decision-making and consent within the marital union, principles elaborated by Islamic 
feminist discourses through focusing on broader Qur‟anic ethics (e.g. Wadud, 2006; Barlas, 
2002). In addition, as argued by Ziba Mir-Hosseini (2007b), the differentiated spousal rights and 
obligations within Islamic jurisprudence also mirror the gendered differences entrenched within 
Islamic society and culture. 
 
Toefy further argues that Islamic divorce courts favour talaq divorces, rather than granting 
women a fasakh. His data reveals that 47% of women‟s divorce initiatives were granted talaq 
instead of fasakh. This means that despite the fact that women were the instigators of these 
divorces (applying for fasakh), their husbands were still responsible, or maybe persuaded into 
taking the final decision by pronouncing the talaq formula and thus dissolving the marital union 
(2001:146).  
 
These realities challenge constructs of moral agency, championed in Islamic feminist discourses, 
as women‟s moral responsibility is restricted through the favouring of men as the final decision-
makers when it comes to the dissolution of a marital union. On the one hand, the data show that 
it is predominantly women who initiate divorce. This can result from a variety of factors, e.g. 
unsuccessful marriages, abusive marital situations, as well as broader social tendencies like the 
quest for self-realisation. Nonetheless, religious authorities are still retaining the symbolic power 
of male authority through giving these women a talaq instead of a fasakh. Even so, ultimately the 
women who instigate divorce do obtain a divorce decree, so whether it is by talaq or fasakh 
might not even matter that much as long as they get what they set out to achieve – divorce. 
Interestingly, Toefy found in his pilot study (1999) that the reversal from fasakh to talaq is 













within Islamic counselling services and divorce authorities, are being renegotiated and 
transformed. Hopefully, these changes are taking place through an increased awareness and 
recognition of complex contextual realities affecting Muslim women in potentially harmful 
ways.  
 
Toefy elucidates that the occurrences of pre-marital pregnancies within Muslim communities are 
intricately related to high divorce frequency. I explore some of the underlying reasons for the 
practice of pregnancy marriages as well as the possible causes for the dissolution of these 
marriages.  
 
In the case of pre-marital pregnancies, in essence, if a couple fell pregnant before marriage, the 
couple was often forced to get married; or marriage was seen as the most logical consequence of 
the pregnancy. This practice might reflect worries with regard to Islamic juridical implications 
that affect the rights of a child born out of wedlock as well as social stigma attached to giving 
birth to illegitimate children. Out of Toefy‟s sample of 600 divorce records, there were 342 
incidents (57%) that could be defined as pregnancy marriages (2001:122). He argues that 
Muslim communities play key roles in determining socially accepted norms in particular with 
regard to marital praxis. The belief that if the couple gets married it will “make things right” or 
the marriage will “save the family‟s reputation” are widespread assumptions that largely 
influence the couple‟s (or the family‟s) decision to contract a marriage (158).  
 
Toefy‟s research results show that pre-marital pregnancies are closely affiliated with divorce. 
One of the main underlying reasons for this concomitant relationship can be traced to the high 
number of relatively young couples entering a marital union. Consequently, age plays a 
significant role in the frequency of pre-marital pregnancies and the dissolution of these marriages 
within a short period of time. The young age of the couple arguably mirrors their possible 
unstable financial situation (due to their age), the lack of future planning, as well as the limited 
time this couple has spent together (151). The influence of the community with regard to societal 
norms becomes an added factor with respect to the practice of pregnancy marriages. The 













according to the data seems to be a short-term solution), appears to be more important than 
ensuring proactive strategies that can benefit the couple in the long run.  
 
With regard to women‟s participation in making decisions related to contracting these types of 
marriages, it is not her future husband that forces her into marriage, but rather community 
pressure that removes the decision-making powers from both the male and female ambit. Thus, 
levels of acceptance regarding normative sexual practices are guided by broader community 
„standards‟ that determine correct behaviour in given situations.  
 
Another possible underlying reason was brought to my attention by Sheikh Nurghaan Singh, who 
previously served as imam (prayer leader) in one of the local Muslim communities of the 
Western Cape.
42
 From his experience of counselling young couples regarding consummation of 
marriages as well as incidents of pre-marital pregnancies, he argues that, in fact, there exists a 
widespread tendency in which young couples deliberately become pregnant before they are 
married. He asserts that these incidents are caused by the families‟ resistance to the couple‟s 
wish to get married at a young age. His experiences with couples that „force‟ their will upon their 
families through a pre-marital pregnancy as the most efficient way into a marital union, is a 
frequent factor that situates pre-marital pregnancies within a different context from the one 
outlined by Toefy‟s data.
43
   
 
The prevalence of pregnancy-marriages points towards the commonality of sexual encounters 
that take place before a marital union is entered into. These findings might reflect broader South 
African demographics rather than specific Muslim practices with regard to sex and sexuality. 
These findings are of particular interest to my own study, where I investigate Muslim women‟s 
experiences of sexual debut and sexual relationships both prior to, and within marital unions.  
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 Sheikh – an elder, teacher, a learned, pious man, master of an order, title of scholar 
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 Personal conversation with Sheikh Nurghaan Singh (09.10.2007). In addition to his previous role of acting imam 
in a local community of the Western Cape, Sheikh Singh is also a member of the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC). 
He confirms the findings in Toefy‟s research with regard to women‟s primary reasons for instigating divorce. He 
highlights that the majority of Muslim women approach the MJC for divorce decrees because of their experiences 













Overall, Toefy‟s data reveal salient challenges within communities in the Western Cape. The 
underlying reasons for women‟s divorce initiatives must be properly addressed on the level of 
inter-relational acceptability, marital behaviour, as well as social and legal attitudes towards the 
applicant instigating divorce. Toefy‟s findings relate to my study in two dominant ways. Firstly, 
I investigate Muslim women‟s experiences in sexual relationships within which spousal 
behaviour pertaining to sexual abuse, infidelity, and attitudes regarding sexual dynamics are 
explored. As outlined above, the major trends emerging from Toefy‟s study regarding divorce 
initiatives resonate with my respondents‟ experiences of marital infidelity, drug abuse and 
physical abuse. Hence, these realities form part of the lived experiences of the particular groups 
of Muslim women I have interviewed. Secondly, Toefy‟s data and analysis concerning pre-
marital pregnancies are interesting in relation to respondents‟ understandings of sexual norms 
and broader discourses on sex/uality and relations of power. These discourses will be explored 
more extensively in the analysis part of this dissertation.  
 
In the following section I explore the existence of polygynous marriages in the Cape Flats. In 
particular, the underlying reasons for contracting polygynous unions as well as discourses 
pertaining to local acceptability of this practice will be highlighted. Of particular interest to the 
empirical component in this dissertation is the existence of ambiguous discourses on polygyny 
that might affect the number of ways in which women engage with this practice in their local 
communities.  
 
3.4   Polygynous Marriages in the Cape Flats 
 
Sindre Bangstad‟s Ph.D. thesis (2007) explores, among other things, the occurrences of 
polygynous marriages in the Cape Flats. These communities are predominantly inhabited by 
people from lower socio-economic groupings. Bangstad interviewed thirteen (13) Muslim 
women who had experiences of being in a polygynous marital union (2007:104). On a 
methodological level he encountered a high percentage of unwillingness to participate in the 
research due to the fact that many women had experience of high levels of ostracism from the 













such an undertaking. In addition, a few women mentioned negative prior experiences with 
similar research initiatives (104-105).  
 
Out of the sample of thirteen (13) women, Bangstad reports that “[s]even (7) out of thirteen (13) 
interviewees had been in polygynous marriages in which the marriage had been dissolved, ten 
(10) out of thirteen (13) reported experiences with polygyny that could be characterised as 
negative, and ten (10) out of thirteen (13) interviewees were or had been second wives” (105). 
One of Bangstad‟s respondents explained that:  
 
...the stigma faced by a second wife in a polygynous marriage is often greater [than the 
stigma faced by the first wife], as she is often perceived to be “die slegte ene” (“the bad 
one”) by other people who tend to assume that she has at the outset “interfered in” 
another woman‟s marriage, or even that she has “stolen” the first wife‟s husband (“dat ek 
haar man gesteel [het]”) (116).  
 
Bangstad argues that these attitudes are dominant within Cape Muslim communities. These 
understandings also correlate with the assumptions that “the first wife is often perceived to be the 
victim of her husband‟s “lust” [for another woman]” (116). The husband on the other hand, is on 
the hedonic prowl for sexual satisfaction by women other than his first wife. The discourse 
around polygyny in a Cape Muslim context is greatly influenced and challenged by the 
community‟s stereotyping of the social agents involved in a polygynous marital union. The 
derogatory representations of the underlying reasons for why such a relationship is formed are 
particularly prevalent. Consequently, Bangstad observes that the level of secrecy is high in 
relation to the existence of polygynous marriages. Muslim men do not want to make their 
polygynous marital situations a public matter due to the fact that it might become exposed to 
soaring levels of social criticism (116).   
 
In relation to Bangstad‟s research sample, the majority of women interviewed foreground their 
experiences with polygynous marriages as situated within difficult and complicated inter-
personal relationships. The majority of respondents also explain that they would not advocate 













Bangstad argues that the most common underlying reason for contracting a polygynous marriage 
in the Cape Flats is the husband‟s involvement in extra-marital affairs (117). On some occasions 
sexual infidelity leads to pregnancy; however, by contracting a marital union the moral integrity 
and reputation of the husband (and the families involved) often remain intact. This correlates 
with the arguments outlined by Toefy (2001) of “making things right” or “saving the family‟s 
reputation”. Thus, the natural consequence of the discovery of illegitimate sexual relationship, or 
infidelity resulting in pregnancy, is to transform the relationship into a legitimate marital union.  
 
However, as opposed to the case of pre-marital pregnancies investigated by Toefy (2001), the 
marital status of the man (the fact that he is already married) poses other challenges to the 
contraction of marriage. Bangstad argues that the incidence of marital consensus, in essence, that 
the husband‟s first wife becomes part of the decision-making process in which she exercises a 
certain level of agency related to the husband‟s inclusion of a second wife in their marriage, is 
rarely on the agenda (2007:117). Bangstad points towards particular instances where “first wives 
protesting against the fact that consent was never requested have been dragged out of mosques in 
communities on the Cape Flats when trying to interrupt their husband‟s nikahs [marriage]” (117). 
In other instances, second wives are being led to believe by their husbands-to-be that they 
(husband) are single at the time of marital union, when the husbands actually have been married 
for several years prior to this new marital engagement; or, second wives are being led to believe 
that their husbands-to-be are divorced or currently undergoing divorce procedures (117). 
Bangstad‟s research also reveals the brutal fact that Muslim girls below the age of sexual consent 
were joined in matrimony with much older Muslim men (117).   
 
It is noteworthy that Bangstad‟s empirical research highlights the social unacceptability of 
polygynous marital unions. This finding points towards the existence of discursive ambivalences 
regarding polygyny. On the one hand, social attitudes in a particular community render this 
Muslim practice unacceptable despite the fact that it is legally allowed according to an Islamic 
discourse. On the other hand, explicit contestations of polygynous marriages (e.g. Bangstad‟s 
example of wives trying to hinder their husband from contracting additional marriages) are 
subject to the precedence of Islamic discourses that allow husbands to take more than one wife. 













ways within a particular social reality. Often, seemingly contrary views of a gendered practice 
such as polygyny are expressed within the same societal context.  
 
Throughout 2009 there has been much focus and heated debates pertaining to the question of 
South African Governmental recognition of Muslim marriages. On 20 May 2009, the Women‟s 
Legal Centre Trust (WLCT) was heard by the Constitutional Court (CC) on the matter of 
Parliament enacting a law that recognises Muslim marriages. The WLCT‟s support of the 
Muslim Marriages Draft Bill is set against the background of the perceived need to protect the 
rights of women in polygynous unions, regulate the contractions of these unions, as well as to 
alleviate the process of attaining divorce for women. However, the WLCT‟s application was 
denied on the grounds of preliminary procedural issues. The Constitutional Court has directed 
WLTC to apply to the High Court as the court of first instance.    
 
Particular Muslim organisations, such as the Islamic Unity Convention (IUC), were pleased with 
the Constitutional Court‟s decision regarding the Muslim Marriages Draft Bill. In a press release 
following the Constitutional Court‟s decision to decline the Muslim Marriages Draft Bill, the 
IUC stated: “It is not appropriate that other institutions takes charge and dictate to Muslims how 
they should conduct their affairs” (IUC, 22 July 2009). Ideally, the IUC dreams of establishing 
Muslim Courts in South Africa that deal singularly with legal issues in ways that reflect a 
Shari‟a legacy. These Muslim courts will by extension become the sole authority regulating the 
lives of all Muslims in South Africa. This view mirrors IUC‟s position on MPL, in which they 
argue “the Quran and Sunnah are supreme” (IUC, 2009). Thus, organisations (like the WLCT) 
that develop initiatives that give increased power to secular authoritative institutions in matters 
of religious beliefs are viewed as intrusively undermining an Islamic belief system.  
 
The approach taken by the IUC reflects the need to advocate Muslim rights simply because these 
rights are embedded within a religious discourse that is seen as authoritative for the ways in 
which one embodies a lived reality. Hence, advocacy is framed within an Islamic rights 
discourse that might not necessarily reflect social acceptance of the practice of polygyny. 













contracted in Muslim communities might still be prevalent among Muslims who promote the 
recognition of Muslim marriages, within which the right to polygyny is embedded. 
 
The ways in which local communities perceive polygynous marriages can also influence the 
ways in which some Muslim women perceive the acceptability and embodiment of this 
discourse. By stigmatising women in polygynous marriages, through reducing them into 
commodities for their husbands, victims of spousal behaviour and husband-stealers, communities 
convey strong sanctions against polygynous unions. Thus, polygyny is neither encouraged nor 
seen as part of normative Muslim behaviour. This dynamic raises important questions with 
regard to censoring behaviour, community norms and public debates on MPL.  
 
Particular communities develop yardsticks through which acceptable and appropriate behaviour 
is measured against the broader consensus of the community. The research findings revealed in 
Bangstad‟s study illustrate that polygyny is contested and disputed through intense social stigma 
and debilitating stereotypes. Interestingly, polygyny in this social context is being harnessed by a 
form of communal agency. In this way, broader discourses of power and sexuality are 
continuously being constructed through specific understandings of sexual norms and accepted 
behaviour in local communities. Sa‟diyya Shaikh‟s notion of a “tafsir of praxis” (2007) is useful 
when examining the various ways in which individuals and communities engage in particular 
contestations of religious teachings through their embodied realities.   
 
Bangstad (2007) highlights spousal infidelity as a major factor underlying the contraction of 
polygynous marriages and Toefy‟s research (2001) reveals the high frequency of divorce 
initiatives that are rooted in women‟s experiences with spousal infidelity. It might be inferred 
from the data provided in these studies that there exist dominant discourses through which sexual 
norms are articulated. Often these norms are contested and subverted, however, the influence of 
specific social practices on women‟s experiential realities are interlinked with structural 















In the next section I explore the various ways in which Muslim sexual relationships are related to 
the risk of HIV/AIDS. Muslim responses to the challenge of HIV/AIDS are varied. However, 
discourses that centre on women‟s vulnerability in light of the AIDS pandemic, and hence the 
need to re-negotiate religious and cultural practices that make women more susceptible to HIV 
infection, are slowly emerging.  
 
3.5   Muslim Women and the Challenge of HIV/AIDS 
 
Abdul Kayum Ahmed (1999 and 2003) investigates the challenge of HIV/AIDS in Muslim 
communities. Of particular importance is his claim that women in marital relationships are 
increasingly prone to HIV-transmission. In this section I explore Ahmed‟s research findings in 
light of issues pertaining to the contestation of the marital union as a safe zone, the importance of 
a dialogical relationship with regard to contraceptive usage, and the social stigma experienced by 
many Muslim women living with HIV/AIDS.  
 
Ahmed argues that orthodox Islamic discourses on HIV/AIDS predominantly centre on the belief 
that “Aids is a curse from God to punish those who have engaged in immoral sexual behaviour… 
the only way to effectively deal with the Aids epidemic is to return to the moral way of life 
prescribed in religious texts such as the Qur‟an” (2003:iii-iv).
44
 Statements like this have 
enormous influence on the ways in which Muslims understand the challenge of HIV/AIDS. In 
addition, these kinds of statements perpetuates particular beliefs as to why it affects some people 
and not others. Ahmed asserts that these particular beliefs have leaked into the consciousness of 
Muslims in Cape Town. These views and attitudes have detrimental consequences for those who 
are affected by and living with HIV. The fear of isolation and excommunication, as well as 
threats of physical abuse, are but some of the effects that emerge alongside these religious 
persuasions (Ahmed, 2003:iv). Arguably, negative representations and debilitating attitudes 
advocated by particular groups of Muslims situate Islamic moral action as contrary to immoral 
sexual behaviour, as a template for a HIV-free individual existence.  
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If we explore the realities in which Muslim men and women interact, the results of Tofey‟s study 
(2001), A. Mohammed (1997 and 2003), and Bangstad (2007) shed some light in relation to 
actual practices among Muslims. The high frequency of spousal infidelity, various forms of 
marital abuse, and pre-marital pregnancies among Muslims in the Western Cape are areas of 
particular concern.  On the basis of these research findings, I argue that that Muslims, 
particularly Muslim women, in the Cape are increasingly at risk and vulnerable to HIV infection. 
I base this argument on the assumption that there is a concomitant relationship between sex with 
multiple partners and susceptibility to HIV/AIDS.    
 
Furthermore, the high frequency of pregnancy marriages, which indicates sexual activity before 
entering into a marital union, as shown by Toefy‟s data, is also confirmed by Mohammed‟s data 
(1999). Mohammed‟s study also highlights that the majority of religious leaders in the Western 
Cape (88.4%) had performed pregnancy marriage ceremonies. Hence, these findings also reflect 
lack of contraceptive usage, borne out by the number of pregnancy marriage ceremonies carried 
out by Muslim authorities. Based on the findings of these studies, Ahmed argues that: 
  
...Muslim women in marital relationships appear to be particularly vulnerable to HIV 
infection due to their husbands engaging in sexual activity outside marriage. In cases 
where women are unaware of their husband‟s extra-marital sexual behaviour, these 
women are put at risk of contracting HIV since married couples would most likely 
engage in sexual activity without the use of condoms. Even in cases where women are 
aware of their husband‟s sexual affairs outside marriage, they have little control over 
sexual relations and may be forced into having sex against their will. (2003:29-30)  
 
This excerpt directly addresses the complexities with regard to dominant discourses that 
influence sexual dynamics in marital relationships. The high percentages of spousal infidelity, 
revealed by the abovementioned studies, become areas of particular concern when coupled with 
particular constellations of power that operate in intimate relationships. Sexual norms regarding 
the lack of contraceptive usage in marital relationships as well as discourses that emphasise a 
husband‟s Islamic right to have sex with his wife are explored in greater detail in Chapter Seven 














In Ahmed‟s MA thesis (2003), the narratives of five Muslim women living with HIV/AIDS are 
presented. Ahmed narrates the story of Faghmeda Miller, who contracted HIV from her husband, 
and who was the first Muslim woman who overtly exposed her HIV status publicly in Cape 
Town. Her openness regarding her experiences was met with sharp criticism from, among others, 
the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC), which clearly expressed the view that AIDS is a curse from 
God. Secondly, her outspokenness also caused great distress among the MJC. Faghmeda Miller 
argues that “certain religious leaders affiliated to the MJC believe that women are supposed to 
keep quiet” (Ahmed, 2003:v).  
 
On an organisational level, MJC‟s position reflects highly problematic constructions of proper 
female behaviour. The idea that Muslim women should „keep quiet‟ is particularly alarming. On 
the one hand, this understanding can derive from misogynistic understandings of religious 
sources that convey women‟s voices as awrah, presented earlier in this chapter in the case of 
Radio Islam. Obviously, women can contest these constructions and speak out. Nevertheless, the 
fact that these problematic assumptions exist within authoritative Muslim organisations presents 
challenges for women when having to engage with Muslim leaders (e.g. during marital 
consultation, divorce instigation, and seeking advice more broadly).   
 
On the other hand, the need for women to „keep quiet‟ can also point towards the embedded 
resistance of the MJC to dealing with the fact that HIV/AIDS is a challenge facing Muslim 
communities. In this sense, it is not so much women but the issue itself that should be kept 
underground. The fact that Faghmeda Miller made her HIV-status public forced the MJC to take 
a position regarding the issue of Muslims and HIV/AIDS.  
 
On a community level, the attitudes of Muslim governing bodies might influence the levels of 
acceptance/rejection of the broader community. Debilitating aphorisms, stereotyping and stigma 
are but a few of the negative societal expressions that prosper in light of the HIV pandemic. The 
ways in which various communities tackle the challenge of HIV/AIDS are dependent on broader 
social constructions of normative sexual behaviour, awareness of the ways in which HIV is 














Muslim women‟s experiences of living with HIV can be exacerbated by existing understandings 
and stereotypes attached to the disease. The lack of support from community networks and 
individuals affects the ways in which HIV-positive women (and men) face their daily battles. 
The lack of engagement with these issues within Muslim communities, and other communities 
for that matter, arguably derives from the unproductive and damaging belief (or wish) that „if we 
don‟t see it, it doesn‟t exist‟. However, when the community is challenged or confronted with 
people‟s „hidden‟ experiences – it becomes an issue that must be dealt with. Thus Ahmed argues, 
“It is important to note though, that Muslims who have sex before marriage are only stigmatized 
when their actions lead to consequences that cannot be hidden such as pregnancy or HIV 
infection” (Ahmed, 2003:146). Ahmed also explains that the implications of seemingly immoral 
actions affect women more than men. He asserts that:  
 
While women must not get caught and ensure that they marry their boyfriend, men must 
simply make sure that they are not caught.  For men, the obligation to marry the woman 
that you are sleeping with is not as strong as the unmarried pregnant woman‟s obligation 
to marry the man. (147) 
 
Ahmed‟s empirical research reveals that four out of the five women he interviewed contracted 
HIV in their marital or pre-marital relationships. Two of his respondents were infected by their 
husbands, two by their boyfriends, and one through blood transfusion (140-163). Ahmed also 
asserts that two of the interviewees had experienced physical abuse in their relationships (140). 
Due to the small number of interviewees it is not possible to make any generalised statements. 
However, the fact that women within marital relationships, which is the only religiously 
permissible union in which sexual activity is allowed, get infected by their husbands challenges 
the idea that marriage is a sacred union that protects a couple from sexually transmitted 




The circumstances in which women are infected are essentially problematic and point towards 
women‟s vulnerability within sexual relationships and marital relationships more broadly. The 
high level of secrecy surrounding infidelity, coupled with abusive spousal behaviour, poses 
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challenges for the ways in which women can negotiate sexual dynamics within their marital 
relationships. Women‟s experiences bear witness to unacceptable sexual mores produced 
through dominant discourses on sexuality, in which the construction of women as sexual beings 
serving the needs of men becomes an important site of contestation.  
 
Dominant discourses that embrace cultural and religious persuasions elaborating on a woman‟s 
sexual availability to her husband might increase women‟s vulnerability to HIV/AIDS. Thus, 
particular articulations of accepted sexual dynamics (i.e. that sex on demand is a man‟s privilege 
within the marital union) must be increasingly contested in light of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. In 
the empirical component of this dissertation I explore the ways in which narratives on infidelity 
intersect with dominant discourses on women‟s sexual availability.  
 
The studies surveyed thus far suggest serious social challenges reflecting asymmetrical and 
androcentric gender relations within the South African Muslim community. However these 
dynamics are not exclusive to Muslims but form part of a broader configuration of gender within 
the South African socio-political landscape. In order to illuminate the latter point, I present in the 
next section, a brief survey of local data on gender-based violence. This information also 
provides the reader with some background and context within which to situate my respondents. 
These mappings of context again alert us that religion is never the singular and determining 
factor shaping gender relations.  
 
3.6 Gender-based violence in South Africa  
 
In the South African context, the first South African Demographic Health Survey (SADHS) was 
conducted in 1998. Issues of violence against women were included in this survey.
46
 The results 
showed that of the 11 735 women taking part in the survey, the prevalence of physical abuse by 
an intimate partner ranged from 8.7% to 17.8%. On average, for the whole country, 12.5% of the 
South African women who took part in the survey reported being physically assaulted by their 
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male partner. In addition, 6.3% (half of the national average) reported experiencing abuse within 
the last year. The highest percentages of experiencing violence by an intimate partner were found 
in Gauteng (17.8%) and the Western Cape (16.9%) (Department of Health, 1998:90-95).       
 
South African non-governmental organisations which work with battered women have provided 
estimates of wife-battery based on their experience of caseloads and surveys.
47
 In 1992 Rape 
Crisis in South Africa estimated that one in every three women was assaulted by her male partner 
(Hansson and Hofmeyer, n.d.). The organisations People Opposing Women Abuse (POWA) and 
Coordinated Action for Battered Women both estimate that one in six women is abused by her 
partner (Human Rights Watch, 1995). In a survey sample of 1306 women in three South African 
provinces, research findings show that 26.8% of women in the Eastern Cape, 28.4% in 
Mpumalanga, and 19.1% in the Northern Province had experienced violence by a male partner 
(Jewkes et.al., 2001). The Three Province study (Jewkes et.al., 2001) reported higher frequencies 
of violence against women than the SADHS survey conducted in 1998. In a more recent study of 
women attending antenatal clinics (N=1395), 55% (N=765) of the participants reported having 
experienced physical violence and/or sexual assault (Dunkle et.al., 2004a). Another survey 
conducted by Abrahams (2002) includes 1414 working men in three municipalities in Cape 
Town. Of the 1414 male participants in the study, 46% reported using physical violence against 
their partners, 15% reported using sexual violence, 55% verbal abuse, 42.2% emotional abuse 
and 13.5% reported using economic abuse. The prevalence of hitting a woman in the preceding 
year was 8.8%. Amongst the factors associated with the use of physical violence against 
wife/partner were: alcohol abuse, verbal abuse, involvement in religious activities and infidelity 
(Abrahams, 2002).    
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Wood and Jewkes (2001) argue that sexual infidelity is widely prevalent in adolescent 
relationships where violence surfaces as a key feature. In addition, high rates of infidelity 
coupled with hierarchical marital relationships are intimately connected with the increasing rates 
of HIV infection amongst South African women (Dunkle et.al., 2004b). 
 
With regard to sexual violence, a study on teenage pregnancies in a Cape Town township shows 
that nearly a third (31.9%) of the pregnant teenagers and nearly 18.1% of the non-pregnant 
teenagers reported having experienced forced sex or rape as their initial sexual intercourse 
(Vundule et.al., 2001). The SADHS survey shows that 7% of women reported having 
experienced sexual coercion, whereas the antenatal study reports that one in five women 
experienced lifetime prevalence of sexual violence by their intimate partner (Dunkle et.al., 
2004a).  
 
Statistical data from the South African Police Service (SAPS) showed that 71500 cases of sexual 
offences (i.e. rape and indecent assault) were reported in the period April 2008 – March 2009. 
This represents 146.9 incidents of sexual offences per 100 000 of the population (SAPS, 2009:5). 
Statistical data from community-based survey found 2070 such incidents per 100 000 women per 
annum among women from the age of 17 to 48 (Jewkes and Abrahams, 2002). Hence, the 
prevalence of rape in South Africa is clearly very high; however, the rape statistics for the 
country is currently elusive. The above data, albeit limited, suggest that violence against women 
in South Africa is an area of grave concern, and they impact women from different religious and 
cultural backgrounds.  
 
In conclusion, the empirical studies surveyed in this chapter suggests some of the ways that 
South African Muslim women are vulnerable, particularly in relation to gendered differences 
underlying divorce initiatives, the prevalence of spousal abuse and infidelity, and women‟s 
increased risk of HIV/AIDS due to the sexual behaviour of their spouse. The studies also present, 
in varying ways, broader societal discourses underpinning sexual and marital dynamics. 
Dominant religious norms and expressions of male privilege (e.g. with regard to divorce and 













individual initiatives also provide possibilities for contestations that can render certain social 
practices and norms fragile and permeable.  
 
The challenges of gender justice raised within the South African context provide local Islamic 
feminists with a material base for theoretical and theological reflections on the development of 
an egalitarian Muslim ethics. The importance of engaging the pressing social realities of Muslim 
women and men increasingly forms part of an Islamic feminist agenda. The ways in which this 
can be made possible is through expanding the field of empirical studies, so that theories can be 
informed by women‟s experiences and not by what some academics believe to be women‟s 
experiences.  
 
In the next chapter of this dissertation I examine some of the existing debates around 
positionality, through which my own research positioning is made transparent. I also outline the 
research method applied in this study, the process of analysing the empirical data, the research 


















Research Methodology and Research Methods 
 
4.1   Background 
 
The empirical component of this thesis forms part of a larger research project entitled: “South 
African Muslim Women: Sexuality, Marriage and Reproductive Choices”. The overarching aim 
of this project is to develop a knowledge base of the experiences of South African Muslim 
women with regard to marital and sexual relationships. While Muslim women‟s rights are 
vociferously debated in the public sphere, empirical research that examines these issues among 
South African Muslim women is scarce. By engaging with Muslim women and listening to their 
opinions and perspectives, one aim of this study is to contribute to a study of gender in Islam 
grounded in Muslim women‟s lived realities and experiences. As such, this research will provide 
narratives that derive from Muslim women‟s subjective experiences, as opposed to the dominant 
discourses that largely speak about and of Muslim women but seldom consult them. The findings 
of this study will be used to develop various strategies that can contribute to the empowerment of 
Muslim women from within their local communities and from within a gender-sensitive Islamic 
framework.  
 
The larger research project comprises two empirical components, one quantitative and one 
qualitative. The quantitative component consists of a questionnaire to be completed by a 
minimum of 250 Muslim women.
48
 The principal investigators of this study are Dr. Sa‟diyya 
Shaikh of the University of Cape Town and Professor Ashraf Kagee of the University of 
Stellenbosch. I am involved as the research manager in the quantitative research component.   
 
The qualitative research component forms the core part of my doctoral dissertation and includes 
Semi-Structured in-Depth Interviews (SSDIs). As argued by Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach and 
Zilber (1998), the advantages of combining qualitative and quantitative approaches is that our 
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understanding of the proposed subject matter is deepened by utilising several research methods. 
The combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches, often referred to as a mixed-
methods approach (Creswell, 2003; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003), allows the researcher to 
explore complexities deriving from rich and detailed narratives as well as to investigate a larger 
research sample in a systematic way so as to detect broader meaning patterns. Many scholars 
have addressed the various strengths of mixed-method research, which include among other 
things, (1) the possibility of triangulation in which corroboration between quantitative and 
qualitative data is emphasised, (2) complementarity of research approaches, facilitating 
clarification and elaboration of results emerging from applying the quantitative and the 
qualitative research methods, and (3) enhanced credibility/integrity/academic rigour when 
utilising both quantitative and qualitative research methods (Greene and Caracelli, 1997; 
Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998, 2003; Maxwell and Loomis, 2003; Johnson & Christensen, 2004; 
Reichardt & Rallis, 1994).  
 
Thus, the use of a mixed-methods approach can add insights and understandings that could 
otherwise have been concealed or obscured if only one research approach were applied. By 
paying particular attention to the ways in which specific research findings are generated from 
different methods, the process of analysis also elucidates the contextualisation of findings, 
contradictions and ambiguities, and diversity in research. Consequently, the combination of 
quantitative and qualitative research approaches is employed to highlight a more holistic 
engagement with regard to the research project outlined above.  
 
While the data collection process of the quantitative study has been finalised, the analysis of the 
qualitative research in light of the findings of the quantitative component, and vice versa, will 














4.2   The Insider/Outsider Debate 
 
Location and positionality should not be conceived as one-dimensional or static but as 
multiple and with varying degrees of mobility. (Alcoff, 1995:106) 
 
I am a non-Muslim Norwegian woman, whose research journey into the lives and realities of 
Muslim women living in Cape Town was quite coincidental. I came to Cape Town as a religious 
studies student in 2004, with the aim of completing a Master‟s degree in the Department of 
Religious Studies at the University of Cape Town. I became interested in gender and Islam after 
participating in a course on gender and religion as part of my Master‟s coursework. My 
development as a scholar of religious studies is influenced by a secular humanist background 
peppered with strong feminist proclivities. 
 
Due to the marked differences between myself as the researcher and that of the researched in this 
study (e.g. race, nationality and religion), I find it essential to reflect on the construction of the 
insider/outsider binary and the possible power dynamics present within the interview encounters. 
Research relationships are situated and mediated along a range of symbolic and actual 
constellations of power. Particularly among committed feminists, in the social sciences, debates 
around sameness and difference with regard to gender, race, nationality, sexual orientation, class 
and age are central to analysing the nature of the research relationship (e.g. Arendell, 1997; 
Boonzaier, 2008; Roberts, 1981; Stanley, 1990; D. Wolf, 1996). Particular attention must be 
given to how the researcher‟s positioning in relation to intersecting locations of power impact 
upon her research findings (e.g. DeVault, 1999; Bhavnani, 1988 and 1994; Harding, 1987; Minh-
ha, 1989; Oakley, 1981; Williams, 1996). 
 
I find the research methodology developed by Donna Haraway (1988) particularly useful with 
regard to examining the potential operations of power that can function in various research 
relationships. Haraway outlines three key concepts that the researcher should take account of in 
any feminist project: accountability, positioning and partiality. Accountability refers to the 
feminist researcher‟s commitment to not reproducing the divisions of gender expressed within 
the dominant paradigms, consequently reinforcing stereotypes about a particular group of 













of marginalisation or experienced power imbalances that the respondents express. Rather, 
accountability refers to the researcher‟s commitment as a feminist to reflect on these matters in 





Positionality refers to the varying levels of micro-politics that occur during research encounters. 
Haraway argues that the research report should include a discussion of or at least make reference 
to the relationship between the researcher and the researched, that forefronts how various 
constellations of power might have influenced the research interaction. Lastly, partiality refers to 
questions of difference. It is salient that the researcher reflects on the possibility of multiple 
subjectivities present within a research encounter and also the plurality of views expressed in the 
total research sample so as to avoid generalisations and monolithic representations (Haraway, 
1988).
50
 These three key concepts, accountability, positionality and partiality, provide important 
epistemological keys for ways in which to think about the research material and the process of 
analysis.  
 
Many contemporary social science researchers acknowledge the fluidity of positions that often 
shapes research encounters (e.g. Alcoff, 1995; Best, 2003; Hellawell, 2006; Jaschok and Jingjun, 
2000; Naples, 2003; Sherif, 2001). Hence, the rigid construction of the insider/outsider binary, 
where the researcher occupies a position of „either/or‟, is losing currency within certain segments 
of social science research. Historically, ethnographic accounts were driven by an „outsider-
perspective‟, which was believed to be more objective/neutral accounts of people‟s realities. 
Much criticism has been directed towards this historical legacy due to the underlying ideological 
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 Haraway‟s approach is premised on the notion that all knowledge production is situated in particular historical 
processes. She argues that “Feminist objectivity means quite simply situated knowledges” (Haraway, 1988:581). 
Consequently, knowledge production is always embodied and partial. 
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 See also Kum Kum Bhavnani‟s article “Tracing the Contours: Feminist Research and Feminist Objectivity” 
(1994) to see one way in which the principles of Haraway‟s feminist objectivity are being applied.  
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 See for example the critique offered by Mohanty, 1991b; Fine & Weis, 1998; Oakley, 1981; Patai, 1991; 













The lack of reflexivity coupled with religio-political agendas, present within the outsider-
approach, led to the emergence of counter-narratives in which the „insider-perspective‟ was 
emphasised. Some scholars argue that empirical research should only be conducted by members 
of the groups researched, as the proper communication of particular experiences can only be 
conveyed by someone who is within a particular social setting (e.g. Charlton, 1998). Hence, they 
emphasised the insider position as crucial in order to „correctly‟ represent the experiences of 
particular groups of people. This view is premised on the assumption that an insider perspective 
allows for some kind of shared understanding of cultural and religious values, gender relations, 
world view, normative practices etc., between the researcher and the researched. In addition, for 
some scholars advocating this view, having „outside-researchers‟ articulate your views or 
experiences can be seen as disempowering. According to Edwards (1996), resistance to 
participating in research conducted by people perceived to be outsiders can be an empowering 
act in some communities. From that perspective, the act of opposition represents the desire to 
exercise autonomy and protect oneself from potentially oppressive and exploitative research 
relationships.  
 
However, a number of research articles produced among social scientists suggest that there are 
other complicating factors in research relationships where researcher and research subject might 
share particular identity groupings. In the context of racial identity, Hurd and McIntyre (quoted 
in Erasmus, 2000:74) argue that “sameness distances the participants (researcher and researched 
[...]) from the critical reflexive research process and privileges one point of view over another”. 
In research encounters where assumptions of sameness exist, there is a danger of imposing views 
onto individuals due to preconceived notions of sameness. In addition, assumptions of sameness 
can also lead to a negligence of reflexivity in the research process.  
 
Amy Best (2003:906), conducting ethnographic research with particular attention to the notion of 
„doing race‟ in feminist interviewing, reports that “I had assumed an easy rapport with this White 
woman, and because of this, I quickly and mistakenly moved into direct questions about race, 
assuming she would identify with our shared whiteness”. When asking the respondent a direct 
question about whether race was an indicator of who visited her store to shop for prom dresses, 













herself as a researcher who pays particular attention to „racial stereotyping‟, experienced in this 
interview that her question about race was perceived by the respondent as “racial stereotyping” 
(905). Erasmus (2000:74) found in her interview conversation that “problems of power in the 
research encounter do not disappear when the researcher and informant share certain aspects of 
identities and histories”. Particular attention must be paid to the various ways in which both the 
respondent and the researcher assert power within a research encounter, as well as the shifting 
dynamics of power in the research process (75). 
 
With regard to sexual orientation, Pitman (2002:283), a lesbian researcher conducting research 
among GLBT students (gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgendered), found that the power relationships 
between herself and that of the researched “intensified and became even more complicated”. She 
experienced, on the one hand, having to confront her own assumptions of heterosexism, while on 
the other hand, paying particular attention to the existing power imbalances hidden within 
illusions of sameness. Similarly, Kreiger (1982:108) asserts that:  
 
As an insider, the lesbian has an important sensitivity to offer, yet she is also more 
vulnerable than the non-lesbian researcher…to pressure from the inside, from within the 
lesbian community itself – that her studies mirror not the reality of that community but its 
self-protective ideology. 
 
This statement reflects the difficulties embedded within the process of representation. As an 
insider-researcher, dilemmas arise when having to confront realities of particular communities 
and at the same time wanting to offer protection to these self-same communities, particularly if 
there is a strong sense of marginalisation or structural oppression.  
 
From the above excerpts it becomes clear that a shared identity between researcher and research 
subject does not automatically remove relationships of power. The advantages that might come 
with shared identity traits, for example, the possibility of enhanced rapport and understanding, 
must not be confused with shared experiences. Hence, it becomes important that the researcher, 
with an insider positioning, acknowledges the various subject positions that exist and the 
importance of self-reflexivity in the interview process in order to avoid superimposing views and 













In the study of religion, the insider/outsider debate developed alongside the emergence of the 
phenomenological approach within which the increased attention to one‟s presuppositions 
coupled with the value of empathy and sympathetic understanding is elaborated.
52
 Discussions 
included whether an outsider, who does not share religious affiliation with the research subject, 
can adequately understand, present and convey information about the respondent‟s 
understandings/experiences of a particular faith tradition (e.g. MacIntyre, 1999, originally 
published in 1964), the favouring of the religious insider, and the autonomy of religious 
experience (e.g. Eliade, 1999, originally published in 1968; Otto, 1999, originally published in 
1950), and the advantages of being an outsider researcher when studying religious experience 
and norms/behaviour (e.g. Segal, 1983). In addition, the case has been made for a neutral 
position, sometimes referred to as methodological agnosticism (Smart, 1973). Through utilising 
the methodological agnosticism approach, the scholar of religion is not attempting to determine 
whether particular religious traditions and/or individual utterances rooted in belief systems are 
true or false, but rather to investigate, analyse and compare narratives from various subject 
positions. However, this approach also underwent scholarly critique and the question was posed 
whether neutrality and complete detachment on behalf of the researcher was indeed attainable 
(e.g. Donovan, 1990; Hufford, 1995). 
  
Other scholars place more emphasis on the researcher‟s appropriation of knowledge and the 
potential insider/outsider binaries that can be (re)produced through this process. For instance, 
Ryba (2007:278-279) argues that: 
 
…religious meaning does not automatically entail a distinction between insider and 
outsider on the basis of either what is understood or how it is understood. That distinction 
is created by other considerations outside of the problem of accessibility of knowledge. 
The insider/outsider distinction emerges at the level of how and to what ends that 
knowledge is used.  
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 The phenomenological approach within the study of religion has a long and complex history. While there are a 
number of ways in which contemporary scholars of religion apply elements of the phenomenological approach in 
their academic work, the approach has been increasingly criticised by, for example, feminist, deconstructionist and 
post-structuralist theories in particular. For an overview of the key concepts, main theorists and points of 
contemporary critique of the phenomenological approach, see Douglas Allen, “Phenomenology of Religion” in 
Encyclopedia of Religion (2
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Thus, the researcher‟s application of the knowledge produced within a research encounter can 
reflect the rigid insider/outsider binary or fluidity between shifting subject positions. More recent 
developments in the study of religion show that researchers have turned their focus more towards 
constructing methodologies that pay more attention to self-reflexivity, subjectivity, lived 
experience and constellations of power (e.g. Brown, 1992; Jackson, 1989; M. Wolf, 1992).  
 
Sherif (2001:446), grappling with the ambivalence of being a „partial insider‟ when conducting 
fieldwork in Egypt, concludes that a partial insider status, in her case, gave her “access to and 
enhanced rapport with individuals in the society under study”. On the other hand, she 
experienced various levels of outsiderness with regard to respondents‟ understandings and 
expectations of language proficiency, gender norms and definitions of religious piety. Although 
initial rapport was established, due to a preconceived understanding of insiderness, the depth of 
the various interview encounters with regard to openness and sharing of intimate details might be 
implicated in various ways. For example, respondents might decide not to go into too much 
detail because they are under the assumption that the researcher is already familiar with their 
context, hence certain aspects of religious practice or gender relations, for instance, can be left 
unsaid. Or, respondents might choose not to share particular experiences due to fear of being 
judged, since it is assumed that the researcher shares, for example, a religious worldview. There 
are obviously other possible outcomes; however, these accounts exemplify the fluidity of 
multiple subject positions within research encounters.  
 
Along with the multiple locations of sameness and difference that a researcher can possess, I 
agree with Razavi (1992:161) who argues that “By virtue of being a researcher, one is rarely a 
complete insider anywhere”. By extension, I argue that a researcher is never fully an insider, nor, 
never fully an outsider. By moving like a pendulum along the insider/outsider continuum, a 
shifting interactional process in which the relationship between the researcher and the respondent 
is formed, there is an opportunity to explore the multiple subjectivities of both researcher and 
respondent. Consequently, by exploring what is unfamiliar to us, in the words of Julia Kristeva 
(1991), we also encounter the „stranger within‟. Hence, research encounters have the potential to 
be co-constructions in which redefinitions of the insider/outsider binary can take place in ways 













In addition, for me, the cultivation of self-reflexivity throughout the research process creates a 
greater awareness of the ethics of engagement and representation in the research relationship. 
This is less likely to propose monolithic and ethnocentric accounts of plural subjectivities that 
exist in lived realities. The cultivation of self-reflexivity throughout the research process is 
significant as it calls into question assumptions around objectivity and detachment. It also 
enables one to pay more attention to fluid identities, contradictions, positionality, multiple 
subjectivities and ambivalence.
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 It is within this framework that I identify my own positioning 
and also recognise the multiple subject positions that I myself move between.  
 
In my interview encounters I am aware that Muslim women‟s experiences are dependent on, 
shaped by and produced through a multiplicity of locations, including geographical context, 
political landscape, religious persuasion, upbringing, education, experiences of marginalisation, 
etc. Consequently, the experience of being a South African Muslim woman can never be 
identical for any two women. In addition, as Moore (1994:3) argues, experiences can also be 
understood as “embodied intersubjectivity” and are “irredeemably social and processual”. This 
means that the particular experiences that are being communicated in the interview process are 
first of all embodied interactions situated in a particular space and time. Hence, the coming 
together of embodied subjects (respondent and researcher) structures the ways in which 
particular experiences are being conveyed.  
 
Moore asserts that the feminist and anthropological proclivities to fix experience as ontological 
(e.g. experiences are understood as authentic and unchanging and reflect a singular autonomous 
subject) are unfortunate due to the fact that most experiences are re-produced in dialogical 
relationships and are therefore dependent on the context in which these narratives are 
transmitted, as well as the various subject positions taken up by the individuals involved in this 
interaction (Moore, 1994:2-3). Thus, experiences are always processual and open to multiple 
appropriations that are contingent on societal contexts and relationship dynamics. 
 
I view the traditional juxtaposition of the insider/outsider status as limiting since perceptions of 
researcher/respondents can change multiple times within one particular research setting. Factors 
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that might influence these shifting relationships are, among others, time spent with respondent, 
the contexts in which the interviews take place, the various ways in which the different 
respondents situate themselves within their local communities, and respondent/researcher 
experiences. I agree with Naples (2003) who elucidates the fluidity and interaction of 
insider/outsider dimensions:  
 
Outsiderness and insiderness are not fixed or static positions. Rather they are ever-
shifting and permeable social locations that are differentially experienced and expressed 
by community members. By recognizing the fluidity of outsiderness/insiderness, we also 
acknowledge…[that] as ethnographers we are never fully outside or inside the 
“community”; our relationship to the community is never expressed in general terms but 
is constantly being negotiated and renegotiated in particular, everyday interactions; and 
these interactions are themselves enacted in shifting relationships among community 
residents. These negotiations are manifest in local processes that reposition gender, class, 
and racial-ethnic relations among other socially constructed distinctions. (49)  
 
While being cognisant of these aforementioned theoretical and methodological insights, I was 
nonetheless curious as to how I would be received by the potential respondents. I anticipated that 
both access to the respondents as well as subsequently building rapport with the respondents 
would present a challenge. Not only was I, as a Norwegian, secular, white woman, so obviously 
different to my respondents but I was also researching the intimate and sensitive topic of 
sexuality and marriage. To my surprise, however, during a presentation of this current study to a 
local Muslim NGO, it was suggested to me by the Muslim participants that my Western 
background could in fact be an advantage when discussing these sensitive topics. This reasoning 
was premised on the understanding that a non-Muslim Western researcher might be perceived as 
less likely to impose value judgement on the women‟s experiences and the various decisions that 
they made within intimate relationships.   
 
When I commenced the networking process it became clear that Muslim women actually were 
interested in talking to me about these personal topics. Some women noted that “it is about time 
that someone do this type of research”, others responded by saying “I would very much like to 
share my story, it might be of benefit to other women”, yet others remarked “we are not really 
supposed to talk about things like that, but I feel that it is important, so ja…I‟m all up for it”. The 













about issues like sex and intimate relationships. It was brought up in several interviews that 
speaking about sex normally is viewed as taboo in the community, and the respondents often 
used aphorisms like “what happens in the bedroom stays in the bedroom” and “do not air your 
dirty laundry to strangers”. These understandings were often situated in what the respondent felt 
their religion required from them, namely, gossiping and talking about their intimate 
relationships with their husbands was seen as contrary to an Islamic ethic of appropriate 
behaviour.  
 
However, it appeared to me that the majority of the respondents felt comfortable with sharing 
intimate, difficult, traumatic and often previously untold stories with me. This openness can 
perhaps be explained through the anonymity and confidentiality assured the participants of this 
research. Hence, the understanding that no one can ever identify the respondent by name became 
a catalyst for the willingness to share personal experiences. Another reason for this openness can 
be that the respondents felt that they were contributing to important research, in which the 
overarching aim is to positively impact upon local Muslim communities and develop strategies 
to empower Muslim women. Hence, some women might see their input as being of benefit to 
other women. The benefit-justification was articulated by a few participants and resonated with 
their understandings of a religious ethical responsibility and obligation to do what can be of 
benefit to other people.  
 
Other participants might have felt comfortable sharing their experiences with me because of the 
fact that they perceived me as an outsider. It was noteworthy that respondents generally shared 
very intimate details about their sexual private life. For instance, a few women clearly expressed 
that they never talked about these things (the topics of the research) with anybody. This was a 
quite common assertion particular when it came to taboo topics like orgasm and self-stimulation. 
For example, one woman told me: “even up to now, do you know that I…I‟ve never told anyone 
this before, I don‟t think I‟ve ever had a proper orgasm because do you know what I do [when I 
feel it coming], I totally freeze until it goes away, not so that my husband picks it up”. In the 
process of this interview the respondent made several references to never having told anyone 














So the question arises about why she would choose to share these personal experiences with me. 
This might be rooted in the fact that some respondents saw me as an outsider and that the 
likelihood of my imposing value judgements, both regarding their openness about these topics as 
well as the experience itself, was seen as miniscule. However, their openness can also be linked 
to specific perceptions about my outsiderness – perhaps that of the white female European who 
is sometimes seen as sexually „free‟ or „liberal‟ and therefore is open to having conversations of 
this nature, a point made by participants in a seminar where I presented this study. Although 
none of the respondents in my study made explicit comments related to my „Western‟ descent 
with regard to sharing these intimate experiences, it is my perception that in some of the research 
encounters respondents might have felt a certain level of comfort with addressing particular 
issues related to sexual experiences due to their pre-conceived associations about my 
outsiderness. In particular, perceptions related to Western women‟s sexual openness and 
liberalism (although not always rendering positive connotations) might have been a catalyst for 
the varying ways in which matters of sexual intimacy were engaged.  
 
Thus, the openness when discussing sexuality and sexual experiences might have come about as 
a result of particular perceptions in which our differing cultural/religious levels of 
acceptability/taboo became evident. Some respondents clearly hinted in the direction that I might 
be able to offer them some advice with their sexual relationship. With regard to self-stimulation 
one respondent said: “I can‟t do that with my husband, he will think there is something wrong 
with me, but I think I must try…maybe it is gonna feel strange for me, but now I must learn how 
to do it”. This statement was made in the context of the respondent‟s emphasis on the lack of 
sexual fulfilment in her marital relationship. When I asked the respondent about self-stimulation 
her first reaction was to state that her husband would not agree with this. However, it became 
clear as the interview progressed that the respondent wanted to learn more about how to practise 
self-stimulation. The openness about this intimate topic is truly admirable and I see it as 
concomitant with the ways in which the respondents perceived me as the researcher. I would 
argue that the link between perceived outsiderness and the lesser likelihood of imposition of 
value judgements, bearing in mind the „taboo‟ nature of this topic, is of significance to the level 













abovementioned factors were of importance when a potential respondent decided whether or not 
to participate in this study.  
 
In addition, I would like to mention that on many occasions I experienced that the willingness to 
talk about personal issues also derived from the respondents‟ need to share particular, often 
difficult, experiences with me. I would like to alert the reader to the fact that a significant 
number of my respondents had experienced quite problematic and often painful marital 
relationships. These include, amongst other things, experiences with various forms of marital 
violence and sexual abuse, infidelity, and husband‟s abuse of drugs and alcohol. It is noteworthy 
that respondents who were currently in or had been in marital relationships that they 
characterised as positive, also tended to foreground their negative experiences. Even respondents 
who described their marital relationships as fairly satisfactory and enjoyable, often elaborated on 
particular marital and pre-marital experiences that were problematic for them. Thus, in many 
interviews it was difficult to explore what specifically was positive in their sexual and marital 
relationships.   
 
Hence, for some respondents, the interview provided an opportunity to share previously untold 
stories. For example, as mentioned above, respondents often expressed during the interview, “I 
have never told anyone about this before” or, “it is not acceptable in our community to talk about 
these things”. These responses were often situated within narratives dealing with the experience 
of child sexual abuse, rape, polygynous marital relationships, and forced sexual intercourse with 
their intimate partner. Many respondents had not previously shared these difficult experiences 
with anyone due to the perceived social taboo around these issues. The respondents also referred 
to the lack of existing channels within their local communities in which their stories would be 
taken seriously and dealt with appropriately. In addition, the unacceptability of sharing 
experiences of this nature was felt by many respondents who had in the past told close relatives 
or friends about their experience, as a result of which the latter‟s response was one of avoidance 
or denial. Thus, the need to talk about particular experiences, due to local context and 
inaccessibility of proper channels, came across as a strong catalyst in the respondents‟ 
willingness to share personal narratives. This notion of needing to speak forms a very important 













chapters of this dissertation. This need is also reflected in the duration of particular interviews 
and time spent with respondents.  
 
One of the anxieties that I had as an outsider researcher was that I did not want to reiterate 
stereotypes of Muslim women as abused, oppressed and mute victims. The fact that many of my 
respondents were exposed to various forms of marital violence determined some of the responses 
that I received in the interviews and subsequently impacted upon the structure and content of this 
dissertation. The narratives presented in the empirical component of this dissertation are 
reflective of the experiences of these particular respondents and are not representative of all 
Muslim women in South Africa.  
 
4.3  Developing the Interview-guide and Pilot studies 
As the empirical component of this study focuses on Muslim women‟s experiences, in which 
biographical narratives will form a major part, I decided to utilise semi-structured in-depth 
interviews (SSDIs) as the main research method when conducting the interviews. This 
qualitative approach seeks to avoid overwriting internally structured subjectivities by imposing 
external “objective” systems of meaning (Mishler, 1986). The semi-structured in-depth interview 
is designed in such a way that the researcher has prepared a number of open-ended interview 
questions in advance in order to elicit comprehensive and detailed narratives that can be analysed 
qualitatively (Lofland & Lofland, 1995). The researcher will ask the prepared questions in order 
to learn participants‟ perspectives and opinions; in extension, the questions also serve as a 
catalyst for further discussions. SSDIs were utilised to foreground women‟s narratives and to 
better capture the intricacy and richness of South African Muslim women‟s realities and 
experiences. 
 
The semi-structured, open-ended interview guide to be utilised in the interview process was 
developed while participating in a postgraduate course at the University of Cape Town (2006) 
that dealt with qualitative research interviewing. The course specifically focused on in-depth 
interviewing and analysis. After developing the conceptual framework and the preliminary semi-
structured interview guide, a presentation of the study was held for a local Muslim NGO. The 













well as valuable insight with regard to the preliminary semi-structured interview guide. 
Following the submission of the Ph.D. thesis proposal, the proposed qualitative study was 
approved by University of Cape Town‟s Research Ethics Committee, Faculty of Humanities.  
 
One focus-group interview with seven Muslim female participants was conducted to pilot the 
interview guide. The respondents were assured of confidentiality, asked to sign an informed 
consent form, and asked to complete a demographic questionnaire prior to the commencement of 
the focus group interview. The clarity of questions posed by the researcher, continuity of 
interview guide, flexibility and flow were explored in this focus group session. The participants 
responded to the open-ended questions in the interview guide as well as providing feed-back 
throughout the interview process. Hence, the aim of the focus group interview was twofold. 
Firstly, the semi-structured interview guide was piloted, and secondly, respondents were given 
the opportunity to critique, question and provide insights into the further improvement of the 
interview guide.  
 
This interview/feed-back process attempts to forge dialogical and non-hierarchical research 
relationships. The respondents actively contribute to the research process and are not 
„objectified‟ as passive recipients. Reciprocity and interaction in the interview process is 
highlighted by some scholars as one way of empowering respondents through research 
interviews by means of engaging in a participatory model (e.g. Oakley, 1981; Reinharz, 1992; 
Letherby, 2003; Mishler, 1986). The duration of this focus group interview was two hours. The 
data that emerged from this focus group as well as the commentaries provided were transcribed 
verbatim for analysis using Atlas.ti and used to further modify the content of the semi-structured 
interview guide, and to inform and strengthen the connections between the interview questions 
and the conceptual framework of the study.  
 
Two semi-structured in-depth interviews (SSDIs) were piloted after the modification of the 
interview guide. These one-on-one interviews lasted approximately two hours each. These two 
SSDIs were also transcribed verbatim for analysis using Atlas.ti. The information that emerged 
from these SSDIs was used to further improve the semi-structured interview guide and to 













4.4  Research setting  
 
The qualitative component of this study was conducted between November 2007 and March 
2009 among Muslim women residing in Cape Town. The majority of the fieldwork took place 
between February 2008 and November 2008. Due to the apartheid history of South Africa, most 
of the Muslim women who participated in this research project reside in areas that were formerly 
designated to Coloured, Indian, and Black South Africans in terms of apartheid law. Although a 
transition to democracy has taken place, economic and other structural barriers have influenced 
many Muslim families‟ lack of opportunities to move into previously white areas.  
 
According to the 2001 population census, the number of Muslims in South Africa is 
approximately 654 064 (1.5% of the South African population). The largest number of Muslims 
are found in the Western Cape (292 908), making up 6.5% of the total provincial population. 
Cape Town, with an estimated 2.8 million inhabitants, had an estimated number of 281 507 
Muslims in 2001. This means that in 2001, Muslims made up approximately 10% of the total 
population in Cape Town (Statistics South Africa, 2001). According to Aslam Fataar (2006), 
Cape Town is home to 46% of South Africa‟s Muslim population.  
 
4.5  Socio-Demographic Profiles of Participants 
 
The sample consisted of 33 Muslim women between the ages of 20 and 69 (median age: 44). All 
participants had been historically disadvantaged under the apartheid system. The only eligibility 
criterion for being a respondent in this study was that the participant self-identified as a South 
African Muslim woman. All participants were English and Afrikaans-speaking and 26 of the 33 
respondents stated that English was their first language. Due to the interviewer‟s mediocre 
knowledge of Afrikaans as well as the fact that the majority of the respondents preferred English, 
all interviews were conducted in English. The seven respondents who stated that Afrikaans was 
their first language did not have a problem with communicating in English. However, in many of 
the interviews a non-standard English dialect reflecting a combination of English and Afrikaans, 













„mengels‟ during my past six years in Cape Town I could pick up most of the nuances, 
nevertheless, the respondents who communicated in „mengels‟ or uttered particular 
sayings/aphorisms during the interview session would make sure to always translate the phrase 
into English to ensure that I understood the full picture.  
 
4.5.1   Racial/cultural grouping 
15 respondents self-identified as Malay, seven as Coloured, five as Indian, and three as African. 
Although I informed the respondents that the only eligibility criterion for being a respondent in 
this study was that the participant self-identified as a South African Muslim woman, three 
respondents chose to self-identify as “Other” in the category of “race/cultural grouping” and then 
wrote “Muslim” in the space provided in the demographics questionnaire.  
 
4.5.2   Educational level 
All respondents reported having some education (see Table 1). Differences in educational levels 
were evident. However, inferences cannot be drawn between levels of education and 
racial/cultural grouping as educational differences do not necessarily reflect racial/cultural self-
identification. Naeemah Abrahams (2002:102-105) argues that race and educational levels in 
South Africa are closely interlinked. She supports her argument by referring to findings in her 
own empirical study in which racial profile correlates with educational differences. This 
argument is also supported by information provided by Statistics South Africa (1996). However, 
in Abraham‟s research sample, racial category was determined by the researcher‟s observation of 













Table 1: Level of Education 
 
Level of Education 
Completed primary school 1 
Attended high school but did not complete Matric 9 
Completed Matric 5 
Attended university, college or technikon but did not 
graduate 
6 
Graduated from university, college or technikon 8 




4.5.3   Socio-economic status 
 
Table 2 shows socio-economic status of respondents. I have utilised a number of established 
indicators to describe the socio-economic status of respondents, as there is no single variable that 
can best capture this intricacy. The indicators included are annual family income before taxes, 
employment situation, means of transport, living situation and ownership of household items. A 
number of these variables, plus others, are frequently used in studies conducted in South Africa 













Table 2: Socio-economic status 
 
Socio-economic Status 
Annual family income before taxes 
Less than R10 000 
R10 001-R40 000 
R40 001-R80 000 
R80 001-R110 000 
R110 001-R170 000 
R170 001-R240 000 

































How do you get around? 
I get around mostly with my own car 
I get around mostly with someone else‟s car 
I get around mostly by taxi 
I get around mostly by bus 
I get around mostly by walking 



























Live with other adult(s), no children 
Live with other adult(s) and children 



























4.5.4 Marital status 
22 of the 33 respondents were currently married. Of the 22 women who were currently married, 
five were remarried. The reasons stated for dissolution of first marriage were infidelity of spouse, 
spousal abuse, incompatibility, death of husband and husband wanting a second wife. None of 
the respondents were currently in a polygynous union. However, six of the respondents had 
previously been in a polygynous marriage. Seven of the respondents were currently divorced; of 
which infidelity of spouse and spousal abuse were the most common reasons for initiating 














4.6   Procedure 
 
The respondents were identified and recruited through networking at various community events. 
For example, I spent hours in various social settings such as mosques, workshops conducted by 
local Muslim NGOs, unofficial social gatherings during Ramadan and other religious holidays, 
seminars hosted by Muslim activist groups, annual fairs that conveyed religious and cultural 
themes, informal Muslim women‟s groups, Muslim women‟s empowerment workshops, and 
public lectures related to Muslim interests in South Africa. These social encounters resulted in 
informal lengthy conversations with a variety of Muslim women. I informed the potential 
respondents about my current study, and invited them to participate if they were interested. Some 
of these encounters transpired into invitations to other social gatherings and some resulted in 
women wanting to participate in this study. When women indicated their interest in participating, 
the researcher made an appointment to conduct an interview. A few of the participants in this 
study were referrals from those interviewed. Other women initiated contact with me after hearing 
about this study from other women. No one who was approached declined to participate.  
 
No financial remuneration was offered to the respondents. However, some exceptions to this rule 
were made in particular situations. For example, in the interview sessions where I spent the 
whole day in the respondent‟s house, we would often go to the local tuck-shop or supermarket to 
get lunch/refreshments. In these circumstances I would offer to pay for the food. Other times, the 
respondent had cooked a meal that we shared during the interview session. In cases where I 
visited respondents more than once, I took savouries/drinks with me on subsequent visits.   
 
Given the levels of violent crime in Cape Town, and the prevalence of gang violence and drugs 
in some of the communities I visited, most of the interviews were conducted during day-time. I 
was also restricted in that I do not possess a driver‟s licence, consequently, in most of the 
interviews conducted in local communities I utilised public transport. For those familiar with the 
public transport system in Cape Town, it is not easy to get around after dark – along with 
obvious safety issues. Nevertheless, on some occasions when interviews lasted well into the 
evening, I was able to organise a lift home with close friends familiar with the Cape Flats. 













session, get myself into one of the local taxis before dark, and return to the respondent another 
day to finalise the interview.  
   
4.7  The interview process 
 
Most interviews were conducted at the respondents‟ homes. At the time of the interview, the 
respondents were explained the details of the study, assured of confidentiality, asked to sign an 
informed consent form, and asked to complete a demographic questionnaire.
54
 The respondents 
were informed about their right to withdraw their consent from participating in the study at any 
time during the interview process. The respondents were also informed of the opportunity to 
know the results of the study when these were available. The semi-structured interview guide 
was used as a basis for the interview session. All questions were open-ended and designed to 
elicit from the respondents comprehensive and detailed narratives that could subsequently be 
analysed qualitatively.  
 
All interviews were audio-taped so that respondents‟ narratives could be illustrated with 
verbatim quotations in this thesis; also, the audio-taping of interview sessions also allows for 
accuracy when re-presenting individual narratives. Based on the experiences of the pilot studies, 
one focus group and two SSDIs, the length of the interview was planned to be approximately two 
hours. However, the majority of the interviews I conducted lasted more than two hours. On most 
occasions I spent the whole day with the respondent, with four hours being the longest audio-
taped interview. It is salient to mention that the informal talk both before and after the „official‟ 
audio-taped interview also contributes to the ways in which the research process is constructed 
and perceived by both the researcher and the respondent. At the end of each interview, the 
interviewer initiated a session in which the respondent could express her feelings about the 
interview process and questions she had regarding the aims and objectives of this research 
project in general. These conversations were useful in terms of addressing potential anxieties the 
respondent might have with regard to the use of research material emerging from the interview. 
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4.8   Analysis 
 
The interviews were transcribed and entered into Atlas.ti, a computer programme that assists in 
the analysis of textual data by enabling the researcher to manage large amounts of text with the 
use of linking and search functions. Atlas.ti thus facilitates textual analysis and interpretation by 
means of various coding procedures described below.  
 
The first phase of analysis consisted of reading through the transcripts searching for natural 
meaning units that emerged from text. The holistic-content approach outlined by Lieblich, Tuval-
Mashiach and Zilber (1998) was utilised as the main analytical approach, as its starting point is 
the whole narrative of the respondent in which “sections of the text are interpreted in the context 
of other parts of the narrative” (12).  
 
A sample of five transcribed interviews served as a preliminary guide to outline key themes and 
preliminary codes. The selection of a subset of the research data is informed by Miles and 
Huberman‟s “inter-subjective consensus” (1994:11) and Morse et.al‟s (2002:9) concept of “an 
active analytical stance”. This technique is applied in order to test the analytical tools developed 
so that modification and refinement can take place before engaging with the rest of the research 
material.  
 
While reading through the transcripts I wrote comments in a separate column to clarify 
respondents‟ answers, highlight essential elements of narratives, noting particular concerns 
related to interview process and other observations that were seen as influential with regard to 
the process of analysis. The approach outlined by Coffey & Atkinson (1996) has been influential 
in how I think about the relationships between a study‟s conceptual framework, the data that 
emerges from a study and how to apply and formulate these realities into a broader social 
context. The idea of thinking beyond the data itself, as well as being able to establish a dialogical 
relationship with the data, is important in all phases of the research process. Coffey & Atkinson‟s 
concept of “abductive reasoning” (1996:156) is especially useful when it comes to the thinking 













researcher to cognitively relate the particularities of the data to the broader social context, and to 
actively utilise these particularities to inform new theories about social constructs.  
 
After having gone through the five first transcripts, a codebook was developed. The codebook 
was based on the content of the respondents‟ narratives and emerging themes. As such, the codes 
were developed ad hoc during the analysis of the transcripts and were not stated a priori. This 
approach is open-ended and highlights the respondents‟ narratives. The process of coding 
continued as I started engaging with the rest of the interview transcripts. As the transcripts were 
read and re-read, excerpts were coded as they related to the preliminary codebook. The codebook 
was revised and modified several times during this process as new codes emerged and/or 
recoding was necessary.  
 
The next phase of analysis was to group the developed codes into broader categories. Codes were 
defined, similarities/differences were identified according to the content, and themes were 
labelled. The approach of Miles and Huberman (1994), which includes the comparison of data 
with data, category with category and concept with concept (three-level analysis), with strategies 
for ensuring analytical rigour (Morse et.al, 2002:9) such as “investigator responsiveness”, 
“methodological coherence”, “theoretical sampling and sampling adequacy”, “an active analytic 
stance” and “saturation”, was utilised in this process. Finally, I listened to the original audio-
taped interviews in light of the codes and categories developed as well as the study‟s conceptual 
framework. This was done in order to modify codes and categories as well as interrogate coded 
units of meaning as they related to the initial conceptual research framework. 
 
Atlas.ti was used to call up all the categories and codes developed and visual networks were 
created in order to outline potential relationships between codes and categories. This enabled an 
overview of the data and also provided a final examination of the model developed through the 
process of analysis. The visual networks also facilitated an identification of overarching themes 














In order to respect participants‟ anonymity and confidentiality, identifying details and signifiers 
are omitted from this study. In addition, only pseudonyms are used in reporting the findings from 
this study. 
 
4.9  Research Ethics 
 
The “University of Cape Town Code for Research Involving Human Subjects” was applied as a 
guideline for conducting this research.
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 I conducted the research in a responsible and respectful 
manner in accordance with these ethical principles. I have tried my best throughout this research 
to ensure scholarly integrity and accountability. With emphasis on informed consent and 
anonymity, I assure that truthful and respectful exchanges between the respondents and the 
researcher (author) have taken place. All documents related to this research endeavour have been 
stored in an appropriate manner.
56
   
 
In the following chapters of this dissertation I illustrate, through the use of quotations from the 
conducted interviews, Muslim women‟s understandings and experiences of sexual realities. I 
highlight the varying ways in which dominant discourses can influence intimate relationship 
dynamics and marital relationships more broadly. I pay particular attention to the weight of 
religious epistemologies and the ways in which they inform dominant discourses on sexuality. 
By extension, I investigate Muslim women‟s perceptions and embodiment of some of these 
dominant discourses and the ways in which particular understandings are mitigated, subverted 
and contested through women‟s experiential and lived realities.  
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 See Appendix V, “University of Cape Town Code for Research Involving Human Subjects”. 
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 The research data (consent forms, demographic questionnaire, audio-recordings and field notes) have been stored 
in a filing cabinet in my research office, to which only I have access as I am the only holder of the key. Dr. Sa‟diyya 
Shaikh and I are the only two people that have reviewed and processed the data obtained through the research. In 














On Being a Muslim Woman in South Africa 
 
In this chapter I explore the various ways in which the respondents in this research project spoke 
about the role of religion in their lives and the ways in which they reflected on being a Muslim 
woman in South Africa. There were a number of ways in which the respondents thought about 
religiosity in relation to self-definition, ranging from those who expressed the salience of various 
established religious practices to those who highlighted a more individual form of religiosity 
within which internal modes of being were emphasised.  
 
On the one end of the continuum, several respondents articulated a very distinctive religious 
identity, often expressing the notion that „Islam is a complete way of life‟. It is noteworthy that 
for many of these respondents, particular external markers of religious identity were seen as 
fundamental for the ways in which religiosity and a Muslim identity was expressed. For 
example, many respondents said that traditional dress and covering of their hair was essential to 
the way in which they identified as a Muslim woman. Also, many respondents were 
foregrounding the importance of observing particular aspects of religious praxis, such as 
performing the five daily prayers and going on hajj, as central to the ways in which they 
embodied a religious identity.
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 On the other end of the continuum, many respondents, while 
expressing the importance of religion in their lives, seemed to be less concerned with some of the 
external markers of religious identity. For example, for some of these respondents various forms 
of Islamic dress were not salient for the ways in which they conceptualised and asserted their 
identity as Muslim women. Many of these respondents focused on broader religio-ethical 
principles and the importance of being conscious of God as central to the ways in which a 
religious identity was expressed in social contexts. For some respondents, cultivating particular 
personal moral qualities in and through human interactions and broader social relationships was 
an important means of conceptualising a religious identity. This understanding also mirrored 
articulations made by respondents for whom particular external markers of religion were 
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significant. A few respondents also seemed to be quite critical of Muslim communities, 
highlighting the ways in which seemingly normative practices, such as wearing a scarf, have 
been equated with expressing a „correct‟ kind of religious identity. For these women, the 
importance of opening up to different ways of being Muslim and consequently various ways of 
expressing a Muslim identity was seen as salient.  
 
When my respondents reflected on what it meant to be a Muslim woman in South Africa, there 
were a number of influential discourses that emerged as significant for the ways in which they 
spoke about their identity as Muslim women. For many respondents, a sense of privilege and 
deep appreciation was expressed with regard to the freedom of religious practice present in the 
South African context. There was a common perception that South Africa allowed for a diversity 
of religious expression and provided many respondents with a sense of safety and confidence to 
assert a distinct and integrous religious identity as Muslim women. This perception was often 
contrasted with existing dominant popular discourses in Western contexts where Muslim women 
were seen to be represented as oppressed or mute victims in ways that effectively limited their 
religious identity in those contexts. A few women who had travelled to various European 
countries noted their own experiences of being subject to such stereotypes. The following 
narratives illustrate some of the ways in which respondents referred to these various discourses 
in speaking about being a Muslim woman in South Africa: 
 
The fact that we have freedom of religion is extremely important. You hear constantly 
how people are being harassed in other countries where they don‟t have freedom of 
religion, so I appreciate that fact [that in South Africa] I can wear my hijab as prescribed 
by the Qur‟an, so the freedom to do that, I can attend the mosque, I can walk down the 
street [with hijab] I‟m not being harassed, so I can practise my religion freely. (Saba) 
 
I feel very proud and very privileged to be a Muslim South African woman because we 
are free to practise our religion at any time [whenever you want], you can dress as a 
Muslim and we‟re proud of it, whereas in other countries people are restricted and even 
locked up, so I‟m very proud to be a South African Muslim. (Shirin) 
 
I feel quite proud, it has been a long process for me in terms of thinking about my 
identity as a Muslim woman and what that means. I think that I have realised just in terms 
of my exposure to people from outside of South Africa how fortunate and privileged I am 













women in other countries, and I think I‟ve maybe taken for granted the freedom with 
which I can practise my religion. (Zaida) 
 
Hence, a common theme that featured in many respondents‟ narratives was the profound 
gratitude expressed concerning the realities of religious pluralism and freedom in South Africa. 
Although a few respondents had travelled to various European countries, it is significant that 
respondents who never had travelled outside South Africa also pointed to these dominant 
Western discourses as a contrast to the ways in which South Africa provides a safe space for 
expressing a distinct Muslim identity. In particular, the issue of freedom to don Muslim dress 
and not being subject to harassment was highlighted by many of the respondents.  
 
One of the respondents who had travelled to a few European countries experienced some of the 
dynamics operating in countries where Muslim minorities live in a different secular landscape. In 
our interview she explained that she felt unwelcome in these secular contexts, a sentiment largely 
generated through being subjected to looks of suspicion and pity. Conversely, another respondent 
who had travelled as a single woman to the Netherlands experienced being harassed by some of 
the Muslim men residing there. She explains: “I don‟t think I want to do it again because of how 
I was perceived in a strange country by Muslim men. It was terrible! I think they saw me as 
available, and I got stalked”. Thus, experiences of harassment were articulated both in relation to 
discourses that stereotype Muslim women, as well as through particular expectations in Muslim 
communities in the Netherlands that a „good‟ Muslim woman does not travel alone. This latter 
point suggests salient differences between Muslim minority populations situated in different 
national and geopolitical landscapes. Also, it raises some interesting questions regarding broader 
global Islamic discourses on gender, within which conservative articulations on gender dynamics 
sometimes are retained within particular segments of Muslims minorities living in Western 
contexts.
58
 In my perception, the ways in which many of the respondents spoke about being part 
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 Interestingly, a current debate in Norway with regard to Muslim minorities is the presence of a „Muslim moral 
police‟, trying to enforce „correct‟ religious Muslim behaviour/dress particularly in the Norwegian capital of Oslo. 
On 9
th
 January 2010, the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten printed the headline: “Grønnland is more Muslim than 
Morocco” [my trans, original Norwegian headline: “Grønnland er mer muslimsk enn Marokko”]. Many Muslim 
women who reside in Grønnland, a central part of Oslo with a large Muslim population, report experiences of 













of the South African context suggested high levels of comfort, integration and identification with 
the broader South African environment. For example, Waheeda asserted that:  
 
In other countries, a lot of the Muslim immigrants seem to be an appendage to the rest of 
the population, whether it is in the US or Europe. I think because of the history of slavery 
from Indonesia and Malaysia, Muslims has come a long way with the history of this 
country, so in that sense being Muslim here you feel part of the tapestry of the country, 
and it is very easy and normal to see people wearing traditional gear [Muslim dress]. 
 
In comparison with the South African context, migration of Muslims from predominantly 
Muslim countries to European countries is a more recent historical occurrence, and these 
contexts are often characterised by increasing polarisations.
59
 Anti-immigration political parties 
advocate assimilation for minorities and negative media portrayals of abused and victimised 
Muslim women reiterate particular stereotypes of uncivilised and cruel Muslims. Thus, the 
secular landscapes in European contexts are dominated by binary representations that place 
Muslims outside the parameters of normative European citizenry.
60
 In contrast, South Africa 
                                                                                                                                                             
and „slut‟, are the most common types of harassment. In particular, harassment is reported to have taken place when 
a so-called Western dress or non-Muslim dress is adopted by Muslim women, which for some Muslim men means 
that women are fair game. Some women stated that they tried to avoid going into this area as far as possible, 
whereas others said that they dressed traditionally in order to avoid harassment. This form of religious conservatism 
is also experienced by homosexuals entering or residing in this area. Late last year (2009), a gay couple were 
physically attacked while walking in Grønnland because they were holding hands. The man who attacked them had 
reportedly said that they were walking in a Muslim neighbourhood and that this kind of behaviour was prohibited 
there. A direct consequence of this incident is that the annual Norwegian gay and lesbian parade has been moved 
(from the centre of town, where it is traditionally held), and is now planned to start from Grønnland. This decision is 
a critical response to the incident that took place in Grønnland and can be seen as a form of social protest 
(Lundgaard and Stokke, 2010:16-18).  
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 Muslims originally arrived at the Cape in the 17
th
 century as Indonesian slaves, workers, and political exiles 
imprisoned by the Dutch colonialists. The history of Muslims in South Africa has been shaped by the legacies of 
colonialism and apartheid. For work dealing more thoroughly with the history of Muslim arrival and presence in 
South Africa, see for example, Mukadam, 1990; Vahed, 2000; and Tayob, 1999.  
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 The continuous hijab debate in many European countries is a good example of a particular discourse that 
primarily depicts Muslim women as „other‟, and the practice of regulating as well as prohibiting the wearing of hijab 
in various social settings (e.g. public schools and the workplace) enhances the disparities between the us/them 













appears to present an easier and more welcome home to its Muslim citizens. These dynamics 
reflect some of the diverse and multiple ways in which Muslim subjectivities are produced in 
relation to broader contextual and global realities. Thus, the relational nature of particular 
subjectivities to their specific social contexts illustrates the complex relationship between 
discursive production of meaning and the formation of the Muslim subject.  
 
The notions of freedom expressed by some of the respondents resonate with liberal theorists‟ 
engagement with the concept of negative freedom. Liberal theorists often distinguish between 
positive and negative freedom, where negative freedom is conceived of as the “absence of 
external obstacles to self-guided choice and action, whether imposed by the state, corporations, 
or private individuals” (Mahmood, 2001:207). Arguably, the notions of freedom articulated in 
some of the excerpts above are expressed through elaborating aspects of the South African 
context vis-à-vis Western contexts, within which the absence of particular structures of 
oppression in the South African context represents freedom, e.g. freedom from discourses that 
regulate dress/religious expressions, freedom from harassment, etc. In addition, several 
respondents placed emphasis on Islam as a guiding framework for correct actions, behaviour and 
dress. In this particular context it would seem that liberal assumptions about autonomy and self-
expression enable South African Muslim women to live their lives in ways that do not limit their 
religious expressions. There was one notable exception. Nazreen, who spent several years in 
Saudi Arabia, had a different experience. She explains: 
 
I think for me it is more about being a Muslim woman because I see myself as Muslim 
first and South African second. Being Muslim really shapes my identity completely, but I 
think the difficulty of being Muslim in South Africa is the fact that we are a minority. 
The fact that most people don‟t understand anything about Islam and the new so-called 
                                                                                                                                                             
erecting minarets (tower of a mosque) in Switzerland, an initiative launched by the Swiss People‟s Party and the 
Federal Democratic Union. As of November 2009, the constitutional amendment banning the construction of new 
minarets was approved. Following this decision, an appeal has been submitted to the European Court of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg where it is pending further examination. For work dealing more extensively with questions of 
minorities in a European context as well as representations of „otherness‟, see for example, Yvonne Y. Haddad and 
Jane I. Smith (eds.), 2002; Shanaz Khan, 2002; Hoel and Shaikh, 2007; Michela Ardizzoni, 2004; Kylie Baxter, 
2006; Stacey Burlet and Helen Reid, 1998; Chouki El Hamel, 2002; and Adrien Katherine Wing and Monica Nigh 













war on terror has added another dimension to being Muslim. The other thing that I 
struggle with is that I find that people assume certain things. They assume that I am 
oppressed or that I always wear a scarf. People ask questions like “isn‟t it hot?” or “is it 
your choice?” and there is this assumption there. This I struggle with [...] having lived in 
a Muslim country, there is an acceptance [there] in a way that I don‟t find here. So there 
is a sense that people are somewhat intolerant [in South Africa] and that for me is 
difficult. 
 
Nazreen stresses the importance of a Muslim identity as salient to the way in which she sees 
herself. Arguably, Nazreen‟s experience of living for so many years in Saudi Arabia, where her 
identity as a Muslim woman could be more comfortably expressed, influences her understanding 
of what it means for her to be Muslim in South Africa. For her, to be a Muslim woman is on the 
one hand a continuous identity. However, on the other hand, Nazreen‟s Muslim identity also 
becomes mitigated through changing contextual circumstances. She perceives being a Muslim 
woman in a majority context as different from being a Muslim woman in a minority context. 
Thus, various discourses holding particular notions about what it means to be a Muslim woman 
influence self-understandings and expressions of religious identity in relation to contextual 
realities. Often, religious identities are constituted through fluid and ambiguous components, 
reflecting continuity and change. Thus, the ways in which a Muslim identity is maintained and 
articulated in a South African context possibly reflect the shifting assumptions and perceptions 
embedded within dominant discourses of what it means to be a Muslim woman in a broader 
secular context, which are dissimilar to discourses of what it means to be a Muslim woman in a 
predominantly Muslim society.  
 
It is notable that Nazreen does not raise any particular problematic issues concerning being a 
Muslim woman in Saudi Arabia. For other Muslim women situated in contexts in which 
women‟s rights discourses and gender justice form a natural part of their social contexts, Saudi 
Arabia and other Muslim majority countries like Afghanistan are often portrayed as quite 
conservative and restrictive with regard to their treatment of women. The fact that Nazreen is 
markedly silent about the functioning of gender dynamics in Saudi Arabia might imply that for 














Nazreen places emphasis on people‟s lack of knowledge about Islam in South Africa as one of 
the primary reasons intolerance and prejudice exist. As opposed to some of the views articulated 
by other respondents, Nazreen‟s narrative reflects experiences of embodying the stereotypes 
often attributed to Muslim women in Western contexts, e.g. the oppressed, voiceless and 
subservient Muslim woman. 
 
The excerpts above illustrate that South African Muslim women make sense of their identities in 
relation to a number of contexts. For some respondents, being a Muslim woman in South Africa 
is both empowering and positive with regard to the perceived freedom of religious expression 
and they often identified as part of the South African „tapestry‟. For other respondents, Muslim 
minority contexts are more challenging due to the dominant discourses that espouse particular 
depictions of Muslim women as „other‟. Also, popular media discourses portraying Muslim 
women as victims of religious patriarchy have increasingly seeped into the public South African 
imaginary, particularly after 9/11, and might shape perceptions of women embodying a Muslim 
identity also in a South African context. Seemingly, South African Muslim women often draw on 
Muslim women‟s experiences elsewhere, real and perceived, when engaging with issues of 
religious identity and self-definitions. This shows that Islam is part of a global landscape within 
which a number of discourses inform Muslim women‟s subjectivities and experiences. 
 
In addition, a few respondents more explicitly articulated that their Muslim identity was more 
significant for self-definition than a South African identity. These narratives suggested that 
binaries between religious and secular identities exist. For example, Hamedah asserts:  
 
You are not part of society first and then a Muslim, you are first a Muslim and then you 
are part of society. And as a Muslim person in South Africa I feel that I got all my rights, 
I can do anything I want but my parameters are my religion, that is what I do my things 
within. I do have a problem with them [secular society] telling you what to eat and what 
to drink, you [as a Muslim are] already divorcing yourself from the society by not 
drinking what they drink and not eating what they eat, or by dressing differently, so you 
already have made your distinction.  
 
For Hamedah, a Muslim identity is navigated through rigidly contrasting secular and Islamic 













narrative through dietary praxis. Here, distinct dietary regulations form a clear boundary of 
religious identity. Parameters of inclusivity/exclusivity are embodied through practices related to 
dress and food, which foreground a Muslim identity as different from a non-Muslim identity. For 
Hamedah, distinctive external markers of identity provide her with a Muslim space within the 
South African landscape.  
 
Whilst Hamedah appreciates the freedom to practise her religion within the South African social 
landscape, her conceptualisation of freedom is related to her ability to adhere to a particular 
religious worldview that provides guidance and structure, through religious norms, for correct 
action, behaviour, lifestyle, personal relationships, etc. Thus, for her, her perception of freedom 
is articulated through the capacity to practise Islam. If no restrictions are placed on religious 
agency within the secular context of South Africa, then freedom of religion is experienced to the 
extent that believing individuals have the capability to act in accordance with religious 
prescriptions. 
 
Hamedah‟s phrase “parameters [of] my religion” introduces an important construct that I explore 
in greater depth in the following chapters of this dissertation. How are these parameters of 
religion formulated in a South African context within which poverty, unemployment and 
violence are salient manifestations? What are the sources of authority that define and produce the 
parameters of religion? What constitutes the parameters of religion for Muslim women in South 
Africa? How do certain parameters of religion lend themselves to being negotiated, subverted 
and challenged in social contexts? And, what are the ways in which particular parameters of 
religion inform Muslim women‟s lives? The notion of „parameters of religion‟ opens itself up for 
critical engagement with the ways in which religious norms and construction of the religious 
subject are articulated in contemporary local contexts. 
 
5.1  Islam is a Way of Life 
 
When asked the question of the significance of religion in their lives, it was noteworthy that 
many respondents expressed the notion of Islam as a complete way of life, permeating 













religiosity through reflecting on their past experiences in which particular impoverished social 
conditions became transparent. Seemingly, for some respondents, experiences of financial 
constraints and challenging, sometimes brutal, marital relationships can be seen as salient for the 
ways in which religiosity was cultivated and embraced in relation to experiential realities. Also, 
some respondents elaborated on a personal process of transformation to illustrate their current 
religious connectedness. Often, the phrase “Islam is a way of life” encompassed a large range of 
experiences and interpersonal interactions. For example, Leila explains:  
 
He [husband] started to have this extra-marital affair [and] I was diagnosed with cancer, 
and then my breast was removed and I went for chemo and I didn‟t have the support of 
my husband. At least you got a God, you got something to believe in, and then you cling 
to that God that can really lead you out of your misery. He gives you comfort and he 
nurtures your soul, and yes the body is already so full of scars that the soul is already 
aching, so you seek that spirit, and you seek that guidance from him. If you are just 
yourself and do righteous things then Allah will open so many doors for you, and you 
know so many doors has been opened [for me] it has been proven, God has proved to me 
Nina that he is there, so he takes care of me. I believe that Islam is a way of life, [it is] 
how you do things, it is the choices that you make, that is my Islam. God has chosen you 
and you [need to] accept your responsibility [with regard] to the choices that you make, 
and what you do, [you must] not blame somebody else. You must first sweep in front of 
your own door and the path will become clearer. I did a lot of injustice to myself, because 
I had long hair, and I loved my make-up and I loved my style of dressing, I just loved it. 
But that is an injustice to yourself, you don‟t see it [then], but now you are older, you got 
more matured and then you feel like… something is missing in your life. Allah put that in 
your mind, make your prayers on time, you must pray, I must pray, then you feel so nice, 
because all the Muslims pray on one time [at the same time] and they are connected…. 
 
Similarly, Shafieka asserts: 
 
If you have your creator within here [points to her heart], everything falls into place. I can 
say it because I know where I came from, what I became when I was married to my first 
husband. When I divorced him [I became…] they will say reborn, that is when I started to 
spiritually uplift myself. And today I won‟t say that I regret leaving my first husband, I 
am sad about it. I didn‟t know if I was doing the right thing, but then I thought to myself 
that I have been living in hell all these years and my decision was a good one. As I said I 
have gone through a lot. It was just with the help of Allah that brought me here otherwise 
I would have never… if I was weak I would maybe [have] been on the streets selling my 
body for my children. It is just because that I had Allah in the back of my mind, always 
asking for guidance, always being satisfied with what little I have, and I said al-
hamdullillah shukran Allah. I was very naughty I never used to wear a scarf. That was 













I had to be thankful for, that was who I was missing. So all those years I had everything 
but really nothing because the thing you needed was Allah in your life, and then my life 
changed. So I changed and now I can say that religion is like everything for me. 
 
Leila and Shafieka have been through different cycles and experiences in their lives. As a result 
they both seem to have undergone a number of personal transformations, including leaving 
extremely challenging and painful marital relationships. They each also adopted different ways 
of dressing which seems to be connected to an increased spiritual awareness. Their religiosity is 
first and foremost articulated through their feeling that God sustained them in very difficult 
times. For both Leila and Shafieka, religion appears to be a tremendous source of strength. In 
particular, at the times in their lives when there was clearly no social support, nor support from 
their husbands, be it financial or emotional, their understandings of and belief in God provided 
them with a sense of security. Arguably, their belief in God allowed for particular understandings 
of being protected and being taken care of in a social context of scarcity and threat. Thus, 
profound experiences of God‟s presence in their lives kept them centred and enabled them to 
continue surviving through conditions of poverty, violence, drugs, and disempowering marital 
dynamics.  
 
Both Leila and Shafieka are divorced due to having experienced various forms of abuse in their 
marriage as well as spousal infidelity. Shafieka also speaks about her ex-husband‟s drug 
addiction and points out that this had a severely damaging effect on their marital relationship. 
Her husband spent all the money that he made on drugs like mandrax and dagga and did not care 
about whether the children had something to eat for supper. Shafieka explains that she can see 
the scars left by her ex-husband‟s drug abuse and explicit violence, in the behaviour manifesting 
in her children. She explains that one of her sons is currently using a drug called tik, and another 
son is violent and abusive towards his own children.  
 
After leaving her husband, one of the primary reasons Shafieka was able to carry on with her life 
was her belief in the power and the spiritual sustenance she received from God. Her financial 
difficulty, due to her husband‟s lack of financial contribution to her and their four children, was 
so severe that she could envisage herself on the streets. In our interview, Shafieka told me 













imagining eating delicious feasts. Shafieka explains: “Ashraf [her son] does not eat chicken so he 
imagines that it is steak...and he takes the bread and he says: „mmm...nice steak‟...you can see 
the joy in the child‟s face when he is eating dry bread”. 
 
Poverty and dire economic constraints govern Shafieka‟s life. However, although her situation is 
difficult due to the scarcity of resources, the way in which she deals with her reality is admirable. 
Shafieka‟s creativity in this excerpt shown through interaction with her children in matters of 
food illuminates her unique sense of resourcefulness in very challenging times. I would like to 
evoke Fiona Ross‟s concept of con-viviality to further reflect on these creative responses to 
impoverishment and the dynamics of „lack‟. For Ross, con-viviality is: 
 
an ethic that seeks to secure life, both life itself and „good‟ life as it is made through 
relationships. Con-viviality used in this sense anticipates that life itself, being alive, is at 
stake in social worlds, and that it is accomplished alongside and through others. It does 
not necessarily anticipate peaceableness in everyday relations but extends a notion of 
alertness and liveliness to life‟s contingency. Con-viviality thus includes awareness of the 
limits of life-making, including violences of many kinds – interpersonal, symbolic and 
structural. (2009, draft paper for discussion) 
 
Despite the continuous presence of these dire conditions of lack, Shafieka finds new and 
constructive ways of living with joyfulness. Shafieka secures the continuation of life for herself 
and for her children by employing a particular ethics of survival in interaction with her children. 
The way in which she engages with her children when having supper shows that con-vivial 
relationships can be cultivated through performative acts of playfulness. Shafieka transforms the 
dynamics of „lack‟ into imaginary ways of „having‟. At the same time, an awareness of harsh 
social conditions is manifested through these very acts of playfulness where the imagined 
becomes real, and the real becomes imagined. 
 
For Leila as well, the presence of God in her life empowered her to go through chemotherapy 
while simultaneously trying to cope with the fact that her husband was being unsupportive and 
sleeping with another woman. Shafieka‟s and Leila‟s narratives point towards broader social 
conditions within which poverty, spousal abuse and drugs are among some of the difficult factors 













dynamics are salient with regard to how Muslim identity and personhood are negotiated and 
formulated.  
 
It is noteworthy that both Leila and Shafieka stress the significance of dress in order to illustrate 
a process of personal transformation. Hijab is seen as part of an embodied religiosity that not 
only expresses a Muslim identity but a spiritual connectedness to God. Both Leila and Shafieka 
recount a past life where they used make-up and did not wear a scarf. Part of their respective 
personal transformations is symbolised through adopting an external marker of religious identity 
that seemingly strengthened an inner connectedness to God and allowed for the cultivation of the 
spiritual self and an increased awareness of a religious identity. For both Leila and Shafieka, 
their subjective process of transformation becomes pronounced through their shifting social 
relationships and contextual circumstances, and their new sense of self is intimately interlinked 
with increased levels of religiosity. In some sense, wearing the hijab symbolises this personal 
transformation. 
 
The religiosity expressed by Leila and Shafieka is related to making particular choices in their 
lives, and a religious worldview has in a sense empowered them to make these choices. Thus, 
religion is not something that has been imposed. Rather, religion has enabled Leila and Shafieka 
to exercise particular forms of agency in very trying and unmerciful social conditions. By 
extension, their religious worldview foreground certain kinds of responsibilities for the ways in 
which they lead their lives. Part of this decision-making process has involved cultivating a sense 
of God-consciousness through expressing devotion and piety. This is contrasted with an 
articulated awareness that previously, they made other choices. However, these other choices 
made transparent feelings of „missing something‟, which highlighted the need to be spiritually 
connected with God. 
 
In addition, Leila elaborates that regular ritual prayer is empowering, bringing about not only a 
deepening spiritual connection with God but also a sense of connectedness, community and 
belonging with fellow Muslims. As such, prayer in light of the notion of con-viviality can be 
seen as an empowering response to a disempowering context. By making prayer an integral 













midst of challenging, sometimes life-threatening social realities. The significance of prayer 
(salah) was emphasised by many respondents, highlighting a spiritual component that can be part 
of everyday life.  
 
5.2  The Value of Prayer for Religious Identity and Social Development  
 
One of the main pillars of Islam, the salah, to be performed five times per day, constitutes a 
salient part of many women‟s religiosity and identity as Muslims. For my respondents, the 
integrating function of salah, where body, soul and spirit can be united, establishes a sense of 
interconnectedness with God. In addition, a central theme that emerged in their narratives was 
the relationship between prayer and ethical behaviour. Many respondents perceived prayer and 
ethics to be intertwined in an organic relationship, informing behaviour and attitudes. For 
example, a number of respondents spoke about cultivating humility through the act of prayer. 
Some respondents placed emphasis on the harmonising function of prayer. And yet others 
highlighted the social responsibilities that often come to the fore through the performance of 
prayer. For many respondents, prayer functioned at multidimensional levels, within which 
various combinations of subjectivation and moral agency were entwined. In the following 
narrative Shamielah elaborates on particular advantageous aspects regarding prayer, illustrating 
the various ways in which prayer as a form of religious expression can be embedded in daily life:  
 
I look at the salah, the five salah, as your reminders throughout the day that there is a 
God, and this God has placed us here for a reason. If you keep that in mind it doesn‟t give 
you that big-headed feeling that I am in charge, because you need humility to be able to 
deal with people. What happens is that the actual physical way of making salah humbles 
you, because you are taking your intellect [ego] and putting it on the ground. That 
physical movement humbles you, and humility is necessary to deal with other people and 
to deal with your children. Also it is what you say in your salah, [it] is [the] message that 
God keeps giving you: “Be kind to people, educate people”. So you are getting the 
message that you need to go out there and educate people, you need to understand the 
message. Also salah puts discipline into your life, you need to get up early in the 
morning, and that already brings discipline to you. Salah teaches you punctuality. A 
punctual person is a reliable person. Who is the one who is going to get the job? The guy 
who is punctual, the man who is there with a smile, the humble man. Also salah is your 
time-out, it is actually a meditation. So there you got five times a day where you are 
meditating where nobody is going to disturb you. Your kids are going to say „mommy is 













on that musalla [prayer mat] they [children and people in general] will leave you alone. 
So a busy mother gets her time out, a busy worker can get his time out, and if you look at 
studies that have been done, they will tell you that certain times of the day a human being 
actually needs that rest. So if you look at salah in all those various levels that I have just 
mentioned, it is enough for me to know why I am making salah. It is something I need. 
 
Similarly, Azizah explains: 
 
For me Islam is mostly a way of life, praying is important, you got to do the rituals 
because in Islam there are reasons why you got to pray five times a day. You got to 
balance the cycles, [and] you got to implement what you are praying and put it into 
action. And accordingly, scientifically there is a lot of benefits for the body. The 
implementation of meditation brings your body alignment in tune with the magnetic 
forces around. That is why it has been made compulsory [and] why those rituals [salah] 
are important, from that time [you pray] to the next time [you pray] you got to see that 
you don‟t create any sins, so powerful is your intention when you sit and pray. I just feel 
personally that Islam is more a humanitarian way of living you know, and it is more 
[about] giving and serving and sharing… 
 
Shamielah and Azizah stress the significance of prayer as it purportedly functions as a means 
through which the individual can attain internal harmony and foster individual moral and social 
responsibility. The performance of salah reflects the ways in which religious identity is 
embodied through ritual practice on a daily basis. Thus, if subscribing to the religious guidance 
within which compulsory prayer is to be undertaken five times per day, the embodiment of a 
Muslim identity permeates everyday life through the regular moments of prayer as well as 
particular social actions prompted by these ritual engagements.  
 
In Shamielah‟s narrative, the interconnectedness of internal and external aspects of prayer is 
particularly noteworthy. The humbleness and humility with which the believer approaches God, 
symbolised through various body postures among other things, mirrors the ways in which the 
believer should approach and interact with fellow human beings. Similarly, as also emphasised 
by Azizah, the essence of the meaning systems embedded in the Qur‟anic verses recited during 
prayer should be applied in a social reality.  
   
Shamielah‟s and Azizah‟s emphasis on social responsibility and action resonates with 













Sa‟diyya Shaikh (2003b) and Amina Wadud (2006). Consequently, a Muslim identity, expressed 
in the above narratives through ritual prayer, should ideally affect how you live your life, 
employing your responsibility as an engaged Muslim, through embodying particular moral and 
ethical principles that direct your actions and behaviour.  
 
The perception of being able to cultivate general ethics and action through various modes of 
prayer speaks to notions of different ways of being Muslim. It foregrounds moral agency as an 
ideal principle, nonetheless, the parameters through which moral agency can be asserted are 
guided by an ethical framework that opens up to diverse enactments of being moral in the world. 
It also brings about an understanding of being Muslim in interaction with other people. Thus, 
social relationships can define and reflect the ways in which Muslims live Islam and the manner 
in which ethical principles can be borne out in interpersonal relationships.  
 
It is noteworthy that both Shamielah and Azizah convey particular notions of Islam‟s rational 
character through articulating the „scientific‟ rationale for why prayer is important. Through 
utilising a more popular and even New Age discourse on the value of meditative prayer for our 
physical body, they provide another significant dimension that makes the ritual practice of prayer 
more „logical‟ for someone like me (non-Muslim and not overtly religious). Possibly, the detail 
with which many respondents explained the ritual practice of salah and its various functions in a 
social context might be related to the fact that they perceived me as an outsider and tried to make 
prayer understandable to me. Often I was invited to observe or participate in performing salah 
whilst the interview took place.
61
 On two occasions respondents gave me a salah-top with 
matching scarves. These occurrences solicited particular interview-dynamics in which I felt as 
though the invitation of an identity was extended to me, symbolised through the wearing of an 
Islamic dress.  
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5.3  Muslimness and God-Consciousness 
 
Many respondents placed emphasis on „living with God-consciousness‟ (taqwa), as central to 
their idea of being Muslim. Living with God-consciousness suggested a religious identity where 
internal modes of being were more salient than external markers of religiosity. In addition, some 
respondents pointed out that external markers of religious identities do not always correctly 
reflect proper behaviour or ethical interpersonal interactions. They highlighted discrepancies and 
ambiguities that exist within Muslim communities, often concealed through „correct‟ external 
religious symbols. A few respondents also provided what seems to be a social critique of Muslim 
communities. For example, Faiza explains: 
 
A lot of my cousins they cover themselves modestly and some wear hijab, I don‟t, so I 
don‟t quite fit in. The most important thing for me is just to try and be as good a human 
being as you possibly can and I don‟t care if you are wearing a scarf or you have this long 
black robe on. None of that interests me. If you ask me what is my Islam what do I 
believe in, without an absolute shred of doubt I believe in God. I believe in Allah and I 
believe in the Prophet. Do I pray regularly? No. Do I pray in my head every day? Yes, 
from the time I wake up in the morning I will say prayers in my head, I have 
conversations with God all the time. For me it is important to be God-conscious. Look, 
ideally yes, I should be praying five times a day, and yes I wish I would and I wish I 
wasn‟t so bloody lazy. I am lazy and I have no excuse and I will have to answer for that. 
From the moment I wake up until I go to sleep [my aim is] to relate well to other human 
beings, that is far more important to me than the garment and all the right Arabic words. I 
listen to my cousins and their conversations are peppered with inshallahs and mashallas. 
They seem to be filled with this religiosity…the more Arabic words that they say the 
more they think they are better than everybody else. The biggest problem that I have with 
Muslims is their narrow-mindedness, they are super judgemental and they are assuming 
that once you wear this black garb you are „holier-than-thou‟. I often go to family 
functions and I am not wearing a scarf and I know what they are saying about me. I am 
this person out there because I don‟t wear the garb and I don‟t sit and gossip with them 
about whether the chips is halal [permitted]. When I think of myself as a Muslim, and I 
think of my purpose on this earth, is it simply to get along with my fellow human 
beings… to try… and it is not easy keeping your heart clean and your thoughts clean, and 
your deeds clean. To try to just to be a decent human being, that is a struggle on its own. 
To me it is a huge struggle every day to go out there and really treat people [with 
kindness]…and be kind and be conscious of God all the time…that is what it is about. 
 
Faiza acknowledges that there are a number of ways to be Muslim, however, her perceptions of 













within which to be a Muslim. She articulates ambiguous feelings towards other Muslims whose 
emphasis on particular dress and practice, halal/haram (permitted/prohibited) regulations and 
Arabic is definitive of what constitutes a Muslim identity. Faiza points to existing discrepancies 
between what Muslims wear, what they say and what they do. Seemingly, Faiza holds a very 
individual notion of her own Muslim identity and way of being Muslim.  
 
Faiza‟s Muslim identity focuses on a constant awareness of God that inspires and guides the way 
in which she lives her life. She especially strives to exercise actions of kindness, respect, and 
responsibility towards other fellow human beings. As such, she draws on a broader socially 
engaged framework of morality and sociality to express a religious identity. Her particular 
response resonates with the importance of living with taqwa (God-consciousness) highlighted in 
the work of Islamic feminists. For example, Amina Wadud (2006), amongst others, emphasises 
the salience of embodying taqwa in contemporary societies. Wadud argues that “Taqwa is 
essential to the moral attitude of the agent as an individual as well as a member of society since it 
assists in activating the tawhidic principle...” (Wadud, 2006:42).
62
 Thus, by recognising the 
emergent and relational nature of human beings, living with taqwa highlights the salience of 
employing ethical principles and moral sensibilities in a manner that can reflect the tawhidic 
reality (i.e. mirroring the oneness of God).  
 
Faiza‟s emphasis on being constantly conscious of God might relate to underlying influences of a 
Sufi discourse, which seems to be percolating through the ways in which she defines herself. The 
importance of self-vigilance and cultivation of kindness, love and compassion as significant 
markers of ethical social interactions, are significant within a Sufi discourse. Spiritual refinement 
involves the development of an ethics of care in interpersonal relationships.
63
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 Tawhid – the doctrine of Allah‟s oneness, uniqueness 
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 For a more thorough engagement with Sufism and social ethics see Seyyed Hossein Nasr, The Garden of Truth: 
The Vision and Promises of Sufism, Islam‟s Mystical Tradition (2007), The Heart of Islam (2002) and Islamic 
Spirituality (1990). See also William C. Chittick, Sufism: A Short Introduction, 2000 and Toshihiko Izutsu, Sufism 













Faiza‟s conceptualisation of her Muslimness both differs from and overlaps with many other 
respondents‟ self-identifications as Muslims. Although Faiza seems less occupied with external 
markers of religious identity, she also critiques herself as lazy with regard to her lack of 
performance of the ritual prayers. She does believe that the ritual prayers are important and form 
a salient part of being Muslim, which is why she interestingly states: “I will have to answer for 
that [not praying regularly]”. Nevertheless, she notes that the ritual prayer is not the only form of 
prayer that is available to her and introduces the notion that her prayer is also a kind of 
continuous communication with God throughout the day. So, while Faiza feels conflicted with 
regard to the fact that she does not always perform her ritual prayers, she stresses the notion that 
she is communicating with God “all the time”. 
 
Faiza‟s religious subjectivity is articulated through an overarching Islamic framework within 
which foundational principles, such as the belief in God and the Prophet and the importance of 
living with God-consciousness, comes to the fore. Yet, her Muslim identity is not rigidly 
attached to distinct religious practices that singularly shape her self-identification. Another 
respondent, Leila, having previously described her process of self-transformation and increased 
connectedness with God, expressed similar sentiments to Faiza‟s, stating: 
 
Everything start with intention, you ask the question about Muslims, yes we are born with 
that, being a Muslim. I think all of us are Muslims, you as well are a Muslim [referring to 
me]. You don‟t judge a person by what you wear, your God-consciousness is a better 
garment [i.e. to be God-conscious is more important than wearing a Muslim dress]. Allah 
says drinking, drugs, smuggling, and alcohol…if you do [use] that, I am not going to say 
that you are not a Muslim, but Allah has abandoned that, taken it away [made it 
unlawful]. So you see some people got the name Mohammad and they are lekker drunk. 
They go in the shop and they say „I don‟t want that pie because it is not halal‟… 
 
Leila elaborates on the notion of God-consciousness as being more important than particular 
forms of Islamic dress. However, previously Leila spoke about a personal transformation in 
which the adoption of appropriate Islamic dress was significant for her newfound sense of self 
and her Muslim identity. While donning Islamic clothing helped to cultivate a stronger sense of 
God-consciousness in her life, she emphasises God-consciousness as the overarching principle. 













importance of maintaining boundaries set by God, for example in relation to questions of drugs, 
alcohol, etc.  
 
For Faiza and Leila, religiosity includes, amongst other things, the cultivation and refinement of 
the spiritual self through living with God-consciousness. Thus, external markers of religiosity or 
religious identity are seemingly not as salient to the ways in which they perceive potential 
expressions of religiosity. In addition, they are providing a social critique through pointing out 
how external markers of religious identity, like having a Muslim name or wearing an Islamic 
dress code, do not always correlate with internal states of what one would perceive to be 
religious. Hence, these discrepancies and inconsistencies exist within the broader Muslim 
community and illustrate the influence of difficult social contexts within which alcohol and drug 
abuse forms part of Muslim realities.   
 
The excerpts included in this chapter illustrate some of the ways in which the respondents 
participating in this project articulated experiences of being a South African Muslim woman as 
well as particular understandings of religious identity. Firstly, one of the major themes that 
emerged in my interviews was the salience of particular notions of nationhood that allow for and 
facilitate certain expressions of religious identity. In addition, it is noteworthy that what it means 
to be a Muslim woman in South Africa is interlinked with discourses operating in Western 
countries, Muslim majority environments and local contexts, which influence to varying degrees 
how one thinks about and asserts a Muslim identity.  
 
Secondly, although the majority of the respondents expressed a profound appreciation of being 
Muslim in South Africa, many of the respondents‟ experiential realities were subject to 
conditions that were in essence disempowering. It is significant that religion served as a source 
of power, enabling many respondents to overcome and deal with their various life situations. 
Throughout this chapter we have also seen that notions of God-consciousness (taqwa) are 
particularly salient for Muslim women‟s identity. For some respondents, living with God-
consciousness facilitated creative ways of confronting and navigating unsympathetic marital 





























Chapter 6:  
Islam and Sexuality: Understandings and Experiences 
 
“Sex plays an important role in marriage and in 
our religion that is what I believe” – Ghameeda   
 
A major overarching theme that emerged from my interviews was the importance of dominant 
Islamic discourses for the conceptualisation of sexuality. In my interviews it became apparent 
that the textual foundations of Islam, the scholarly and legal traditions as well as current religious 
authorities, informed some of the ways in which my respondents spoke about, understood and 
engaged with sexuality. While admittedly my study holds some level of ascertainment bias due 
to the fact that respondents were solicited on the basis that they are Muslim women, it was 
particularly salient how central Islamic discourses on sexuality featured in their narratives.  
 
In this chapter I highlight particular views that formed part of respondents‟ perceptions of 
Islamic norms. These include notions of Islam being a sex-positive religion, ethical ideals for 
intimate relationships and sexual praxis, the various parameters of sexual behaviour, the 
importance of virginity before marriage, and specific sexual taboos that respondents spoke about 
in our interviews. I also explore the view of sex as a spiritual experience or a form of worship, a 
view that many respondents foregrounded. Even so, I found that respondents‟ understandings 
and views on sexuality often represented ideals that did not necessarily mirror their lived 
experiences, as we will discover in the following chapter.  
 
6.1  Sex is a Gift Given 
 
One of the dominant understandings of sex in Islam, as articulated by the majority of the 
respondents, is that Islam is a religion that embraces and values sex. For many respondents their 
understandings included the view that Islam is a sex-positive religion and sex is seen as a natural 














If people really cared to read up about it [sex] you will find that Islam basically promotes 
sexual intercourse, obviously in a legal and lawful manner. It [sex] is beautiful; it is for 
your pleasure [and] enjoyment. 
 
Another respondent, Rashieda, married for 32 years, now divorced, said:  
 
As I grew older and with my own experiences and going out to find knowledge, I became 
more aware of what din is about, it sanctions sex. It is a pleasurable experience and there 




Similarly, Nuriyya, married for three years, explained: 
 
It [sex] is the most beautiful thing and it is a gift given, sex is this gift and Islam gives 
this beautiful gift to people to enjoy. 
 
It is noteworthy that many respondents spoke about sex as a „gift from Allah‟, which suggests 
that there exists an implicit notion about the goodness of sex because it is seen as „given‟ to 
human beings from God. The excerpts above indicate that sex is seen as „pleasurable‟ and 
„enjoyable‟ for men and women and is not restricted to the sphere of procreation.  
 
Interestingly, many respondents consistently used phrases such as „Islam promotes‟ and „Islam 
says‟ to support their views. Thus, respondents‟ understandings were often situated within 
discourses on what constitutes normative Islam. Nonetheless, as a non-Muslim researcher, I 
sometimes felt as if some of the respondents were trying to convey the authoritative position on 
Islam and sexuality to an outsider. Hence, on a few occasions it was difficult to ascertain whether 
respondents‟ frequent use of „Islam says‟ in fact corresponded with their own understandings and 
opinions.  
 
The positive ways in which some of the respondents spoke about sex resonate with dominant 
positions held within the textual canon of Islam. For example, B. F. Musallam illustrates how 
traditional pre-modern Muslim jurists conceived of sexual activity as a way to assure sexual 
fulfilment regardless of procreative purpose (1983:35). In addition, Islamic history gives 
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evidence of the accepted practice of coitus interruptus, as well as the use of various herbs and 
other ingredients to prevent pregnancy. This bears testimony to the religious understandings of 
sex as lawful and positive and not purely for procreation.
65
 The influential eleventh-century 
scholar Imam al-Ghazali strongly encouraged sexual activity and fulfilment due to its spiritual 
connection to the hereafter:  
 
God created pleasure of the world with this object: that if the people have pleasure, they 
will be eager to have lasting pleasure in the next world. To get this pleasure divine 
service is necessary. (Al-Ghazali, quoted in Anwar, 2006:134) 
 
In this sense, another dimension is added to the importance of sexual satisfaction in this world. 
Sexual gratification gives a foretaste of paradise. Arguably, Al-Ghazali believed that people, 
through the pleasure of sexual intimacy, would long for the hereafter. Consequently, people 
would need to direct their behaviour in this world towards reaching this potential through “divine 
service”.  
 
Similarly, in a contemporary period, Asma Barlas (2002) highlights views on sexuality in light of 
Qur‟anic teachings. She argues that “the Qur‟an also affirms that sex is not primarily for 
procreative purposes; it is a joyful and purposive activity in itself which is conducive to sukun” 
(153).
66
 Seemingly, the respondents‟ views and perception on sex are echoed in both the classical 
discursive tradition as well as in contemporary readings of different Islamic texts.  
 
6.2  Sexual Reciprocity 
 
Although a number of respondents elaborated on the importance of a woman‟s sexual 
availability and duty to satisfy her husband, to be discussed in the next chapter, many of the 
respondents placed emphasis on the ideal of reciprocity during sexual intimacy. For some 
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part of the classical Islamic discursive tradition.  
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respondents, this ideal is realised in their sexual relationships, whereas for others, reciprocity and 
mutuality is an idyllic vision. Nonetheless, real and/or ideal, reciprocity emerged as a salient 
theme when discussing perceptions of „proper‟ sexual dynamics. For example, Aisha, married 
for 15 years and mother of three, explained:   
 
You have to set down the proper conditions for both to enjoy sex, because [in Islam] it is 
conjugal rights for both, both must be pleased. 
 
Another respondent, Khadija, previously divorced due to various forms of spousal abuse and 
infidelity but now happily remarried, said: 
 
Sex is so much more different now because I have a husband [who] is very conscious 
about the fact that according to Islam there should be mutual satisfaction. 
 
Again, an Islamic discourse is evoked as a supportive framework to highlight ethical ideals that 
should guide sexual praxis. For Aisha, sexual pleasure is perceived as a right. This understanding 
also espouses a certain kind of responsibility, on behalf of the spouses, to ensure each other‟s 
sexual fulfilment. When I inquired about her sexual relationship with her husband, Aisha simply 
confirmed that they have a good sexual relationship and that her husband is sensitive to the 
stimulation that she desires. Aisha did not seem willing to go into too much detail regarding this 
aspect of her marital relationship. Instead she reiterated the importance of privacy through 
explaining what she called the „philosophy of the garment‟. According to Aisha, a husband and a 
wife are garments unto each other.
67
 For her, the „philosophy of the garment‟ not only represents 
the ideal of mutuality in sexual relationships, but also the protective fabric guarding intimate 
dynamics in marital relationships.  
 
In my interview with another respondent, Khadija, a range of sexual experiences came to the 
fore. On the one hand, Khadija has experiences from her first marriage that were extremely 
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painful and primarily negative. On the other hand, she defined her sexual experiences in her 
current marriage as strongly satisfactory and enjoyable. For Khadija, her experiences with sexual 
abuse and other forms of violence in her previous marriage seem to inform a profound 
appreciation of her current marriage and a husband who honours an Islamic sexual ethics of 
mutuality. In her first marriage, Khadija experienced sex more as a duty and believed that it was 
her responsibility, as a good Muslim woman, to assure her husband‟s sexual gratification. Her 
husband‟s repeated adultery also influenced the ways in which she perceived sexuality. She did 
not see her own sexual fulfilment as a right, and nor did her ex-husband. Khadija‟s 
understandings of sex in her first marriage seemed to be premised on particular and essentialised 
understandings of male and female sexuality respectively. Her current and changed 
understandings of sexuality resonate more strongly with a more egalitarian understanding of 
Islam.   
 
For Khadija, shifting personal experiences facilitated alternative discourses that mirrored her 
changing relationship dynamics. Arguably, the currency of dominant discourses in women‟s 
lives is dependent and relational to the social actors involved in producing intimate experiences. 
Sometimes, respondents embrace seemingly conflicting discourses that speak to their various 
experiences in different ways. It should be noted that the ideals of reciprocity and mutuality do 
not necessarily negate understandings of a wife‟s sexual availability. For example, as discussed 
in more detail in the next chapter, many respondents stressed the importance of being sexually 
available to their husbands irrespective of their personal desire to have sex. However, this 
understanding does not mean that they do not take the ideal of reciprocity seriously in their 
marital relationships.  
 
Although there seems to be a tension between sexual availability and reciprocity, many 
respondents were subscribing to these discourses simultaneously. For some respondents, the 
ideal of reciprocity is realised in various dimensions in their marital relationships. The fact that 
this ideal does not necessarily permeate all of their experiences in their marriage does not mean 
that the importance of the ideal as such should be mitigated. Similarly, the ideal of sexual 
availability was negotiated and contested through particular experiences in marital relationships. 













of the prevalence of HIV in South Africa formed part of dominant contestations of the sexual 
availability discourse. Nonetheless, many respondents still reiterated this ideal as it often 
correlated with their understanding of what it means to be a good Muslim woman.  
 
Some respondents emphasised the notion that marriage is also about „making sacrifices‟ and this 
included sexual dynamics. For example, several respondents asserted that when their husband 
expressed the need for sexual fulfilment, or made sexual advances, they forfeited other chores in 
order to make sure that he was satisfied. For some women, the ideal of a wife‟s sexual 
availability formed a significant component of how sexual relationships were navigated. For 
other women, caring about their husband‟s needs formed an integral part of what constitutes 
marriage, together with the expectancy among some of them that this „sexual care‟ was 
reciprocated. However, sexuality is but one of the components within which reciprocity in 
marriage can be expressed. Also, that women responded to sexual advances initiated by their 
husband obviously does not preclude them from experiencing sexual pleasure, or necessarily 
suggest a lack of mutuality in the interaction. 
 
Arguably, the ideal of sexual availability can coexist with the ideal of reciprocity in sexual 
relationships. Nevertheless, the varying ways in which this combination is manifested in reality 
are deeply dependent on the nature of the marital relationship. Clearly, the discourse of sexual 
availability can sometimes perpetuate various inegalitarian power relations. For women who 
experience sexual coercion and violence, the existence of this discourse generates a variety of 
possible responses, ranging from acceptance to subversion. Both the ideal and reality of sexual 
reciprocity inform the manner in which the sexual availability discourse is negotiated.  
 
Even for women who did not experience sexual satisfaction in their marriages, the ideal of sexual 
reciprocity was reiterated. For example, Shafieka, a re-married mother of four, stated the 
following about her sexual relationship with her current husband: 
 
He don‟t have a problem, he is satisfied. I am the one [who is not satisfied]. This give and 
take thing…it was just finish klaar. It is a totally different thing for him and for me. We 
are different people with different feelings. But I want to have my things working out 













Shafieka‟s inclusion of “a religious way”, as the proper way in which she wants her sexual 
relationship to function, gestures to perceptions about particular Islamic ethical ideals that she 
sees lacking in her sexual relationship. It became clear in the continuation of our conversation 
that she strongly felt robbed of her religious right to sexual pleasure:  
 
I should have told my husband to leave because he doesn‟t satisfy me the way he should 
satisfy me, [but] I accept it the way it is. I accept to live like this, because it was my 
decision to make, there are two ways now. I could easily leave him and say: “I can find 
somebody else that is sexually satisfying”, because that is my right. 
 
Interestingly, Shafieka points out another dimension of how one might think about sexual 
dynamics. Not only does mutual sexual fulfilment represent an ideal, but it is also perceived to 
be a religious right that should be realised within intimate relationships. Nevertheless, Shafieka 
has made a conscious decision to stay with her husband despite the fact that he does not satisfy 
her sexually. However, Shafieka is clearly flirting with the idea that it is within her rights to 
leave her husband due to his sexual „shortcomings‟ in this particular area of their relationship.  
 
It is noteworthy that for many respondents the ideals of reciprocity and mutuality were evoked 
through employing particular perceptions of Islamic sexual ethics, notions also reflected in the 
works of some contemporary Islamic feminist scholars. For example, Barlas suggests in her 
reading of the Qur‟an that mutual satisfaction should be seen as legitimised and encouraged by 
Islam due to the fact that the Qur‟an conveys notions related to the “sexual sameness” of human 
beings (2002:152). Thus, women‟s and men‟s natures are equally driven by needs and desires 
and consequently, women and men need to be equally fulfilled. Similarly, Shaikh argues in light 
of her discussion on contraceptive techniques, such as coitus interruptus, that Islam prioritises 
“mutual sexual fulfilment as well as consultative decision making between a married couple in 
terms of family planning” (2003:115). Shaikh‟s emphasis on mutuality is informed by the view 
held amongst traditional Muslim scholars, that coitus interruptus might “diminish [a woman‟s] 
pleasure” (115). Although these understandings are articulated by stressing the ways in which 
Qur‟anic and Islamic legal frameworks embrace these ethical principles, the existence of textual 














Nonetheless, as shown through some of the quotations in this section, the fact that these ideals 
are embedded within the religious tradition does not necessarily mean that they are realised in a 
social reality. For example, financial constraints and unemployment which form part of many 
respondents‟ marital dynamics, and respondents‟ experiences with various forms of marital 
abuse and violence, constitute significant factors within which these ideals are to be realised. 
Also, the ideals of reciprocity and mutuality exist simultaneously with other religious discourses 
that in various ways inform marital dynamics and sexual relationships.  
 
6.3  Religious Parameters for Sexual Behaviour  
 
The positive ways in which my respondents viewed sex in Islam often led to discussions on what 
constitute legitimate sexual interactions. Many of the narratives indicated that the pleasures 
experienced when engaging in sexual intercourse should only be thoroughly enjoyed if situated 
within a marital union. This understanding was unequivocally asserted by most of the 
respondents who took part in this study. The following excerpt is reflective of this dominant 
view. Hamedah, married with four children, asserts: 
 
Sex is a beautiful thing [that] men and women can have if they are married. [Then] they 
can have it as often as they want, wherever they want [but] not flaunt it and not speak 
about it, like outside of your marriage, don't talk about it to others. So in Islam sex is a 
beautiful thing, it is a right given to men and women by Allah. 
 
This excerpt points towards a few salient factors that form the basis of how to engage with 
sex/uality within the parameters of Islam. Firstly, sexual relations can only occur within a marital 
union. And secondly, an ethics of modesty that guides sexual behaviour is required. The 
principle of modesty includes behavioural discourses (what is understood to be acceptable public 
behaviour), and the etiquette of privacy surrounding sexuality (don‟t talk about it outside of your 
marriage). However, as I indicated in the methodology chapter, exceptions to this „rule‟ of „what 
happens in the bedroom stays in the bedroom‟ were clearly made by some of the respondents 














Nevertheless, this religious ideal was not always reflected in respondents‟ realities. A number of 
women had engaged in sexual encounters outside of/before marriage. I include a few of these 
quotations in this section to illustrate how these experiences are interlinked with powerful 
perceptions of what constitutes the parameters of Islam. Shirin, married for 23 years and mother 
of two, explains:  
 
If I look back at it now and really think about it [having sex before marriage], we knew 
we did wrong [but] it happened so fast. When I look at it now, you cannot repent. There 
is not enough repentance to make up for that wrong that you done then. In Islam for every 
action there is a reaction, you will be punished for it, you got to repent and ask God‟s 
forgiveness. For me, I cannot repent enough over that, although I was in Mecca and I 
asked God‟s forgiveness. They say once you stay on the plains of Arafat and God has 
forgiven you then you mustn‟t doubt it because God has forgiven you, but I still feel that 
that is a repentance that I have to take with me to my grave. 
 
Another respondent, Fayrooz, now divorced, asserted: 
 
I was very scared and I didn‟t want anyone to find out. It [adultery] is like a major secret 
because that is the ultimate sin… adultery and sex and all this before marriage. So it was 
a whole hush hush between me and him, and yes, I did have a major guilty conscience, 
even the day I had a white dress on. 
 
These two excerpts highlight the difficult nature of transgressing what is perceived to be 
normative sexual boundaries. For Shirin, although she recognises that forgiveness is one of the 
attributes of God, she views her transgression as so severe that it is almost beyond forgiveness. 
Clearly, Shirin‟s experience is given meaning as a transgression through particular perceptions 
about what constitutes the parameters of Islam.  
 
Fayrooz‟s response does not focus on divine punishment or issues of repentance or forgiveness. 
Noting that premarital sex is the “ultimate sin”, she is primarily concerned with keeping this 
sexual experience a secret. She appears to be particularly worried about reactions from the 
community if this indiscretion were to become known. Hence, Fayrooz acknowledges that there 
are strong ethical ideals related to acceptable sexual behaviour operating in the community. 
Although these ideals are held in high esteem, it does not mean that people do not engage in 













the community are enough to make Fayrooz feel that she has done something wrong. Thus, “the 
major guilty conscience” can reflect, as in Shirin‟s narrative, a type of community consensus of 
what constitutes acceptable Muslim sexual behaviour, which unmistakably influences the way in 
which Fayrooz feels and thinks about her experience.  
 
In the conversations I had with respondents who had engaged in pre-marital or extra-marital sex, 
their narratives focused predominantly on their own subjectivity in light of these experiences. 
Hence, no particular reference was made to the men involved in these sexual relationships. It is 
noteworthy that respondents who had experienced spousal infidelity in their marriages did not 
seem to evoke the religious discourse of sin when speaking about these experiences. Rather, in 
some cases, spousal infidelity was spoken about as being part of a normative social context, a 
view that often was premised on respondents‟ assumptions related to men‟s stronger sexual 
needs. Although some respondents contested the acceptability of men‟s adultery, it is significant 
that seemingly distinct standards for sexual behaviour were reflected in many respondents‟ 
narratives, in which particular religious discourses on sexual behaviour were applied differently 
to men and women.  
 
6.4  Virginity 
 
A dominant theme that emerged in my interviews was the importance of virginity. It was 
noteworthy that for many respondents this chastity ideal was intricately entwined with their 
religious identities. For some respondents, having gone through particular problematic sexual 
experiences, virginity remained salient for self-definitions. Often, the ideal of virginity was 
brought up when respondents spoke about their upbringing. Some respondents emphasised that 
the virginity ideal was one of the main religious ideals that was strongly stressed by family 
members. For example, Waheeda explains:  
 
Virginity is a big thing, like with my mom especially [she says] “don‟t have pre-marital 














Another respondent, Somayya asserts: 
  
[Virginity] is what your religion preaches for you and that is what you try to practise as 
long as you can. It is taboo if somebody is not a pure woman. 
 
Similarly, Faiza narrates: 
 
I remember growing up and thinking that if I lost my virginity before I got married I 
would not be able to look at myself in the mirror the next day. That [feeling] was very 
strong. I don‟t know who put it there, probably my mother with all her preaching and 
whatever else, and that is the way I was brought up. 
 
For many of the respondents, conceptions of virginity were often associated with the purity and 
honour of a woman. It is noteworthy that when discussing virginity, most of the respondents 
appeared to singularly prioritise chastity for women. Even so, it might be that their silence 
regarding the importance of men‟s chastity was unintentionally eclipsed due to the fact that I was 
inquiring about their experiences and understandings. Or, their narratives could mirror dominant 
trends in the community where particular attention to women‟s virginity is highlighted. Shaikh, 
having conducted empirical research amongst Muslim women in Cape Town, argues that 
women‟s perceptions of virginity espoused quite “different standards of sexual ethics” (2007:76). 
In her research sample, particular assumptions related to men‟s predatory nature necessitated the 
importance for women to safeguard their chastity.  
 
These conceptualisations of virginity within Muslim communities have been analysed by many 
scholars in a number of different ways. For example, Mernissi (1996 and 1982) argues that the 
emphasis placed on women‟s virginity in many Muslim cultures is part of a patriarchal symbolic 
order that primarily informs discourses of sexual inequality. On the other hand, Barlas (2002) 
discusses virginity in relation to broader sexual ethics. According to her reading of the Qur‟an, 
both men and women alike have the virtue of chastity. Barlas employs Q24:26 to illustrate the 
corresponding ways in which both men and women should guard their behaviour.
68
 Arguably, 
part of the normative tradition seems to embrace chastity for both men and women. Nonetheless, 
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the priority given to women‟s virginity in particular has prevailed in various parts of the Muslim 
world and indeed other parts of the world.
69
 Munira‟s narrative reflects this ambiguity when she 
asserts: 
 
Why is it that men when they want to get married they want to get married to a virgin, 
because in Islam it says: if you‟re not a virgin you need to marry a non-virgin, and if you 
are a virgin you need to marry a virgin. 
 
It is interesting to note that Munira singles out men as the ones who want to get married to virgin 
women. This mirrors some of the existing cultural stereotypes regarding marital expectations that 
elegantly eclipse the salience of men‟s virginity. Munira implicitly offers a critique of male 
sexual expectations and suggests that there is a double standard present in Muslim communities 
where non-virgin men want to get married to women who are virgins. For her, this particular 
sexual dynamic represents a problem as it does not correspond with Islamic guidelines. The 
importance of identifying with the virgin image was espoused by some of the respondents who 
had experiences with sexual abuse or rape while growing up.
70
 The following rather powerful 
narrative illustrates the way in which Rashieda thinks about her experience in relation to 
questions of self-definitions: 
 
I was raped when I was a teenager. I came from work and myself and a helper of my 
mom went walking in the evening. We were walking towards the shopping centre and 
three or four guys got hold of us, both of us, and we were raped by all of them. I still 
regarded myself as a virgin because it is not something I asked for you know. What I 
couldn‟t understand at the time, and it is something that I have thought about, I was fully 
dressed [in hijab] as I am now and I wanted to know what made these guys come after us. 
We weren‟t in a place where it was quiet. We were just grabbed and pushed into the field. 
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 Overall, the data emerging from my interviews reveals that eight women had experienced sexual abuse and/or 













Rashieda‟s narrative illuminates the reality of extreme sexual violence prevalent in local 
contexts. Many of my respondents lived in areas where going out after dark, or even going into 
particular areas in daylight, was perceived to be extremely dangerous. This point was also 
reiterated by respondents in relation to my safety. As I often travelled by public transport to visit 
my respondents, they made an effort to „see me off‟, ensuring that I got into a taxi before dark 
and that the driver looked trustworthy and seemingly sober. Reports of sexual violence were 
common in particular areas that I visited. Sometimes, I got the sense that for many of my 
respondents, sexual violence as a constant threat was almost normalised and formed part of the 
challenges characterising their social fabric.  
 
To return to Rashieda‟s narrative, for her to be a virgin constitutes an essential part of how she 
sees herself as a woman. Rashieda‟s sense of self is articulated through a discourse within which 
the virginity ideal is stressed as an important component of a woman‟s pre-marital identity. It is 
noteworthy that these ethical ideals regarding chastity continue to hold social currency amidst 
violent contexts that do not always allow for the realisation of these particular sexual norms. 
Rashieda presents a remarkable way of navigating the ideal of virginity in light of a particular 
horrific experience. Her conceptualisation of virginity confirms the notion that virginity is an 
ideal. Simultaneously, her narrative reflects that virginity is not necessarily related to a physical 
or biological condition. Rather her conception of virginity is intricately connected to questions of 
choice and consent. Arguably, for Rashieda, only consensual sexual relationships can result in 
„losing‟ your virginity. 
 
Rashieda‟s reference to what she was wearing when this occurrence happened conveys notions 
regarding the centrality of a woman‟s dress when exposed to the experience of rape. The idea 
that a woman‟s dress or behaviour is the cause for rape has been problematised in a great deal of 
feminist literature on rape. Feminist critique has astutely pointed out that seeing women‟s 
particular way of dressing as the cause for male sexual attack is highly problematic. Feminist 
critique also points out that this view is premised on patriarchal ideas of embodiment and 













ingrained in patriarchal ideologies, are unravelled in order to identify rape myths that effectively 




Rashieda believes that the hijab, as symbolic of a particular form of female representation, 
should signal sexual unavailability. In some sense, her hijab also stands for protection against 
indecent assault. Her reference to her way of dress, when narrating this painful experience, is 
particularly significant with regard to contemporary debates on Muslim women‟s dress, that 
often pay less attention to the reality of violence in broader social landscapes within which many 
women are situated.  
 
The topical subject of hijab, Muslim women‟s sexuality and moral agency has been dealt with 
extensively by Mernissi (2003 and 1991), Barlas (2009 and 2002) and Hoel (2005). Barlas 
stresses the Qur‟anic verses, often interpreted by conservatives to refer to the compulsory 
donning of hijab, which she argues conveys both general and specific prescriptions.
72
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specific prescriptions involve, among other things, Muslim women‟s wearing of hijab in Jahili 
society in order to protect themselves from sexual harassment by hypocrites at the time of the 
Prophet.
73
 Through wearing the hijab, Muslim women were recognised as pious women, as 
opposed to prostitutes or slaves who were open to public scrutiny (2002:53-58). It is noteworthy 
that many respondents participating in this study, who reside in areas in which gangsterism, 
drugs/alcoholism and sexual abuse/rape of women form part of their local context, used this 
specific prescription of hijab as one of the underlying reasons for which they chose to wear 
niqab/hijab.
74
 Thus, hijab for protection from sexual harassment as well as the religiosity 
expressed through this dress code were believed by some women to have an ameliorative impact 
on potential sexual attack. Rashieda did not allude to this particular reasoning during our 
interview; however, it is possible that her social reality has influenced the way in which she 
thinks around safety.  
 
For some of the respondents participating in this study, wearing hijab can be seen as a particular 
social response to a violent context. The fact that some respondents pointed out the hijab‟s 
protective function significantly speaks to the social conditions and structures within which they 
are situated. By extension, various local contexts bear resemblance to the Jahili society where 
women risked being sexually violated unless they took preventative measures. Arguably, local 
South African contexts necessitate similar preventative measures.  
 
In Shaikh‟s (2003) analysis of the multiple reasons (and defences) for which Muslim women 
wear hijab, the importance of engaging Muslim women as subjects comes to the fore. By taking 
seriously women‟s self-understandings, monolithic representations and objectification can be 
increasingly prevented. For the respondents participating in this study, religious identity, 
obedience to God and keeping with the Islamic ideal of modesty were amongst the most 
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common reasons for wearing hijab. Nonetheless, it was noteworthy that particular perceptions 
about social contexts also significantly impacted upon their rationale and need for hijab.  
 
6.5  Sexual Taboos  
 
Besides pointing out that marriage is the condition that legitimises sexual interaction, some 
women also mentioned particular taboos that regulate sexual dynamics within marital 
relationships. Among the most prominent themes emerging from women‟s narratives were anal 
and/or oral sex, sex during menstruation and masturbation. There was a range of ways in which 
the respondents engaged with these topics. For some women, sexual practices like anal and oral 
sex were forbidden (haram) due to religious persuasions that were rooted in pure/impure 
dualities. For others, however, understandings and interpretations of what the text says, among 
other sources of information, do not necessarily determine how sexuality is played out or literally 
played with in reality. Particularly the issue of masturbation and oral sex reflected a diversity of 
opinions and respondents often articulated ambivalent subjectivities with regard to these sexual 
practices. Respondents often acknowledged dominant religious discourses mapping out 
guidelines for sexual praxis, while concurrently discounting these very structures in their 
intimate relationships. Some of the following narratives illustrate the complex relationship 
between understandings and social realities. For example, Nuriyya explained to me that: 
 
Islam has set criteria of how you live your life [and] it also extends to the sexual life as 
well. There are certain things that are prohibited like masturbation, anal sex, and oral sex, 
and for me it [is] according to that set criteria. 
 
In the above excerpt Nuriyya outlines the sexual practices she understands to be prohibited in 
Islam. It is also clear from this excerpt that she tries to live according to these regulations. 
However, further on in our conversation she asserts:   
 
…unless my husband really really wants me to have oral sex with him I will think about 
it or consider it but I won‟t go near any of those, like anal sex. If he wants me to have it I 















Interestingly, Nuriyya is willing to make an exception (or at least think about it) in order to 
satisfy her husband‟s desires, despite the fact that she believes that oral sex is prohibited in 
Islam. In our interview, she did not mention the possibility of her own sexual satisfaction 
through any of the means she considers prohibited. However, Nuriyya clearly distinguishes 
between the possibility of partaking in oral sex and the total rejection of anal sex. Thus, from a 
perspective of acceptable sexual praxis, oral sex is seemingly viewed to be more acceptable on a 
personal level than anal sex.  
 
Aisha explained her perception of the prohibition of oral sex through highlighting the underlying 
reasons for why she understands this sexual practice to be taboo: 
 





Shanaaz articulated a similar understanding for why oral sex is prohibited: 
 
If you think about it logically your mouth is the organ that you use to consume food 
which is ni‟ma, something that God gives you to nourish your body. Number two is that 
your mouth is the organ you [use to] worship God, so if you are a Godly creature then 




In addition to perceiving the mouth as an organ for worship, utilising your mouth to give oral sex 
was associated, by some respondents, with succumbing to the desires of the carnal self. It is 
interesting to note that although many respondents view sex predominantly as a gift from God to 
be enjoyed, there are particular sexual practices, like oral sex, that revealed certain ambivalences 
relating to body/spirit dualisms. In addition to being a physical act, sex was sometimes conceived 
of as a spiritual engagement that intricately connected intimate spouses with God. However, the 
practice of oral sex was often spoken about in terms of carnal desires that should be subdued. 
The mouth should rather be cultivated as a spiritual organ whose sole mission is to worship God. 
Thus, for some respondents, it was inconceivable to perform oral sex on one‟s spouse with the 
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same mouth that is used for spiritual invocation. To a certain extent, there seems to be a 
dichotomy between the spiritual nature of sex and the carnal body, at least with regard to 
particular sexual practices. On the other hand, different respondents also had different 
conceptualisations regarding sexuality. A number of respondents emphasised the spiritual value 
of sex in general. Several respondents elucidated intercourse as the primary sexual union that 
potentially can bring about a spiritual experience. Some spoke about sex as a purely physical 
reality. Yet others expressed ambiguity and ambivalence related to particular accepted sexual 
norms when articulating views, understandings and experiences related to sexual practice.  
 
With regard to masturbation/self-stimulation, women took part in a variety of discourses in 
which they made sense of particular understandings and/or practices related to this topic. The 
respondents articulated a number of positions regarding masturbation, ranging from expressing 
disgust to embracing it. However, a distinction was often made between performing 
masturbation alone and with spouse. Many women advocated that masturbation is not acceptable 
if it is performed alone, for example:   
 
We as women can‟t have your [our] own satisfaction where you are meant to have your 
husband. [That] is wrong. Allah Ta‟ala actually says that he frowns upon that person that 
performs masturbation. (Mansura) 
 
I feel if you are doing it on yourself you are doing a sin and you will get punished for it. 
But if you are with your husband [and] you two are trying to [please each other] then... 
(Shanaaz) 
 
I feel that it is permissible with regards to the wife giving pleasure to the husband 
especially when she is in a state where they cannot have intercourse, like maybe when 
she is menstruating. (Farhana) 
 
 
The two first excerpts indicate, through the phrases “it is wrong”, “Allah Ta‟ala…frowns”, 
“doing a sin”, and “you will get punished,” that a woman performing self-stimulation is 
understood to act contrary to constructions of normative accepted sexual behaviour. These two 
narratives clearly invoke religion to express the negative associations linked with this sexual 
practice. In the second and third excerpts, acceptability of masturbation is acknowledged if it is 













masturbation if it is performed by a wife on her husband, particularly if she is menstruating – 
when the couple is not allowed to have sexual intercourse. However, the second quotation can 
indicate that both husband and wife can masturbate each other/together. Due to the fact that the 
second quotation articulates religious consequences (punishment) if masturbation is done alone, 
masturbation as a mutual sexual praxis can be understood to form part of an accepted sexual 
praxis within an Islamic framework. This conveys an understanding of sex, when practised, as 
always being partnered.  
 
It was noteworthy that when discussing sexuality, respondents often evoked what they perceived 
to be the parameters of Islam. This is significant because it indicates that part of the way in 
which many of the respondents conceptualise broader aspects of being sexual is informed by 
dominant discourses of normative religious behaviour. Part of what emerged from many 
narratives was the relational aspect of being sexual. In a way, many respondents‟ 
conceptualisations of their own sexuality were interlinked with and generated through intimate 
interaction with a partner. For some women, their sexual self-representations were reliant on a 
significant other to be sexual with. Within this conceptualisation of sexuality, particular sexual 
proclivities and fantasies might not be lived out through an individual capacity to be sexual with 
oneself, but rather through spousal sexual dynamics. Arguably, the importance given to 
mutuality and reciprocity in sexual relationships might influence perceptions specifically 
regarding self-stimulation. 
 
Nonetheless, other respondents asserted that they do self-stimulate, for example Shafieka, having 
already expressed her dissatisfaction with regard to her current sexual relationship, said: 
 
Because I have not been in any relationships that could get me [to] the point where I am 
stimulated enough… there wasn‟t someone to do that. I would imagine that if the need 
should arise again there shouldn‟t be a problem with that [self-stimulation] because I am 
not doing anyone harm. 
 
Although Shafieka explained earlier that she sees attaining sexual pleasure as her right, she does 
not invoke religious justifications for why self-stimulation is acceptable. She does, however, 













husband, has been able to fully satisfy her sexually. Other women emphasised egalitarianism as 
grounds for the right to masturbate. Nurunisa explained:  
 
Because a man can do it [masturbate], so why can‟t I do it? They talk about 
equality…what is equality in that. It is only the imam part, [that a] woman can‟t be a 
leader in a mosque, that is the only part… If he can stimulate himself then why can‟t I 
stimulate myself, I will go for it and I will do it. 
 
From this excerpt it seems that Nurunisa believes that the only sphere in which a man and a 
woman have different capacities relates to the leadership of ritual prayer. Masturbation is 
understood by her to be equally allowed for men and women. She elucidates the unfairness in 
that men clearly do masturbate, and questions the underlying assumptions for why a woman 
cannot do it. Nurunisa‟s argument with regard to masturbation is interconnected with her 
understandings of gender equality within an Islamic framework. Hence, for Nurunisa, an Islamic 
sexual praxis can include the practice of self-stimulation. In addition, she challenges the notion 
outlined by quite a few other respondents – that it is not allowed for women to self-stimulate – 
by stating that “I will do it”. Through this statement Nurunisa rejects an apparently normative 
female subjectivity that forms part of a dominant Muslim discourse, in which self-stimulation is 
seen as contrary to Islamic acceptable sexual behaviour, and she presents an alternative 
subjectivity which she sees as concomitant with, and indeed supporting, her broader 
understandings of gender equality in Islam.  
 
In the context of having gone through a divorce or experienced the death of a husband, and 
consequently having experienced being single for quite a number of years, many respondents 
explained how they dealt with the lack of sexual contact. For example, Khadija, reminiscing 
about the time before she re-married, explains: 
 
I went the route of fasting, the first few years of my divorce. I fasted a lot, because for 14 
years you‟re used to sexual activity. I‟m not that highly sexed but I like having sex, and 
then all of a sudden you‟re in a situation where you don‟t have access to sex. [And] 
because of your religion and your morals and values, you‟re not gonna look for [go and 
have sex outside of marriage], and then I went the route of fasting because that is what 














Khadija, although having experienced a difficult first marriage in which sex was something that 
was demanded of her, argues that it was difficult getting used to not being sexually active after 
14 years of marriage. She chose fasting as a mechanism to keep her own desires under control.
77
 
Her statement “you‟re not gonna look for” can refer to the unacceptability within an Islamic 
framework of having sexual interactions outside of marriage. Khadija does not engage with the 
issue of self-stimulation, but it can be inferred from the context that her practice of fasting 
includes avoiding self-stimulation as well. Her understanding of Islam informs her decision to 
fast, as reflected by her statement: “that is what religion taught me”.  
 
From these excerpts it becomes clear that respondents had varying understandings of particular 
sexual practices, as well as different ways of dealing with sexual desire. Often, respondents 
spoke about sexuality within what they perceived to be the parameters of Islam. Sometimes, this 
framework informed how sexuality was played out in their intimate relationships. Other times, 
respondents mitigated and navigated through these discourses by performing sexual practices 
that could be seen to be opposing religious norms. Even so, some respondents still retained 
particular religious guidelines as ideal mappings for sexual praxis.  
 
6.6  Spiritual Sex  
 
It was noteworthy that the understanding of sex as a sacred and spiritual union was articulated by 
many of the respondents. This perspective conveys nascent ideas about the interconnectedness of 
embodied experiences and engaged spirituality. By viewing sexual intimacy as a way of 
potentially connecting to divinity, or the spiritual realm, many Muslim women challenge 
patriarchal notions of body/spirit dichotomies. For example, Somayya explains:  
 
You just don‟t go for the pleasure of it, because if you are going to cohabit then he prays 
his niyat and you say your own niyat. It is a niyat for the male and a niyat for the female, 
so God is involved on all levels. What you actually are saying [when evoking this niyat] 
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is: take the male shaitan [Satan], the male devils and the female devils away from this 




Somayya points out that there is a particular prayer that should be recited before having sexual 
intercourse. In this way, she argues, “God is involved on all levels”. Consequently, for Somayya, 
sex is more than a physically pleasurable and enjoyable experience. Sex is about being conscious 
of God and by employing this particular prayer prior to the sexual act, one might suggest that for 
this couple, God is involved as part of a spiritual foreplay. Somayya places emphasis on God‟s 
protection from the devils that might be present during this act of unification, as well as the 
yearning for piousness in offspring that can blossom from this sexual union.  
  
Hence, sexual encounters are open to both positive (God) and negative (shaitan) spiritual forces. 
In this way sexual intimacy could be seen as a spiritually charged realm that is vulnerable and 
potentially ambiguous. Arguably, then, the spiritual realm is also generally susceptible to good 
and evil. By invoking God in this union, to protect the sexual act from negative influences (and 
by extension, to protect the spiritual sphere from evil manipulation), piety is also expressed in a 
way that places emphasis on the sacrality of the sexual act. For Somayya, this prayer can be 
understood to form part of an Islamic sexual praxis in which the pleasurable experience of the 
physical act of sex is only made meaningful through divine invocation and commemoration. 
Consequently, spirituality and sexuality are interwoven and are integral categories that reflect the 
fundamental nature of a complete human experience and at the same time challenge normative 
patriarchal dichotomies between the body and the spirit. Another respondent, Zaida asserts: 
 
It [sex] is a form of worship and it is a form of connectedness with the Creator as well. I 
feel it is quite intimate the act of sex. It is so sacred in a sense. I‟m talking about for me 
in marriage, it is the one time that you‟re in a completely different space in terms of what 
happens between two people and it is almost like a third space in a way. [Sex] feels so 
spiritual, it feels so God-given and special and nothing actually compares with it in the 
rest of your life. I think it is quite a gift to be able to experience [sex] the way I‟m 
thinking about it, which I don‟t think I have experienced, where it can be two people 
really wanting to be in completely being. Maybe I‟m being a bit romantic and idealistic, 
but being together and doing it [having sex] because [of] the care that they [spouses] have 
for each other, and the deep love and the authenticity with which they kind of living their 
lives together, that feels quite sacred with me. 
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In comparison with Somayya‟s narrative, it seems that Zaida places more emphasis on the act of 
sex itself as a form of worship. Her view of sexual interaction is intimately linked with 
understandings of sex being “sacred” and a “form of connectedness with the Creator”. Zaida‟s 
narrative also elucidates sex as a God-given gift and the non-duality of a spiritual and embodied 
sexual experience. Her allusion to the creation of a “third space” highlights the divine element 
potentially present among and between two people, and indeed binding the two people together 




However, Zaida‟s narrative reveals some marked paradoxes and ambiguity related to ideal 
conceptualisations regarding sexual intimacy and actual lived experiences. There are a number of 
elements in her response that are worth commenting on. Her reference to “a third space”, a 
spiritual space that coalesces intimate spouses with the divine, is not borne out in her own 
experiences with sexual intimacy. Arguably, Zaida holds out this ideal conceptualisation of 
sexual encounters, lacking in her reality, as a way in which she one day hopes to experience 
sexual dynamics.  
 
Zaida believes that there is such a thing as being “in completely being”. In the context of our 
conversation I understood her notion of being “in completely being” to refer to an experience of 
oneness, unification, and interconnection with divinity that can permeate and infuse sexual 
relationships. For Zaida, on a conceptual level, Islam offers a symbolic space for this particular 
kind of intense spiritual/sexual intimacy, which she yearns for. Zaida is in fact currently 
divorced, due to her husband‟s repeated infidelity throughout their marriage. Speaking about her 
ex-husband, Zaida referred to her own feelings of emotional disconnectedness and distance as 
characterising features of how she experienced their marital relationship. She asserts: “I was 
feeling quite removed, so it was very unpleasant in that sense because I didn‟t feel like I was 
really connected at any kind of real level with him.” Arguably, Zaida‟s need to feel a sense of 
interconnectedness through sexual intimacy, contrasts starkly with her actual experiences that are 
coloured by noted emotional and sexual distance. Her experiences and treasured ideals point to 
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the tensions and ambiguities often embedded in respondents‟ narratives. Seemingly, this was a 
recurring motif where some women projected particular ideals as a way of coping with 
unmerciful, disappointing and at times even dysfunctional marital relationships. The following 
narrative also elucidates the sacredness of sex and is articulated by Waheeda. She explains: 
 
We don‟t really talk about it [sex], [as] something that is really celebrated. We have sex 
everywhere but it‟s not celebrated, not the spirit of sex. The vile stuff and the titillating 
stuff is celebrated, but not the real joy. It [sex] is completely away [removed] from 
spirituality. You don‟t really see it [sex] as wow this is an experience and a union of souls 
and stuff. It [sex] is usually something dirty or cheap. 
 
In this excerpt Waheeda highlights the paradox or lack in public discourses on sexuality. She 
argues that public discourses portray sex as completely stripped of sacredness. In our current 
society there is nothing sacred about sex; sex is celebrated, although only in a way that reinforces 
its profane nature. Sex, even in its most profane form, has become polluted through discourses of 
exploitation, materialisation and capitalism. The nature of these discourses is reflected in 
Waheeda‟s concluding comment in which she uses the words “dirty” and “cheap” to describe 
current public portrayals of sex. Waheeda provides a salient critique of the dominant mores on 
sexuality existing in contemporary culture. It can seem that Waheeda yearns for a sexual 
discourse in which the interconnectedness of souls and the sacrality of the sexual act can be 
restored and rejuvenated.  
 
It is noteworthy that for many of the respondents that participated in this study, the explicit 
articulation of the interconnectedness of sexuality and spirituality was salient. This 
interconnectedness also mirrors the powerful human bond to God. These views are also 
expressed by some thinkers in the Muslim scholarly tradition within which spirituality and 
sexuality were seen as interdependent categories intrinsic to human nature. For example in the 
Islamic mystical tradition, writers like Ibn al-Arabi suggest that sexual intimacy not only creates 
the potential for procreation, but the potential for divine remembrance and service. He notes how 
loving spouses can through the act of sexual intercourse experience a sense of oneness with each 
other that mirrors the unicity of the divine. Thus, sexual activity can cultivate and nurture the 
spiritual essence shared by human beings, a bond that establishes a notion of spiritual sameness. 













When a person loves women within these bounds [the ability to witness God through 
loving women], that is a divine love. But when someone loves them [women] only out of 
natural appetite [sexuality that is driven by animal instincts], then he falls short of the 
knowledge of this appetite. For him the marriage act [sexual relationship] becomes a 
form without a spirit. Though in actual fact that form possesses a spirit, it is not witnessed 
by the one who comes to his wife, or to whatever female it may be, strictly for taking 
pleasure, but not knowing in whom. He remains ignorant of his own soul just as someone 
else remains ignorant of him as long as he does not name himself with his tongue so that 
he might be known...Such a person loves the taking of pleasure, so he loves the locus 
within which it is found, that is, the woman. However, the spirit of the question has 
remained hidden from him. Were he to know it, he would know in whom he takes 
pleasure and who it is that takes pleasure. Then he would be perfect. (Ibn al-Arabi, 
quoted in Murata, 1992:195; comments in square brackets are mine)  
  
Despite Ibn al-Arabi‟s explicit emphasis on the divine potential of male sexual experiences 
through the relationship with women‟s bodies, the interconnectedness of sexual intimacy and 
pleasure with the divine is salient in the above narrative. Through reconnecting with the source 
of our being when engaging in sexual activity, the sexual encounter becomes infused with divine 
love that we experience through our physical body and unites us, in the spiritual sense, with the 
divine. By witnessing the divine in this intimate way, sexual relationships can be seen as a form 
of worship, ibadat, as well as an acknowledgment of spirituality as an essential aspect of human 
experience that can be present in bodily and sexual experiences.  
 
Seeing spirituality and sexuality as integral categories that reflect the fundamental nature of a 
complete human experience, challenges particular normative patriarchal structures. Often, 
patriarchal religious discourses create dichotomies that separate the body and the spirit, soliciting 
gender hierarchies and dualisms. The excerpts included in this section reflect the various ways in 
which women‟s narratives challenge the very core of these patriarchal epistemologies through 
elucidating the intimate relationship between spirituality and sexuality that exists within all 
human beings. These engagements, embracing the possibility of spiritual sex, provide an 
alternative rationale through which a lived reality is experienced.  
 
In the next chapter I explore the dominant discourse of a wife‟s sexual availability in light of 
respondents‟ experiential realities. This dominant discourse makes an interesting comparison 
with some of the religious ideals that have been articulated by the respondents in this chapter. 













various ways in which the respondents engage with, hold together, and navigate through these 















“A Good Muslim Woman should not refuse her Husband Sex” 
 
“I'm not going to be cursed on the day of Qiyamat [Day 
of Judgment] because I refused to give my husband 
sex.” – Khadija  
 
In several interviews, assumptions about women‟s sexual availability to men emerged as a 
salient theme. The notion that it is unacceptable for a Muslim woman to refuse her husband sex 
formed part of a dominant and powerful religious discourse on sexuality that was recognised and 
accepted amongst many of the respondents. In this chapter I explore how some of the 
respondents engaged with the notion of sexual availability in light of their experiences in 
intimate relationships and marriage.    
 
There were a number of ways in which the respondents spoke about sexual dynamics. On the one 
hand, for some respondents, the religious perspectives that suggest male sexual privilege 
informed sexual praxis in very real ways. A few respondents who were subject to violence more 
broadly in their marital relationships were also subject to the potent discourse of a wife‟s sexual 
availability. The coupling of hierarchical gender relations with this religious norm placed some 
respondents in very vulnerable situations. On the other hand, several women also challenged and 
contested this dominant norm through elaborating alternative theological perspectives, including 
highlighting qualities such as God‟s mercy and compassion. The discourse of Muslim women‟s 
sexual availability was often countered or tempered through employing an Islamic ethic of 
mutual consideration and care. Yet, other women deeply internalised particular religious 
understandings of sexuality that prioritised their sexual availability to their husband.  
 
Often, this notion of being sexually available was coupled with other religious discourses that 
interlinked sexual dynamics with religious responsibilities and the notion of God‟s satisfaction. 
For example, many respondents believed that sex is a form of worship (ibadat). Since worship is 
a religious obligation, seeing sex as a potential expression of worship further informed various 













of a particular hadith that entwine a husband‟s sexual satisfaction with God‟s satisfaction. The 
hadith reads as follows: 
 
If a man invites his wife to sleep with him and she refuses to come to him, then the angels 




Women who refuse to sleep with their husbands will, according to this hadith, be cursed by the 
angels until the following morning. For some respondents, having sex with their husbands is 
better than being cursed by the angels and by extension provoking God‟s displeasure. 
Nonetheless, several respondents also negotiated this hadith, which featured to different degrees 
in their marital relationships, with a number of other existing religious discourses that espouse 
different ideals regarding spousal dynamics.  
 
7.1  The God-Human Relationship in Sexual Interaction 
 
As outlined in the previous chapter, many respondents understood sex to be intimately 
interlinked with a sense of spiritual connectedness. Although for many respondents this 
conceptualisation of sex was merely a symbolic ideal, often not reflected in actual experience, 
seeing sex in this way provides alternative views on the purpose and potential of sexual 
interaction. Nonetheless, these idyllic beliefs can also be combined with the discourse of a wife‟s 
sexual availability. For example, Aisha explained to me that: 
 
You can‟t really say no, but I am now speaking of considerateness also, so if she is not 
feeling well, then maybe he can exercise a little bit of patience. You got to consider each 
other as well, but you mustn‟t refuse because the union is also the practising of an ibadat 
[worship]. 
 
Interestingly, within the context of this narrative, sex as a form of worship is not solely reflective 
of an unambiguous spiritual engagement. Rather, the coupling of sex as ibadat with the powerful 
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discourse of sexual availability generates potential problematic relations of power within a 
sexual relationship. Although Aisha asserts that “considerateness” and “patience” should inform 
sexual relationships, Aisha believes that a woman cannot say „no‟ to sex because it is an act of 
ibadat. Thus, Aisha is not primarily making the case for mutual considerateness, although her 
understanding of sexual dynamics is nuanced through balancing broader ethical principles with a 
notion that demands her perpetual sexual readiness. While the spiritual dimension of sex is 
expressed in Aisha‟s narrative, there is a stronger sense of not refusing sex because of its 
religious dimension, than of having sex as a way of expressing religiosity and connectedness to 
God. 
 
The construct of „sex as a form of ibadat‟ establishes a distinct and paired human relationship 
with God. Nonetheless, understanding sex as an act of ibadat is not removed from social 
contexts in which sexual relationships are lived out. Sex as a form of ibadat for many of my 
respondents involves heterosexual sex within the legal framework of marriage, thus always also 
influenced by broader marital dynamics. Sexual relationships encompass interpersonal gender 
dynamics, subjective expressions of religiosity, broader experiences in marriage, particular 
conceptualisations of sexuality, and the interrelation between these various levels of human 
experience and understandings.  
 
Arguably, Aisha is holding together seemingly ambivalent understandings of sexual intimacy. 
On the one hand, her subjectivity is expressed through a particular conception of sex as part of 
religious worship together with an ethics of mutual consideration. And, simultaneously, she 
expresses that you should not refuse an opportunity to perform worship. The interconnectedness 
of these ambiguous discourses raises important questions on the nature of worship within a social 
context. What does it mean to be in a God/believer relationship? What are the ways in which 
various human relationships can mediate the relationship between the believer and God? What 
are the potential implications of intimate relationships in forming particular God/believer 
relationships? What if sex is perceived by the husband as a right he has over his wife? What if 
sex takes place through coercion? Can sexual interaction acted out through inegalitarian relations 
of power still be perceived as an act of ibadat? Is sex an act of ibadat if pleasure and enjoyment 













satisfaction? These are some of the questions that I address in the last chapter of this dissertation 
where I discuss some of the principles promoted by the Islamic feminist discourse together with 
the dominant themes that emerged in my empirical research. 
 
A few respondents also expressed another dimension of sexual interaction that involves the God-
human relationship. Here, a wife‟s sexual availability is interlinked with acting according to the 
will of God. For example, Hamedah explains: 
 
When your husband asks you to have sex, you have to because you don‟t want [to] 
disobey God. The only time when you can say „no‟ is when you‟re not feeling well, [and] 
that is only when you have your menstruation, [then] you‟re not allowed to have sex with 
your husband. 
 
In this excerpt, Hamedah, like Aisha, invokes a particular understanding on the nature of sexual 
intimacy for why saying „no‟ to your husband is problematic within an Islamic framework. 
However, instead of elaborating on the „positive‟ aspect of sex as a form of ibadat, Hamedah 
places emphasis on the fact that you are disobeying the will of God if you refuse to have sex. 
Within this understanding, the pleasure/will of God becomes intimately connected to the 
pleasure/will of the husband. Correspondingly, obedience to God is shown through having sex 
with your husband when he makes sexual advances. Interestingly, the boundary between what is 
God‟s pleasure and what is a husband‟s pleasure appears to be permeable. The dominant 
discourse of a wife‟s sexual availability to her husband is here entwined with fulfilling the will of 
God, achieved through complying with the will of her husband. To the extent that this particular 
understanding of sexual dynamics forms part of marital relationships, the locus of power rests 
with the husband who can invoke religious justification, i.e. divine punishment, as the primary 
reason for why his wife should not refuse sex.  
 
Although a few respondents challenge and mitigate these understandings, which I deal with later 
in this chapter, it is noteworthy that these perspectives form part of normative discourses on 
sexuality that largely inform respondents‟ conceptualisations of sexual dynamics. In the next 
section I highlight the existence of one particular hadith to illustrate the influence of the religious 
canon on contemporary sexual praxis. The social currency of this hadith might impact upon 













7.2  Invoking Hadith in the Bedroom 
 
The hadith that we encountered in the beginning of this chapter is explored in this section. What 
is the social world of this hadith? In many interviews, respondents expressed that this hadith is 
„common knowledge‟ in Muslim circles.
81
 The significant number of respondents who were 
subject to their husband‟s invocation of this hadith in their marital relationship clearly 
underscores its significance in influencing contemporary Muslim sexual dynamics. Nonetheless, 
respondents who experienced the invocation of this hadith responded to its implicit directives in 
a number of different ways. For some women, this hadith has become part of an accepted jargon 
in the sense that it forms part of sexual praxis. One respondent mentioned that this hadith is a 
viable antecedent for sexual interaction and is sometimes entwined with sexual foreplay in her 
marriage. For other women, this hadith informed sexual praxis and particular understandings of 
sexual dynamics, often legitimising a husband‟s purportedly religious right to demand sex 
whenever he wishes. Yet, other women challenged and contested the legitimacy and justification 
for the invocation of this hadith in their intimate relationships. The following excerpt is from a 
conversation I had with Somayya:  
 
Somayya: If you have refused your husband [sex] then you will be cursed by those angels 
from that time [that you refuse] until the next dawn, and then I don‟t see any reason why 
you should actually refuse.  
Nina: Have you ever experienced your husband saying that hadith to you? 
Somayya: Yes, many times, and women sleep with their husbands even though they hate 
them because of that. 
 
Somayya‟s acceptance of this hadith is strongly linked to the „punishment‟ it invokes. It is the 
possibility of being cursed by the angels that removes any doubt as to whether one should 
question the underlying reasons for why a woman should not refuse her husband. The authority 
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inherent in this hadith is illuminated through her statement: “women sleep with their husbands 
even though they hate them because of that”. Although Somayya expressed in our interview that 
she is in a loving marriage and has a “good sexual life” with her husband, intimate relationships 
still become potentially ambiguous by acknowledging the authority of the religious prescriptions 
implicit in this hadith. Similarly Nurunisa explains: 
 
Nurunisa: I was raised to never say „no‟ to your husband, even if you are making a pot of 
food. If I make a pot of food and he decides that he wants to [have sex], then I have to put 
off [stop cooking] and you have to go [to have sex], you can‟t say „no‟, then the angels 
will curse you from the morning to the night. 
Nina: Did he say that to you? 
Nurunisa: Yes he always says it [recites this hadith], even now he will say it. Maybe 
Allah is going to punish me, I must pray a lot. 
 
Nurunisa‟s conceptualisation of sexual dynamics is partly informed by her upbringing where the 
powerful discourse of a wife‟s sexual availability was emphasised.  For Nurunisa, this hadith 
(although a different version of it) forms an intricate part of her intimate relationship and 
effectively guides sexual praxis. Nonetheless, in her marriage, Nurunisa has been exposed to her 
husband‟s infidelity and various forms of abuse. As a result of these experiences Nurunisa 
challenges the legitimacy of these religious prescriptions for her marital relationship. She 
explains:   
 
Nurunisa: I decided I am not going to sleep with him anymore, now it is enough. I am 
tired of all the funny smell, or lying in bed and the blankets don‟t smell nice. He 
[husband] is the one who makes me sick like that, sweat and smell and wine. 
Nina: Does he respect that? 
Nurunisa: No, he is cross! 
Nina: So does he try to have sex with you? 
Nurunisa: No, he just says, this isn‟t me speaking I am just repeating, [husband says:] „I 
am not going to come after you for pussy‟, and „I don‟t beg you for your pussy‟, that is 
what he says. That is fine, I want it like that because I am tired. 
 
Nurunisa‟s reference in the first excerpt to God‟s punishment, “Maybe Allah is going to punish 
me, I must pray a lot”, can be linked to the fact that she recently told her husband that there will 
be no more sex in their marriage. Her belief in the potential punishment from God as a 













our interview, Nurunisa explained that her experiences with her husband‟s abuse of alcohol and 
drugs and the occasional extra-marital affair strongly contributed to her decision not to have sex 
with him. Interestingly for Nurunisa, although a wife‟s sexual availability still holds currency on 
the level of religious persuasions, the nature of her particular marital relationship opens up a 
space for contestation. Her engagement evokes Shaikh‟s (2007) discussion of a tafsir of praxis as 
Nurunisa‟s social reality undoubtedly influences the ways in which she makes sense of religious 
meaning. Consequently, the authority of particular religious constructs of sexual dynamics is 
mitigated through Nurunisa‟s own sensibilities coupled with her experiences in her marital 
relationship. Although Nurunisa elucidates praying as a means by which she can compensate for 
her decision, she does not go back on her decision or regret it.  
 
Many respondents who were confronted with this hadith evoked the notion of a merciful and 
compassionate God as a way of contesting and challenging the currency of this hadith in their 
marital relationship as well as in broader social contexts. The following excerpt is from a 
conversation between Saba and me: 
 
Saba: My husband is a very vocal person, I mean you should meet him, he is very vocal, 
and you know he likes that one about the angels. 
Nina: Would he say it to you? 
Saba: He did, he doesn‟t know hadith, he can‟t quote hadith, but who doesn‟t know that 
one, so he knows that one but... if you choose to say that [recite this hadith] to me I first 
and foremost would take a step back and look at what you did that brought us to this 
place [of having to use coercive hadith to obtain sex]. So he can say it all he wants, he 
did, but I didn't take it to mind. 
 
Arguably, for Saba, one does not need to be a religious expert in order to be aware of the 
existence of this hadith. This indicates that this particular hadith has a powerful social 
acceptance among the broader population of the Muslim community and is being kept alive 
through being articulated in various social interactions and within marital relationships. Although 
she is confronted with this hadith in her marital relationship, Saba responds to her husband in a 
way that actually interrogates the utility of the hadith. 
 
Saba‟s narrative revolves around the underlying reasons for why it is necessary for her husband 













salient in the context of finding out what factors and relationship dynamics prompted him to 
recite this hadith. In effect, Saba is suggesting that there is a problem or a moment of crisis in 
their relationship that precipitates her husband‟s use of this hadith as a way to deflect the 
problem at hand. Thus, Saba implies that this hadith is in fact symptomatic of a problem, and 
that she prefers to deal with the problem. She is not rejecting the hadith, nonetheless, she is 
significantly reinterpreting this hadith in a way that marks it as a signal of a problem in her 
marital relationship. It is interesting that her focus is solely on her husband‟s actions, and not 
whether it was something that she did that could potentially provoke him to recite the hadith. 
Saba is contesting the very premise of their sexual engagement when this hadith forms part of 
their sexual dynamics. Thus, the justification of sexual intercourse through the invocation of 
religious text is not taken at face value, but rather, must be understood in light of broader 
relationship dynamics. Saba includes the importance of reflection in this situation as a way 
through which she responds to her husband‟s sexual „invitation‟.  
 
Furthermore, Saba states that it does not matter how many times her husband invokes this hadith, 
her response would still be the same – she would not take it to mind. Thus, Saba implicitly de-
legitimises the religious and sexual authority embedded in this hadith through firstly, not 
complying with her husband‟s request, and by extension rejecting the structure of sexual 
dynamics it creates. Farhana, who earlier in our interview expressed that a husband has a 
„religious‟ right to sexual intercourse, asserts the following in relation to this hadith:  
 
You know the story where you need to sleep with your husband and if you don‟t then the 
angels will curse you until the morning…I understand that part, but I think the 
interpretation is sometimes not taken the way it should. Take the situation and look at it, 
if your husband is sleeping around and there is AIDS everywhere, whether religion says 
it or not I am not going to sleep with that man. I always then think about that God is 
merciful. 
 
In this narrative Farhana highlights that the directives implicit in this hadith should be contingent 
on the social context in which we live. Thus, although she acknowledges particular religious 
ideals related to a wife‟s sexual availability to her husband, she balances this view by pointing 
out particular circumstances in which religious „commands‟ can be abrogated. For example, 













fabric in which she situates herself, as well as the reality of HIV/AIDS in her community. 
Similarly, Saba argues,  
 
Say for example that a man slaps his wife around and then he says to her you know here I 
am [indicating with gestures that they shall have sex], how can she possibly want to sleep 
with that man? So how can the angels be angry at that woman for not [having sex with 
her husband]? It‟s inhuman for a man to have ill-treated the woman and then she must be 
ready to share her body which is a very private part. I can't believe that Allah would be so 
unfair. 
 
By constantly invoking a merciful God as a counterpoint, Farhana and Saba provide an implicit 
critique of the lack of mercifulness and humanness embedded within this hadith. The notion of 
God as merciful was a constant refrain amongst respondents who were confronted with 
hierarchical sexual power dynamics in their marital relationships. Although some respondents 
employed this notion of a merciful God as a form of resistance, for other respondents, believing 
that God is merciful also functioned as a coping mechanism in brutal and unmerciful marital 
relationships. Nonetheless, for many women the belief that God is merciful trumps the religious 
legitimacy of this hadith in complex contemporary contexts within which life-threatening 
illnesses, infidelity and woman abuse exist. The need to contextualise particular religious 
prescriptions guiding sexual praxis, in light of current contexts, becomes salient. Thus, for both 
Farhana and Saba, a contemporary Islamic sexual ethics must include principles such as mercy 
and fairness, as divine pillars guiding sexual praxis in a contemporary challenging environment. 
This way of engaging with religious texts resonates with Islamic feminist endeavours in which 
emphasis is placed on the questionable eternality of particular textual sources and their validity 
for contemporary societies.  
 
In the excerpts above, Farhana and Saba engage in particular contestations of dominant views 
regarding women‟s permanent sexual availability to their husbands and the possibility of 
receiving the curse of the angels if they refuse to have sex. This engagement evokes Amina 
Wadud‟s (2006) discussion on khalifah (moral agency) in which individuals‟ moral 
responsibilities are stressed in order to work towards ideals of social justice. Farhana and Saba 
effectively challenge the existence of patriarchal norms as they relate to social contexts in ways 













Farhana and Saba are employing their ethical responsibilities in ways that advocate religious 
meaning systems that they see as more in accordance with Divine attributes of justice and mercy. 
Abou El Fadl‟s (2001) notion of taking a “conscientious-pause” echoes Farhana and Saba‟s 
engagement, as their resistance can be seen as interlinked with a form of internal unsettling of 
consciousness within which lack of acceptable and humane interactions evokes the need to 
redress the dominant discourses shaping contemporary Islamic sexual ethics. By extension, it can 
be inferred from the quotations above that Farhana and Saba utilise the methodological option 
outlined by Amina Wadud (2006) to „say no‟ to particular religious texts/teachings that cause us 
discomfort in our social context.  
 
The abovementioned hadith, with its prominent historical residues, is relevant for the 
understanding of contemporary sexual dynamics. As shown through the excerpts outlined above, 
the implications of the commonality and acceptance of this hadith with its particular androcentric 
proclivities are influential, to various degrees, in women‟s lives. Patriarchal epistemologies 
revived and reproduced through articulating this hadith in various social contexts and in intimate 
relationships express an Islamic sexual ethics that is rooted in inegalitarian understandings of 
gender dynamics. The invocation of this hadith can as such inform women‟s sexual experiences 
and perceptions of what it means to be an embodied human being, and can also influence the 
ways in which sexual relationships in marital unions are structured and lived out. Within this 
context, the construction of women as sexual beings serving the needs of men becomes an 
important site of contestation. 
 
7.3  Sexual Availability and Broader Marital Dynamics 
 
For some respondents, religious discourses that assert male sexual privilege were intertwined 
with experiences of sexual abuse, marital infidelity, and domestic violence.
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 The following 
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 Amongst my respondents, fourteen women had experiences with spousal infidelity. A significant number also had 
experienced physical abuse within the marital union, and a combination of verbal, financial and emotional abuse. 
Also, a substantial number of my respondents said that they experienced sexual abuse/marital rape in their marital 
relationships. The prevalence of marital infidelity, marital abuse and sexual violence are reflective of broader trends 













narratives illustrate various marital dynamics that are subject to the influence of these normative 
views on sexuality that further complicate intimate relationships and make salient broader 
relations of power. Khadija‟s previous marriage was characterised by various forms of abuse that 
permeated sexual dynamics and marital relations more broadly.
83
 Khadija explains: 
 
I‟m a Muslim woman and I should be obedient towards my husband, my brain told me 
that he has a right to have access to my vagina. I didn‟t think of it as violation at that 
time. Now, I can say yes [it was a violation], but that time it was just what I have to do 
because I‟m a good Muslim woman and good Muslim women satisfy their husbands.  
 
For Khadija, wifely obedience and sexual availability are behavioural components that make up 
a good Muslim woman.
84
 Although Khadija explained in the interview that she often did not 
want to have sex with her husband, she believed, at the time, that her husband‟s unrestricted 
access to her vagina was part of what constitutes marriage.
85
 Furthermore, Khadija also believed 
that it was her duty as a good Muslim woman to make sure that her husband was sexually 
satisfied. Thus, the concept of being a good Muslim woman contains both personal 
characteristics that can be cultivated within and lived out in intimate relationships (e.g. 
obedience), and qualities realised through engaging with one‟s husband (e.g. sexual availability 
and ensuring husband‟s satisfaction).  
 
The understanding of having a responsibility/duty to satisfy your husband sexually was 
highlighted by a few other respondents as well. Shafieka, having experienced adultery in her first 
marriage as well as in her current marriage, linked this „duty‟ to the belief that “if you are not 
available, he can go out and give it [sex] to somebody else, that is where you as a woman make 
your mistake”. By implication, according to this excerpt, it is a woman‟s responsibility to keep 
                                                                                                                                                             
My empirical findings related to these issues broadly reflect the data reported in Toefy (2001) and A. Mohammed 
(1997 and 2003).  
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 Khadija‟s understandings of sexual dynamics was also dealt with in Chapter 6, page 131-132.  
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 Shaikh (2007) found in her study on battered women that her respondents predominantly connected the ideal of a 
good Muslim woman with wearing modest dress and remaining chaste. Shaikh argues that respondents‟ 
understandings of religious identities were “significantly related to sexual propriety” (2007:76). 
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 According to Kecia Ali (2006), the classical legal tradition primarily conceived of men‟s unrestricted sexual 













her husband sexually satisfied so that he does not go out and commit adultery. In this 
construction, a good Muslim woman ensures a sexually satisfied husband thereby becoming 
partially responsible for male sexual behaviour. This understanding poses great challenges with 
regard to developing an egalitarian sexual ethics. It also questions the essence of each believer‟s 
individual responsibility for sexual behaviour and ability to monitor their own sexual boundaries. 
Rendering men unaccountable for their sexual transgressions, justified by lack of sexual 
satisfaction within the marital union, also creates very problematic notions of male agency in 
relation to sexual ethics. It begs the question of what is ethical sexual behaviour for a Muslim 
man. I will draw this point into a discussion on notions of moral agency as it relates to sexual 
behaviour, in the last chapter of this dissertation.   
 
Many respondents seemed to be interrogating or resisting some of these norms of sexual 
behaviour. Some respondents challenged the inegalitarianism implicit in this construct by 
foregrounding equal responsibilities and sensibilities. Other respondents stated that their 
husband‟s infidelity was one of the main reasons for why they initiated divorce or marital 
counselling. For other respondents, the discourse of a wife‟s sexual availability became 
increasingly contested when exposed to a husband‟s infidelity. For example, Khadija started to 
challenge her husband‟s right to have sex with her:  
 
He [husband] said that you are going to be punished if you don‟t [have sex with him], so 
I said I won‟t, because then I started challenging him and [I] said, God is not unmerciful. 
Every day I tell myself that we have a merciful God, and God will not put anyone 
through this, I‟m not listening to you [husband] using religion for your own benefits, I‟m 
into using this [pointing to her head], my logic, my brain that Allah has given me in order 
to defend myself against people like you. I doubt whether you are clean, I don‟t know 
with which diseases you‟re coming home. I refuse to accept the facts [that she must sleep 
with her husband despite his sexual infidelity], and you‟re a practising Muslim woman 
[referring to herself]. I said that I refused to accept the fact that Allah will punish me 
because I say „no‟ to you [husband]. I don‟t know what the man is coming home with 
[referring to potential diseases]. I refuse to accept the fact that I don‟t have a say in 
whether I want to have sex or not. 
 
Khadija‟s husband is fully aware of her commitment to being a good Muslim woman, and is able 
to take advantage of her assiduous effort to live up to this ideal. He justifies his right to sexual 













Khadija‟s decision to contest the discourse of a wife‟s sexual availability is deeply informed by 
her own situation. There are aspects of her sexual relationship with her husband that she finds 
unacceptable. She does not believe that God demands of her to have sexual intimacy with a man 
who can expose her to diseases and illness due to his adulterous behaviour. Khadija enacts her 
right to say „no‟ to sex partly due to her understanding of particular qualities of God that inform 
her religious worldview. It is noteworthy that Khadija‟s resistance is predominantly enacted by 
utilising religion as a supportive framework. Arguably, the existence of ambiguous Islamic 
discourses can be employed to suppress as well as to empower. This reflects, amongst other 
things, the multifaceted dimensions of Islam as well as the relational nature of various discourses 
with social realities. 
 
The ways in which many of the respondents in this study engage with the ambiguous nature of 
religious heritage are also highlighted by Shaikh (2007). She found in her study on marital 
violence in Muslim communities that when women were confronted with fundamentally harmful 
experiences, they often engaged with religion in ways that challenged patriarchal ideologies. 
Simultaneously, they employed other religious discourses that allowed for empowerment and 
rebuilding of alternative individual religious selves. Similarly, Abdulkader Tayob (2003) found 
in his interviews with women who experience a crisis in difficult marital relationships, varying 
modes of negotiating relationship dynamics and religious identities. Often, the existence of 
ambiguous religious beliefs provided novel ways to engage with problematic marriages.   
 
Khadija‟s assertion that God is merciful can be seen as a form of resistance to a dominant 
patriarchal narrative that has influenced the sexual dynamics in her marital relationship. Through 
elaborating on God‟s mercy, Khadija also presents an ethical ideal that empowers her in what is 
patently an unmerciful social reality. In addition, the belief in a merciful God challenges her 
husband‟s more instrumentalised use of religion in matters of sexual dynamics. Furthermore, 
through this engagement with religious values and ethics, Khadija asserts her right to utilise what 
she considers as her God-given logic. Khadija‟s response to her husband is fundamentally 
premised on moral reasoning that is intricately linked with her social context. Her moral 
reasoning also projects particular understandings of Islamic ethics that should guide 













Khadija asserts and emphasises her right to sexual autonomy in light of her husband‟s behaviour 
of seeking pleasure elsewhere. Khadija refuses to accept that she will be punished if she says 
„no‟ to her husband. First of all, her husband is the one engaging in extramarital sexual 
intercourse. Secondly, by being aware of her husband‟s infidelity, Khadija believes she has the 
right to protect herself from possible life-threatening diseases. Thus, the contextual engagement 
with religious norms in light of the real threat of becoming infected with HIV, as outlined by 
Saba and Farhana in the previous section, renders particular accepted religious discourses 
obsolete. In Khadija‟s case, dominant male-favourable assumptions and discourses that guide 
sexual praxis are replaced by an Islamic ethics that is grounded in Khadija‟s life experiences and 
need for alternative understandings of religious discourses shaping sexual praxis.  
 
For one respondent who experienced spousal infidelity in her marriage, speaking to a religious 
leader in her local community formed part of the way in which she approached the situation. 
Shafieka explains: 
 
When I first found out that my husband did this [extra-marital affair] I said “sheikh, I 
know a woman is not allowed to say no to her husband for sex, any sex, any time, in my 
case do I have the right?”, I needed his [approval], he knows a little bit more [about 
Islamic rights] and I went to him and I said to him “sheikh this is it…” [informing the 
sheikh about husband‟s adultery], I have never spoken to him like this before ever. I was 
too shy to talk about sex like that. I would never mention it. 
 
Seemingly, Shafieka gathers the courage to ask the local sheikh for advice. The very act itself of 
asking the sheikh‟s advice on this sensitive and personal matter was for Shafieka extremely 
challenging. It became apparent from other narratives as well that there are particular areas 
specifically related to issues around sexuality, which are considered socially unacceptable to 
speak about to people outside of the bedroom. However, Shafieka felt that this issue was so 
important to her that she defied normative standards of acceptable dialogical relationships.  
 
Although Shafieka believes that a woman is not allowed to refuse her husband sex, in this 
particular situation she wanted to know whether it was within her rights to refuse. It can also be 
inferred from Shafieka‟s narrative that to have the sheikh‟s permission and support to say „no‟ to 













The sheikh did tell Shafieka that she had the right to refuse her husband sex, and he also said that 
she had the right to tell him to “get out”.  
 
It is noteworthy that Shafieka appears to genuinely need this kind of support and advice from the 
local sheikh. Throughout our conversation it became apparent that the sheikh was very accessible 
to the local community with regard to marital problems, amongst other issues, and that many 
women in the vicinity had established a close and personal relationship with him. It is significant 
to note that this sheikh engaged with Shafieka in a way that was empowering. He also advocated 
an ethics based on justice, in which sexual transgressions are unacceptable behaviour for men 
and women alike. Shafieka‟s narrative stands out as one of the few narratives amongst my 
respondents where religious authorities are seemingly helpful with giving advice to women who 
experience difficult marital relationships.  
 
Nonetheless, Shafieka‟s narrative also raises some critical questions regarding her own capacity 
to act and make decisions in her own right. Why does Shafieka need pre-approval to say „no‟ to 
having sex with her husband? Although the sheikh does not restrict Shafieka‟s range of potential 
responses to her husband‟s infidelity – rather, he says that she has the right to leave him – the 
sheikh‟s potential influence over Shafieka‟s decision-making can represent women‟s dependency 
on a symbolic (male) authority. Thus, the locus of control regarding decision-making related to 
subjective experiences is placed outside of the female individual who is living this experience. 
This resonates with Wadud‟s (2006) and Shaikh‟s (2003b) engagement with women‟s limited 
potential to act as moral agents in their own right, due to structures of male power. Even on a 
symbolic level, the authority of male leadership has become so deeply ingrained that many 
women hesitate to employ their capacity for individual responses and actions in situations that 
are profoundly unjust.  
 
Shafieka is allowing her experiences to inform the way in which she makes sense of and applies 
religious teachings. In this context, Shafieka‟s capacity for agency is intricately linked to a 
particular subjective experience that acquires alternative or expanded readings of accepted 
normative female behaviour rooted in religious discourse. Shafieka‟s active engagement with 













of the „don‟t ask, don‟t tell‟-mentality. And secondly, her engagement provides her with an 
authoritative opinion that supports her decision to refuse her husband sex, while at the same time 
being situated within an Islamic discourse of acceptable female behaviour.  
 
For respondents who had experienced sexual abuse prior to their marriage, the dominant 
discourse of a wife‟s sexual availability presented problematic implications with regard to their 
intimate experiences. For some respondents, conceptualisations of sexuality as well as their lived 
sexual relationships were intimately connected with their traumatic experiences of abuse. Often 
their lack of sexual enjoyment and feelings of sexual disassociation in their intimate relationships 
came to the fore. Mariam outlines the dynamics of her sexual relationship: 
  
I know that it is not allowed for you to say no to your husband if you don‟t have a valid 
reason, so right now basically I don‟t have any valid reasons. I think it is because my 
emotions are not involved when I‟m having sex, it is almost an act outside [of] who I am, 
seriously, as long as he is satisfied then ja then it‟s fine... 
 
Mariam conveys feelings of alienation and even dissociation when explaining the nature of her 
sexual relationship with her husband. It appears as though one of the underlying reasons for why 
she is able to have sex is the fact that her “emotions are not involved” during sexual intercourse. 
Earlier in our conversation Mariam explained to me that she was sexually abused throughout her 
formative years and teens, and as a result of this experience she feels that she is unable to 
experience sexual pleasure. She stated several times in our conversations that “I‟m happy when 
he [husband] gets it over and done with.” This notion is also reflected in the above excerpt in 
which she states that the satisfaction of her husband is basically the main purpose of the sexual 
engagement.  
 
For Mariam, understandings of religious views on sexual dynamics and lived sexual praxis are 
intricately connected, despite her particular (sexual) experiences. Her experiences with sexual 
abuse do not seem to influence the currency of particular sexual norms in her marriage.  
 
Mariam explained to me that she had told her husband about the sexual abuse she experienced in 













share this experience with her husband. However, from Mariam‟s account, it appeared that 
neither possessed sufficient skills in dealing with this situation. Mariam narrates: 
 
When I saw that we were going to be serious [going to get married] I told him [husband] 
about it [the sexual abuse]. He didn‟t react in the way that I thought he would. He just 
brushed over it, because I think it is something that he doesn‟t know how to deal with. 
The worst thing in my marriage is that we never talk about things. I am never allowed to 
talk about it [sexual abuse]. My husband is a very good man and all that, but he doesn‟t 
allow me to express myself. Sometimes I feel that I can‟t stand it, I am silenced by that 
[lack of acceptance with regard to speaking about particular issues]... [but] this world is 
temporal, our true lives are going to begin in the hereafter. That gives me a lot of strength 
for my day-to-day challenges, [and] I can overlook a lot of things of what my husband 
does. 
 
What we are seeing here is an inability on the part of spouses to engage with issues, but in 
different ways: on the one hand, male spouses refuses to engage, while on the other hand, female 
spouses are unable to induce the other party, or other family members, to engage. Many 
respondents pointed out that there is a lack of existing channels within their local community 
through which their stories could be taken seriously and dealt with appropriately. Arguably, the 
„don‟t ask, don‟t tell‟-mentality and the perceived social taboo around having a public discourse 
on this issue, influence women‟s (and men‟s) opportunities to share these often-traumatic 
experiences. The presence of these social dynamics might render a couple incapable of dealing 
with these very painful and sensitive issues when raised in the context of marriage. It also 
impacts upon the intimate and sexual dynamics within marital relationships. 
 
Mariam‟s husband‟s reaction alludes to feelings of discomfort and lack of competence. As 
reflected in other respondents‟ narratives, it is often easier for the intimate partner to avoid the 
issue by rendering it a topic that is unacceptable to speak about. The fact that she complies with 
her husband‟s wish of not speaking about this particular issue can be understood through 
Mariam‟s elucidation on the hereafter within which “our true lives [will] begin”. It is essential to 
note that her strong belief in the reality of the hereafter gives her a sense of profound strength in 
this physical (present) reality. Some of the respondents, particularly women who had gone 
through various traumatic experiences, expressed similar views. Arguably, the emphasis placed 













conditions of violence and sexual abuse because it induces women to accept present negative 
circumstances, instead of attempting to change them for the better.  
 
Often, dominant religious norms and community opinions influence the ways in which 
individuals choose to deal with particular experiences, both within a public discourse as well as 
within interpersonal relationships. Mariam‟s capacity for action and dialogue is clearly tempered 
by the existence of these dynamics. Furthermore, Mariam expressed the existence of other 
religious discourses that influence her understanding of sexual dynamics: 
 
Even when you are having relations [sexual intercourse] with your husband it is a charity, 





Although Mariam expresses feelings of alienation and estrangement when having sex with her 
husband, due to her experiences of sexual abuse, she simultaneously believes that sex is an act of 
charity and that Allah will bestow blessings upon her for her sexual engagement with her 
husband. Her multiple and ambivalent conceptualisation of sexuality is noteworthy in that she 
holds a seemingly larger notion of an individual generous self together with a bereft and pained 
self that has experienced abuse. Seeing sex as an act of charity, arguably presupposes a self that 
has abundance and plentitude. Sex as charity assumes a generous self. A self that has been 
violated and abused is conceivably a wounded self.  
 
It can be inferred from Mariam‟s narrative that her conceptualisation of sex is informed by 
normative religious ideals that espouse generosity. Nonetheless, these discursive traditions do 
not take into account that believers also experience trauma and torment in their lives, sometimes 
rendering individual selves vulnerable and damaged. Difficult experiences influence believers‟ 
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 The understanding of sex as a way of expressing charity also forms part of the hadith tradition. For example in the 
canonical hadith collection of Muslim, the Prophet is reported to have said: “Has not Allah made things for you to 
give away in charity? ...to enjoin a good action is a charity, to forbid an evil action is a charity, and in the sexual act 
of each of you there is a charity”. They [the companions of the Prophet] said: “O Messenger of Allah, when one of 
us fulfils his sexual desire will he have some reward for that?” He [the Prophet] said: “Do you not think that were he 













capacity to subsume or live out these religious ideals in their embodied realities. Often, wounded 
selves need healing before generosity can be expressed. It seems that Mariam‟s sense of self, as 
expressed in her narratives above, is still deeply wounded, being “outside” of who she is when 
having sex with her husband. Nonetheless, perceiving sex as an act of charity might underpin her 
ability to endure sexual intercourse, in particular, through highlighting the blessings that can 
transpire from this union. Arguably, Mariam‟s conceptualisation of sex as charity might function 
as a form of escapism from having to deal with her ambivalent emotions that might emerge if she 
were to be fully present in sexual interaction with her husband. 
  
A few respondents had experiences with violence and sexual abuse in their marital relationships. 
Although some respondents spoke about their experiences in light of religious norms, such as 
wifely obedience and particular conceptions of sexual dynamics, other respondents situated their 
experiences within the ambit of broader cultural constructs. Rashieda, currently divorced, having 
lived through a marriage within which violence and infidelity were characterising features, 
explains:    
 
He [husband] would just rip my clothes off, he did say “it is my right” [as a husband], he 
did say that. He would lie next to me in bed and he would masturbate next to me and he 
would have sex with me every day. Then he would get out of the bed and go out [to see 
other women] in the early hours of the morning. 
 
As Rashieda continued her narrative it became clear that her husband sought sexual satisfaction 
from a variety of women, including prostitutes. I asked Rashieda whether she ever asked her 
husband to use a condom in order to protect herself from possible diseases, she replied: 
 
No, I never, do you know… I didn‟t want him to have sex with me. It was a one-sided 
thing. I often told him “just do whatever you want”. I wasn‟t a participant. I allowed him 
to appease himself just to keep the peace. 
 
As opposed to Khadija, Rashieda does not talk about her experiences by drawing on 
understandings about what it means to be a good Muslim woman. Rather, she states that it was 
her husband that was under the impression that it was his right as the husband to have sex with 













understandings of Muslim sexual dynamics. Hence, in her case, her husband might have thought 
that it was his right to have sex with her simply because he was the man and she was his wife. 
Within the broader context of South Africa, a variety of understandings of male-female dynamics 
and gender hierarchies pervade a number of societies and cultures. Religion is one particular 
social factor that influences and informs contemporary notions of gender norms and behaviour. It 
became clear in my interview with Rashieda that particular cultural perceptions regarding marital 
dynamics and women‟s roles were salient and impacted significantly upon her marital 
relationship I allude to these beliefs later in this section. 
 
In the second quotation, Rashieda makes it clear that she did not want to have sex with her 
husband, however, she “allowed him” to have sex with her in order to avoid other conflicts and 
violent abuse. With regard to negotiating condom use, Rashieda explained that she never asked 
her husband to use a condom. It is unclear what her underlying reason for this was as she moved 
on to saying that she did not want him to have sex with her at all. From her narrative, however, it 
can be inferred that her increased vulnerability to STIs or HIV due to her husband‟s adulterous 
escapades was not salient for her. Rather, her main concern was to keep the peace in the home. 
Thus, the discomfort of having sex with her husband (and the possibility of getting infected with 
STIs/HIV) was measured against other likely scenarios that were seen as more disconcerting and 
disturbing for the broader well-being of her family. 
 
With regard to negotiating condom use due to knowledge about a husband‟s infidelity, Khadija 
explained to me that:  
 
He [husband] didn‟t want to use a condom [when having sex with her] and that time it 
was difficult to refuse him any sex because I thought a good Muslim woman does not 
refuse her husband sex. 
 
Again, the constant refrain of a good Muslim woman that does not refuse her husband sex is 
being invoked. This time, however, it is in a situation in which the risk of contracting STIs or 
HIV is a real possibility. Consequently, for Khadija, her understanding of what it meant to be a 
good Muslim woman increased her vulnerability to STIs/HIV as her husband‟s refusal to wear a 













whenever he wanted to (despite having knowledge about his infidelity). Nonetheless, as outlined 
previously in this chapter, later on in her marriage Khadija did start to challenge her husband‟s 
right to have sex with her and asserted her right to protect herself from potential life-threatening 
diseases.  
 
Both Rashieda‟s and Khadija‟s narratives illustrate how particular structures of sexual dynamics 
might affect women‟s sexual health. It is significant that women are increasingly vulnerable to 
STIs/HIV due to specific norms and ideals that clearly inform intimate relationships and male 
sexual behaviour and expectations, by removing agency from women over their own bodies. 
Also, both Rashieda and Khadija are aware that their husbands are engaging in extra-marital sex. 
Consequently, the discourses in which they are situated guide their sexual praxis and in various 
ways limit their bodily autonomy in ways that potentially can threaten their lives. 
 
Rashieda and Khadija are trying to negotiate a space at home within which pragmatic and short-
term solutions are being employed to avoid marital abuse and violence. The fact that they are 
sleeping with their husbands, despite their husbands‟ adultery and lack of condom use, can be 
seen as a form of self-preservation in light of what they perceive as a greater immediate threat – 
to be exposed to physical violence. On the other hand, by succeeding in avoiding imminent 
violence, essentially by engaging in sexual interaction, they also expose themselves to a greater 
violence, that of a life-threatening illness. Through many years of experiencing marital abuse, the 
relations of power that shape and permeate their marital relationships allow only for pragmatic 
decision-making and self-preservation.  
 
Reflecting upon the reasons for which Rashieda chose to continue in an abusive marriage, she 
notes the impact of culture and socialisation in her upbringing:  
 
...because I was brought up by Indian parents who had the belief that „if you make your 
bed – lie in it‟ and I have always told myself... well you made your choice. I married him; 
I just have to endure it [the marital abuse].
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 The notion of „you made your bed, now you must lie in it‟ simply means that you need to stay in the marriage. 
Sometimes, this saying also refers to the unacceptability of pursuing divorce in communities where particular 













Rashieda‟s upbringing has undoubtedly influenced the ways in which she conceived of her 
marital relationship more broadly. Despite experiencing various forms of abuse, including 
physical and sexual abuse that commenced the first week of her marriage, Rashieda remained 
married to her husband for more than 30 years. Her capacity to stay in the marriage mirrors that 
of her mother, who also endured many years of physical abuse. Rashieda explains that she “grew 
up with that [and] I thought it was the norm, a woman has to be beaten up by her man, I saw 
these things [witnessing the abuse of her mother by her father while growing up], so to me it was 
the norm”. Rashieda‟s acceptance of marital violence is situated within a particular 
understanding of what constitutes a normative marital relationship coupled with the perspective 
of having a sense of duty to endure whatever comes your way due to cultural and family norms. 
 
In the narratives of Mariam, Khadija and Rashieda, the concept of sexual autonomy is not 
included as inherent to a sexual praxis. Mariam‟s participation in a sexual relationship is 
premised on the assumption that she cannot say „no‟ to her husband as well as on seeing the act 
of sex itself as an act of charity on her part. Khadija‟s narrative elucidates the embodiment of the 
ideal Muslim woman whose responsibility it is to be sexually available to her husband. 
Rashieda‟s story illustrates the impact of particular experiences during her upbringing within 
which inegalitarian relations of power were seen as the norm. This background hampers 
Rashieda‟s agentival capacity in her own marital relationship, and has consequences for the way 
in which she engages with sexual dynamics. Consequently, sexual autonomy is not pertinent in 
the existing discourses within which these three respondents function. Bearing in mind the 
various contexts in which these three women situate themselves, Mariam within a sexual 
relationship in which her emotions are divorced from the physical practice of sex due to her 
experience of sexual abuse, and Khadija and Rashieda within marital abusive relationships, the 
incapacity to assert sexual autonomy is interconnected with these lived realities. The enactment 
of particular subject positions coupled with subjective experience denotes that sexual autonomy, 
within the discourses that these women are situated, is excluded as part of an overarching 
discursive network that guides sexual praxis. 
 
Some of these narratives illustrate that women are sometimes caught between various structures 













themselves and their children from being exposed to what they perceive to be increased forms of 
violence. The violent marital structures within which several of the respondents are situated do 
not allow much manoeuvring space with regard to sexual relationships. Hence, there is little 
room for these women to consider their own well-being. Simultaneously, powerful discourses 
that shape Muslim women‟s understandings of self are intricately interlinked with Islamic 
behavioural ideals such as docility, patience and endurance. These aspects of female identity are 
sometimes endorsed and lived out in intimate relationships in ways that limit women‟s capacity 
for health and well-being.  
 
Contrary to Saba Mahmood‟s (2001) positive engagement with the cultivation of various forms 
of religious ideals, such as sabr, as an alternative way of asserting agency, Rashieda has been 
living with sabr for more than 30 years in an abusive marriage. In Rashieda‟s context, sabr is a 
symbolic instrument that has acted as a debilitating factor, hindering her agentival capacity. 
Mahmood, who sophisticatedly deconstructs the underlying assumptions regarding the liberal 
humanist subject of the West, does not engage with the possibility of misusing the concept of 
sabr within an Islamic discourse in ways that reinforce inegalitarian gender dynamics. In many 
ways, Mahmood‟s engagement with the women‟s mosque movement in Egypt does not capture 
the nuances present within the lived realities of other Muslim women who also employ or are 
influenced by the concept of sabr in their lives. The singular focus on cultivating religious ideals 
as a positive endeavour eclipses the existence of lived realities within which inegalitarian 
relations of power and structures of violence operate.  
 
For a number of the respondents participating in this study, the underlying reasons for having sex 
with their husbands are embedded within discourses of worship, cultivating a sense of 
connectedness with God, the receiving of blessings/act of charity, avoiding invoking punishment 
from God, the belief that one cannot say „no‟ to sex, as well as seeing sexual participation as part 
of being a good Muslim woman. These reasons, amongst others, point to a great diversity of 
sexual expressions that is reflective of an ambiguous religious framework in which these 
understandings are articulated and made meaningful. At the same time, many respondents are 













the coupling of some of the religious norms with the constraints of structural violence generates 
little manoeuvring space for women who are confined within these relationship dynamics. 
 
But what about discourses of sexual enjoyment and pleasure? Amongst my respondents there 
were a number of women who mentioned that they had/were having good sexual relationships. 
Nonetheless, they rarely felt the need to go into greater detail or expand on their satisfactory 
experiences. It might well be that the taboo on speaking outside of the bedroom informed some 
respondents‟ choice of not sharing intimate details.
88
 On the other hand, respondents who had 
difficult marriages and problematic sexual experiences often elaborated greatly on their 
experiences. In this case, the interview situation might have provided a space within which 
respondents could express these experiences. In addition, the sexual taboos surrounding the 
expression or discussion of issues of sexual abuse and marital violence in Muslim communities 
might have prompted some respondents to use this opportunity to share these difficult 
experiences. As expressed by one respondent who had experienced a lot of trauma in her 
marriage: “maybe it will help me in the end, I got it off my chest you know”. So while my data 
might seem biased in terms of giving full expression to respondents who had problematic sexual 
experiences, this is not to say that stimulating sexual relationships and discourses of sexual 
pleasure are absent from women‟s lives.  
 
7.4  Resisting Sexual Religious Norms 
 
Several respondents also contested and resisted the dominant discourse of a wife‟s sexual 
availability by employing alternative modes of understanding sexual praxis. Often, an Islamic 
ethics that foregrounds mutuality, reciprocity and care was utilised to make sense of sexual 
dynamics. The following are examples of narratives that challenge the notion of not being 
allowed to say „no‟. They highlight understandings of broader gender dynamics that promote an 
egalitarian ethics for sexual praxis. For example, Azizah asserts: 
 
I don‟t know why you cannot say „no‟ [to sex], because what is written [is that] Islam is 
based upon broadmindedness, the man and the woman should both be broadminded, it is 
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not just grab and go… then you don‟t enjoy the sexual pleasures. It is written that a man 
must respect the woman and the woman must respect the man. 
 
In Azizah‟s understanding, “what is written” suggests the textual sources of Islam, on the basis 
of which she presupposes that the notion of “broadmindedness” is a fundamental principle. For 
Azizah there are broader ethical principles embedded in Islamic texts that should encapsulate the 
way in which one engages and lives out sexual relationships. Azizah also highlights mutual 
respect as an underlying premise for the way in which sexual dynamics should be embodied by 
both spouses. It can be inferred from this quotation that Azizah links the saying that a woman 
cannot say „no‟ to the praxis of sexual inequality (“grab and go”) and lack of mutual enjoyment 
of the potential sexual pleasures produced in sexual encounters. Thus, for Azizah, an 
inegalitarian sexual relationship not only contradicts broader Islamic ethics, but also deprives the 
spouses of enjoying the pleasures of a sexual union. Another respondent, Leila, currently 
divorced, focuses on the importance of knowing what your rights are in her narrative:  
 
It is very important for a woman to go and learn her rights if she is not happy about 
something [in her marital relationship], she has got the right to say no [to sex]. Some 
women say that even if your husband treats you like a dirt bag, [or] a floor [mat], you 
don‟t say no. That doesn‟t work for me because I know that I have rights too. It doesn‟t 
mean that if your husband makes sexual advances that you must retaliate [meaning: 
respond negatively to husband‟s sexual advances], that doesn‟t come into the equation; 
[when] I say no [to sex], I say no for a good reason. 
 
Leila‟s narrative is clearly an expression of resistance to the dominant discourse regarding a 
wife‟s sexual availability. Her narrative points towards the existence of rights for women, 
embedded within an Islamic discourse, which give women bodily autonomy and the capacity to 
negotiate consent in their marital relationships. In effect, Leila challenges the notion that a 
woman cannot refuse her husband sex, and asserts that she can “say no” to her husband (now ex-
husband). Thus, for Leila, an Islamic discourse of sexual praxis consists of women‟s right to say 
„no‟ to sex if they are not “happy about something”. Leila uses the example of women who are 
being ill-treated in their marital relationships as illustrative of a particular marital dynamic in 
which a woman has the right to refuse sexual interaction. Zaida, also divorced, reflects on her 














If I think about myself in my marriage... if my husband wanted to be with me and I 
wasn‟t in the mood or didn‟t want to [have sex] then I would kind of put myself second 
and put him first because that isn‟t the right thing to do to say no. I think about it very 
differently now. Now I think that I have as much right as him to say „now‟ [let us have 
sex] whether you like it or not. I think it [sex] would be more negotiated, I would engage 
with the person because I feel more empowered now. I feel like actually I am important 
and what my needs are, are just as important as yours, and if I‟m going to compromise 
then he must compromise too. 
 
Zaida acknowledges that she did put her needs and wants, with regard to sexual encounters, 
second in her marriage. Nonetheless, now, feeling “more empowered”, she emphasises the 
reciprocity that should guide sexual praxis. Zaida‟s narrative reflects a process of personal 
transformation with regard to acceptable sexual dynamics. She started off in a position in which 
her subjectivity was formulated in a particular kind of way in her marriage, and where she 
thought of herself as having to be constantly sexually available to her husband. However, as she 
has become older and has gone through various life experiences, she has developed a very 
different attitude to the same issue. Her transforming personality might mirror her newfound 
sense of self after having gone through a divorce. Her personal growth and sense of 
empowerment as an individual are intricately related to her varied life experiences.
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Zaida also mentions that she has just as much right to demand sex, “to say „now‟ whether you 
like it or not”. Although this assertion might reflect coercive language, my sense in the interview 
was that she was rather making a case for the equal opportunity to make such a statement. 
Furthermore, Zaida highlights negotiation, engagement and mutuality as key ethical components 
guiding a proper sexual praxis.  
 
The existence of ambiguous discourses brings about possibilities for individuals to employ 
shifting and fluid subjectivities that are related to and rooted in broader contexts of marital 
experiences, societal norms and particular understandings of religious traditions. Azizah stated 
the following related to sexual relationship dynamics:  
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Where sex is concerned if a woman wants to initiate it, then by all means, if a man wants 
to... it does not mean that he is the man, you know, and he hasn‟t got the right to withhold 
sex from you and discard you, that is not allowed in Islam. So we are equal partners.  
 
The principle of equality includes, according to Azizah, that a woman can initiate sex as well, 
and that a husband should be sexually available to satisfy his wife‟s needs. Through this 
statement Azizah turns the discourse of women‟s sexual availability on its head in arguing that 
the same is expected from a husband. Thus, Azizah challenges the authority of an Islamic sexual 
praxis in which a woman cannot refuse her husband, by employing a discourse in which sexual 
readiness seems to apply to both spouses. Since Azizah elaborates on the husband‟s and the 
wife‟s status as equal partners in a marital relationship, it can be assumed that the dynamics 
ideally guiding a discourse of sexual praxis should be based on reciprocity, mutuality and 
fairness.  
 
This chapter has dealt with some of the respondents‟ understandings of sexual dynamics, and 
highlighted a few dominant religious discourses on sexuality that inform women‟s realities in 
various ways. The influence of religious teachings for sexual praxis has been shown by including 
narratives that espouse particular notions of gender and sexual dynamics within marital 
relationships.  
 
The understanding that it is not right for a Muslim woman to refuse her husband sex formed part 
of a dominant discourse that many women abided by. However, as the excerpts show, there was 
a range of ways in which respondents engaged with this normative view on sexual dynamics. 
Women who were subjected to violence in their marital relationships were also influenced by 
particular understandings of sexual behaviour in ways that made them increasingly vulnerable to 
STIs and HIV. However, many respondents also contested and resisted the dominant discourse 
of a wife‟s sexual availability by employing ethical principles that place emphasis on reciprocity 
and mutual consideration.  
 
Some of the respondents‟ narratives illustrate the structures of power that operate between 
intimate partners, and also particular constructs of the God/believer relationship. Often, the 













experiences with various forms of marital abuse and feelings of injustice. This construction 
mirrors the ways in which feminist poststructuralists have theorised the notion of subjectivity as 
always being constituted in relation to influential discourses, and by extension the capacity of the 
subject to engage in alternative existing discourses. The existence of ambiguous and fluid 
discourses is also reflected in the ways in which many respondents hold together seemingly 
ambiguous discourses simultaneously. It is noteworthy that for many respondents it is religious 
















Understandings of Gender and Polygyny 
      
“I am someone who believes in that saying that men 
need to have sex in order to feel good, but women need 
to feel good in order to have sex, I am a firm believer in 
that.” – Saba 
 
In the first part of this chapter I explore some of my respondents‟ understandings of male and 
female nature. I particularly look at the ways in which respondents‟ assumptions on gender 
might influence sexual behaviour and conceptualisations of sexual ethics more broadly. It was 
noteworthy that many respondents highlighted fundamental differences between men and women 
when speaking about sexual dynamics. Predictably, a common perception was that men are more 
sexual than women, while women were often perceived to be more emotional than men, with 
ramifications for particular social practices. In the second part of this chapter I foreground the 
practice of polygyny as one example of a social practice that espouses clear gender differences 
and which is subject to potentially intricate marital dynamics. I present some of the main views 
on polygyny as expressed by my respondents and illustrate through quotations respondents‟ 
experiences of being in polygynous unions.  
 
8.1  Sexual Men and Emotional Women 
 
Traditional gender roles seemed quite pertinent for many respondents when describing the nature 
of their marital relationship. Some of my respondents defined themselves as housewives or 
„homemakers‟, and foregrounded that being a wife and a mother were central to their identity as 
Muslim women. Often, these gender identities were intricately linked with assumptions about 
female nature. In particular, women‟s emotional nature was often illustrated by highlighting 
women‟s capacity for affection and nurturing, which rendered them more competent for 
childrearing and domestic responsibilities. By contrast, men‟s natures were often characterised as 
overtly sexual, highlighting men‟s need for sexual stimulation. These views were often mirrored 












respondents for whom specific gender roles were less pronounced, views of particular gender 
differences were significant for the ways in which they spoke about the nature of their sexual 
relationship. The following narratives are reflective of complementary gender roles, seen as 
essential for the ways in which marital dynamics are conceptualised by some of my respondents. 
Aisha explains: 
 
It is the obligation of the husband to take care of the woman, to maintain and protect 
[and] she must also give him his rights, his conjugal rights as well. [A man] is more 
muscular and strong in a physical sense, whereas women are strong in an emotional 
sense, in raising children and bearing children, caring and nurturing. [So] his obligations 
and rights are based on his true nature, whereas women‟s rights and obligations are based 
on her true nature.    
 
Another respondent, Shamielah said:  
 
I know I am the more emotional person, and I know my husband is more logical. I can 
see that I can deal better with the kids. There is just so much difference between a man 
and a woman, and I know what a man‟s sexual needs are. My husband is very sexually 
orientated, and sometimes women don‟t feel like it [having sex] because you are so busy 
and you got children, [so sex] is the last thing on your mind. [For] men it works the other 
way around, it is the first thing on their mind. So you can see the difference between the 
man and the woman. It is blatant, though Islamically, morally we are equal in the sense 
that equal expectations are [demanded] from us. But sexually we are on different levels, it 
is just a need, a man has a need. 
 
Here, Aisha‟s and Shamielah‟s assumptions on gender difference are central in demonstrating 
their perceptions of men and women‟s natures as inherently different. For Aisha, a man‟s nature 
is arguably a sexual nature since his “right” to have sex originates in his “true nature”. This view 
resonates with the ways in which many respondents in the previous chapter conceived of sex as 
primarily a male privilege. In contrast, a woman‟s obligations, for example to care for children, 
are contingent on her nature, which is perceived to be more- emotional. Although Aisha states 
that women have rights, she does not clarify what these rights entail. Perhaps women‟s rights can 
be seen as relational to men‟s obligations to provide maintenance and protection for women. 
 
Similarly, Shamielah maintains that men are by nature more sexual than women, and their need 
for sexual fulfilment is qualitatively different from women‟s need for sexual satisfaction. The 













biological sex. Nonetheless, as highlighted by Shamielah, men and women have an equal moral 
capacity. Thus, the expectation for the ways in which morality is employed is equal for men and 
women. Paradoxically however, as touched on briefly in the previous chapter, some respondents 
argued that a wife needs to make sure that her husband is sexually fulfilled so that he does not go 
out and commit adultery, a view that is premised on the notion that a man is morally inept when 
it comes to policing his own sexual behaviour. I problematise this position again later in this 
chapter.   
 
Particular conceptions on the nature of sexual interaction came to the fore when I asked the 
respondents to describe their sexual relationship. On the one end of the continuum, some 
respondents expressed shifting levels of sexual needs in their relationships. Often, a certain 
ethics of mutual consideration was applied to meet the sexual needs expressed by the intimate 
partner. On the other end of the continuum, some respondents experienced that their husbands 
were more insatiable where sex was concerned. Sometimes, a husband‟s stronger sexual urges 
caused conflict in the marriage, and effectively opened up debates within the marriage regarding 
the ethics of sexual interaction. The following narratives show how particular understandings of 
sexual difference are performed in intimate relationships. Shanaaz explains: 
  
I was more interested in affection, I was more interested in just being close and sharing 
intimacy than I was with sex. He [husband] sometimes accused me of being selfish 
[because she didn‟t want to have sex as much as him] but I am not an animal. I can‟t just 
go to bed now and have sex, for me it is important for us to have spent time together. For 
me sex is a combination of things that we do together that brings us close together. [Now] 
all of a sudden you want to just come down on me, it doesn‟t work that way. So for me it 
[sex] was disappointing because for him [husband] it was all about that it is so important 
to get as much [sex] as you can. I think most women prefer just being affectionate than 
actually doing the act. You are not an animal; God created you a man, a human being, not 
an animal. 
   
Similarly, Saba stated: 
  
I always told my husband that you can‟t expect [to have sex whenever]. For men it is 
different. For a man you don‟t need to be emotionally connected, because men aren‟t 
created like that, but for me, I have to be emotionally connected. I wouldn‟t be able to 
jump into bed with anybody, besides the fact that it is wrong. If you [husband] said a bad 













doesn‟t work like that. For me it had to do with respect. I am not going to share my body 
with you if you don‟t treat me with respect. So because our marriage has been up and 
down and it [their problems] was related to issues of respect, because he spoke to me 
sometimes in a derogatory manner and I always felt that he treated me with disrespect. So 
for me, the lack of sex [in their marriage] was a result [of] your [husband‟s] [dis]respect. 
It is the other way around for him, he believes that the lack of sex leads to that kind of 
behaviour [lack of respect in their marriage], because he becomes frustrated. So sex 
wasn‟t good, it was a struggle, because you [husband] want sex from me but I want 
respect [from husband]. It is a given – you treat me with respect, I mean there is no 
negotiation on that, so I was now holding back until you treat me with respect and 
dignity. For me it was connected to the whole emotional aspect, for him it has always 
been a physical thing, so sex wasn‟t exactly the best experience for me, although then 
when our relationship was better sex obviously was better. 
  
 
For both Shanaaz and Saba, a certain level of emotional connectedness should frame sexual 
encounters. Simultaneously, they make a clear distinction between what they perceive to be the 
inherent sexual natures of males and the more emotional dispositions of females. Arguably, male 
sexuality is perceived as active, energetic and demanding. By contrast, female sexuality and a 
woman‟s ability to experience sexual pleasure are contingent on her emotional state before and 
during sexual interaction. For Shanaaz and Saba, sex is a relational behaviour that is not divorced 
or sheltered from various relationship dynamics that operate in their marriages. Seemingly, their 
husbands are not attending sufficiently to particular aspects of their relationship, since for them 
(their husbands) sex is something that can happen irrespective of varying levels of broader 
relationship satisfaction and stability. This notion of different expectations and 
conceptualisations of sexual interaction for men and women significantly impacted upon 
Shanaaz‟s and Saba‟s sexual experiences.  
 
It is clear that Shanaaz and her husband did not share similar expectations regarding sexual 
interaction in their marital relationship. Shanaaz‟s emphasis on her husband‟s desire to “get as 
much as you can”, conceived of by Shanaaz as “animal-like” sexual behaviour, was not 
compatible with her idea of a good sexual relationship. Shanaaz is clearly not experiencing the 
level of relationality and connectedness that she needs in order to fully appreciate sex.  
 
For Saba, the issue of respect is elaborated as a salient component in her marital relationship, a 













This relationship dynamic, where Saba refuses her husband sex due to his disrespectful attitude 
and behaviour, presents a stark contrast to the dominant discourse of a wife‟s sexual availability 
outlined in the previous chapter. In Saba‟s narrative, sexual interaction is subject to negotiation; 
respect and dignified behaviour form part of her sexual ethics, and should also guide marital 
dynamics more broadly.  
 
From the issues raised and sentiments expressed by many of my respondents, we could ask the 
following questions: Are women truly more emotional than men, and if so, is this more 
emotional nature a natural barrier against seeking sexual relationships based purely on the 
physical aspect of sex? Similarly, are men by nature more sexual than women, and if so, is there 
a connection between this sexual nature and a greater proclivity towards seeking casual sex? 
Men‟s proclivity for sexual transgressions, as emphasised and experienced by some respondents, 
was sometimes justified by elaborating on the wife‟s responsibility to keep her husband sexually 
satisfied. Arguably, the understanding that it is more in men‟s nature to commit adultery is 
related to some respondents‟ perceptions regarding men‟s potent sexual nature coupled with 
men‟s lack of need to be emotionally connected to a sexual partner. In the previous chapter, 
Shafieka stressed men‟s lack of sexual satisfaction as conducive to their potential for committing 
adultery. Similarly, Saba explains: 
 
My husband could easily have gone astray. He had lots of opportunities because I gave 
him a hectic time and he is a man. 
 
Another respondent, Shirin asserts: 
 
We had a good sexual life over the years, I always say…I will not be the cause that my 
husband must go outside and find himself involved with another female. 
 
These respondents‟ assumptions regarding men‟s sexual natures create particular conceptions of 
sexual ethics and dynamics in intimate relationships. The performance of these perceptions are 
expressed by respondents through elaborating on women‟s need to contain men‟s sexuality, by 
keeping men sexually satisfied within the legal boundaries of marriage, so as to prevent adultery. 













men‟s sexual behaviour, and makes even more transparent a wife‟s duty to remain sexually 
available to her husband. Dominant understandings of normative sexual behaviour, clearly 
distinguishing between male and female acceptable behaviour, sometimes informed respondents‟ 
experiences with spousal infidelity. A few respondents were exposed to behavioural 
justifications from their husband‟s family when his infidelity became known to them. For 
example, Khadija explained:  
 
He [husband] started having affairs and things like that, and his aunts were like: “why are 
you making a fuss, a man is a man and a good Muslim woman would sit and make du‟a 




Similarly, Zaida said: 
 
His [husband‟s] mom said to me that in their family there is lots of infidelity that goes 
down and she also said to me that: “men do this so why should you think of yourself as 
so special that you want to divorce him [because of his infidelity]”. She said to me that 
basically I‟d be stupid to not forgive him. The fact that she can say that men do that [have 
affairs] is quite a disempowering feeling for a woman. She said that I should just accept 
it, it was offensive. I wonder how many other women are hearing that and accepting that, 
it is almost like you should be grateful and feel honoured that he wants you, he doesn‟t 
actually want a lifetime with some other woman. 
 
Arguably, the opinions held by Khadija‟s aunts and Zaida‟s mother in-law reflect some of the 
social consequences of particular conceptualisations regarding sexual differences. The notion 
that men‟s sexual behaviour (and transgressions) can be excused, as well as accepted, is subject 
to these perceptions of innate gendered difference. In my interview with Khadija, she explained 
that she endured her husband‟s extra-marital affairs for a few years. It can perhaps be inferred 
from this excerpt, as well as from Khadija‟s narratives outlined in previous chapters, that one of 
the underlying reasons for her endurance was her perception of what it meant to be a good 
Muslim woman, and by extension, her persistence in trying to embody this ideal. In addition, 
from the excerpt above, it becomes clear that her husband‟s aunts were also partly influencing 
and informing Khadija‟s erstwhile „acceptance‟ of her marital situation.  
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 du‟a – plural, ad‟iya: invocation of God, supplication, prayer asking God for something (e.g. asking God for  













Unlike Khadija, Zaida did not tolerate her husband‟s infidelity and initiated divorce despite her 
mother in law‟s advice to forgive him or „just‟ accept his infidelity. Zaida‟s reflection at the end 
of this quotation regarding women‟s acceptance of spousal infidelity due to powerful social 
norms, echoes some of the underlying reasons for why Khadija chose to remain in her marital 
relationship for a few more years. Zaida‟s narrative presents an explicit contestation of this 
normalisation of male sexual behaviour. In addition, her reflection also brings to light a 
particular social discourse within which women perpetuate particular assumptions on gender. 
The social currency of this discourse effectively questions the possibility for an egalitarian 
sexual ethics where men and women are equally responsible for sexual behaviour, and where 
men‟s infidelity is not normalised nor accepted.  
 
Amongst my respondents, 14 out of 33 women had experienced spousal infidelity in their marital 
relationships. Arguably, dominant discourses that espouse particular understandings related to 
the social acceptability of infidelity, religious persuasions on sexual natures and gender 
difference, and preconceived notions of normative male and female sexual behaviour must be 
critically explored, as some of these „norms‟ inform the various ways in which women 
understand and deal with the experience of infidelity in their marriage. The gendered differences 
reflected through some of these excerpts become important sites of contestation, particularly in 
light of the inherently inegalitarian power relations embedded in this matrix.  
 
Some of the repercussions of essentialised gender categories, within which men and women are 
viewed to be fundamentally different, have resolved in various social practices that inform 
marital relationships and gender dynamics more broadly. For example, the practice of polygyny, 
easy male access to divorce, and women‟s limited witnessing and inheritance capacities are some 
of the practices that espouse clear gender differences. These practices have been contested in the 
contemporary period by many Islamic feminists. For instance, Ziba Mir-Hosseini (2007a and b) 
engages in a critical analysis of the philosophical roots of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) in order to 
unravel some of the constructions of gender that contributed greatly to inegalitarian legal 
formulations. She illustrates that the classical male jurists held particular understandings of 
women‟s sexuality (ironically, as active and uncontrollable), and by extension, assumptions 













marriage and divorce (2007b). Other Islamic feminists, like Etin Anwar who critically examine 
the Islamic tradition to identify conceptualisations on gender and self, draw on thinkers such as 
the classical philosopher Ibn Sina (d. 1037), who argued that woman‟s emotional disposition was 
intricately linked to her lack of ability to control her sexual energy. In contrast, men were 
associated with rationality and reason, which meant that they were able to manage, in a 
controllable manner, more than one sexual partner (Anwar, 2006:118-122). Thus, the association 
of biological sex with feminine or masculine characteristics respectively reinforced gender 
hierarchies resulting in various social practices in previous eras, many of which still hold social 
currency in contemporary social contexts.  
 
Interestingly, this notion of women‟s active sexuality presents a contrasting discourse to the 
conceptualisations of sexual natures expressed by many of my respondents where it is in fact 
men‟s sexual natures that my respondents view as active and to a certain extent uncontrollable. 
This ambiguity is highlighted by Fatna Sabbah (1984), who argues that seemingly contradictory 
messages are espoused by Islamic legal codes and erotic discourses respectively. In her book 
Women in the Muslim Unconscious, Sabbah illustrates the varying and different historical 
understandings of female sexuality that exist within the Islamic legacy.  
 
Conceptualisations on gender that are premised on notions of natural difference have also been 
contested in the contemporary period by Asma Barlas (2002). She argues that these views are in 
fact inconsistent with her reading of the Qur‟an. Barlas suggests that the Qur‟an does not link 
gender with sex (2002:130). In other words, the Qur‟an does not ascribe particular characteristics 
perceived to be either masculine or feminine as a property of the sexed body. On the other hand, 
Kecia Ali (2006) suggests that the Qur‟an is more ambiguous. She problematises the continued 
legal existence of slavery and the gendered regulations pertaining to women‟s limited capacity 
for witnessing and inheritance to exemplify that hierarchical structures espousing notions of 
difference are in fact inherent to the Qur‟anic text. Thus, she argues, “Male-female relations 
embody both norms of ultimate sameness and earthly differentiation” (Ali, 2006:116). 
 
This ambiguity is briefly dealt with by Barlas when she asserts that earthly differentiation “does 













through highlighting the social practice of polygyny. She makes a historical contextual argument 
which implies that polygyny serves a particular social function. In her reading of the Qur‟an, the 
Qur‟anic provision that allows men to take up to four wives is conducive to the understanding 
that men should take care of and/or protect women. Thus, Barlas suggests that the institution of 
polygyny was not linked to male sexual needs (and the understanding that a male is more sexual 
than a female), necessitating more than one sexual partner. Rather, what could be perceived to be 
a practice favouring men is an extended responsibility placed on men to see to the well-being and 
safety of women. Furthermore, Barlas argues that strict regulation regarding just treatment of 
wives is stressed in the Qur‟anic text (2002:197-200).  
 
On the other hand, Ali argues that Qur‟anic differential treatment of human beings, man and 
woman, slave and master, still speaks to the acceptance of particular hierarchies. She asserts, “If 
someone insists that polygamy is valid for all times and in all places because the Qur‟an 
authorizes it, one can inquire whether the same holds true for slavery” (Ali, 2006:156). 
Arguably, although the Qur‟an accepts particular social practices, this does not necessarily mean 
that individuals who are embodying these practices in a lived reality experience these practices 
as just or equitable. In the following section I explore respondents‟ views on polygyny and their 
experiences of being in a polygynous marriage.  
 
8.2  Polygyny: Understandings and Experiences  
 
Polygyny is a social practice that forms part of the South African landscape. In 2009 polygyny in 
Islam has been a topical subject in local media as various groups have tried to obtain recognition 
of Muslim polygynous unions by the Constitutional Court.
91
 Interestingly, when I asked my 
respondents for their perspectives on polygyny I received a range of responses ranging from “I‟m 
dead against it” to “polygyny is the answer”. The variety of responses show that women perceive 
marital unions in different ways, often challenging particular assumptions related to the nature of 
marriage in very interesting ways.  
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One of the most common views amongst my respondents was that they accepted the practice of 
polygyny due to the fact that it is allowed by Islam. Nonetheless, many respondents expressed 
that if their husband wanted to take a second wife he would have to divorce them first. Many 
respondents said that they had discussed polygyny with their husband due to the fact that all 
Muslim marriages are potentially polygynous. However, none of my respondents who had 
marital contracts mentioned that they had included particular clauses related to the dissolution of 
marriage if their husband took a second wife. Even so, many respondents were quite clear on the 
fact that their husbands were aware of their position on polygyny, and the related consequences 
if their husband were to enter into such a union. For example, Rabeah said: 
 
I know it is allowed according to Islam, however, I do believe that a human being cannot 
treat two other human beings exactly the same. I have told my husband that if he wishes 
to have another wife, he will only still have one wife. I won‟t be there then, it won‟t be 
for me, although it is allowed, he is free to go. 
 
 
Similarly, Saba explained: 
 
I most probably don‟t have the most popular opinion, but I cannot [be in a polygynous 
union] and my husband knows. You [husband] want to get married then let me go, there 
is no two ways about that. I have a right to that as well, so I am not open to that 
[polygyny]. Obviously [it] is good for specific situations like for example women who 
perhaps have children and they don‟t have somebody to take care of them, things like 
that. So it works, but I think most importantly that people involved in it, if their mindset 
is right then I think it is a very good thing [but] sometimes the man goes behind the first 
wife's back. 
 
Another respondent, Shirin stated: 
 
He [husband] will always tell me if I make him mad or cross that I [he] will take another 
wife, and I said to him if you feel you want to have another wife, I won‟t stand in your 
way to get married. Get married, and you divorce me. Because the punishment for a 
husband that is unfair towards any of his wives is too severe and I won‟t put that 
punishment on you [husband], you can rather divorce me, and then I know that I freed 
you from the punishment [in] all of the hereafter.  
 
It was pertinent for many respondents that a notion of equitable and just treatment was required 













task made divorce the only option for many respondents. Hence, many respondents would not 
want to be subject to differential treatment in their marital relationships. In addition, particular 
personal dispositions were foregrounded to explain why a polygynous union was not desirable. 
For example, feelings of inadequacy, jealousy and unwillingness to share a husband were 
amongst the most common reasons for why some respondents would prefer getting divorced.  
 
Nonetheless, for many respondents, there appears to be no explicit contestation regarding the fact 
that Islam as a religion allows the phenomenon of polygyny. Hence, the acceptability of the 
practice itself is not questioned due to the power of religious authority and tradition that 
effectively legitimises this norm. Even so, for most of these respondents, their acceptance of 
polygyny remains a purely theoretical constructed acceptance. In practice many of my 
respondents, through their social engagements and enactments, e.g. by evoking their right to 
divorce if their husband takes a second wife or explicitly stating that “polygyny is not for me”, 
fundamentally contest the acceptance of polygyny by refusing it as a possibility for themselves. 
Often, while many respondents pay lip-service to the tradition of accepting polygyny, their lives 
embody a rejection of this norm. This is a very interesting and fascinating contemporary 
negotiation of the notion of polygyny. This also suggests that the social world of the text in 
which my respondents are situated is created through and reflective of ambivalences, paradoxes 
and contradictions. What this dynamic also shows is that in contemporary contexts, Islamic 
norms are not fixed, but rather, continuously co-created and thwarted through women‟s 
experiences and personal relationships.  
 
Often, polygyny was justified and promoted by my respondents when serving particular needs. 
For example, in Saba‟s narrative, she articulates that polygyny could potentially function to 
ensure the protection of single mothers. This justification was employed by many respondents 
who viewed polygyny as a beneficial solution to particular social problems. In particular, some 
respondents highlighted the fact that in their community many women lose their husbands to 
drugs or gang activity. Many of these women do not have the means to take care of themselves 
or their children. This benefit-justification was seen as one of the „correct‟ ways in which a 
polygynous union is entered into. Nonetheless, for many respondents, although underlying 













remain in a potential polygynous union that was subject to these reasons was still perceived to be 
minimal. For other respondents, polygyny was not perceived to be an acceptable social practice. 
Often, assumptions regarding the manner in which men contract these unions, coupled with the 
underlying reasons for why polygyny is used in contemporary contexts, were used to negate the 
acceptability of this practice. In particular, men‟s sexual motives as well as the use of polygyny 
to legitimise an already existing sexual relationship were highlighted. For example, Faiza 
explains:   
 
If you want to look after women nowadays, financially, you can look after her without 
marrying her, so what sort of nonsense is that. Even though it [polygyny] is done [in the 
community] it is highly frowned upon and it is not welcomed in [my] family. I don‟t 
condone such things, I am dead against it. [The] reasons are normally lust, horniness, 
although men like to say there is another reason. To me that is just bollocks, it is rubbish, 
they are just plain flipping horny, and they use Islam [as a justification]. 
 
 
Clearly, the social benefit-justification is not acknowledged by Faiza as she suggests that there 
are other ways of supporting and protecting women who are in difficult situations in a 
contemporary context. Interestingly, Faiza mentions that polygyny is “highly frowned upon”. 
Although a diversity of opinions was expressed by the respondents with regard to the levels of 
acceptance in their local communities, many pointed out that stigma and particular stereotypes 
do exist. For example, the assumption that the first wife is a victim of her husband‟s lust, and 
that the second wife is a “dirty rag” who “steals” other women‟s husbands were some of the 
depictions highlighted by some of my respondents. These perceptions echo some of the social 
attitudes on polygyny found in Bangstad‟s study (2007). These attitudes also illuminate some of 
the underlying reasons as to why a polygynous union is entered. Many respondents foregrounded 
lust and sexual desire as the main reasons men take additional wives. For example, Leila 
explained:  
 
Now men are lusting after [a new wife]. She [their current wife] is not nice anymore and 
she has a fat ass, and they go for a younger figure. 
 
It was a common perception amongst many respondents that the notion of lust was a major 













many respondents expressed that men often use Islam to justify their decision to take another 
wife – even if it is purely for sexual purposes. Nonetheless, for some women, for whom 
polygyny was seen as “the answer”, this justification was also acceptable. For instance, Mariam 
said:  
 
I actually allowed my husband [to take a second wife]. In fact I said get married for lust 
also. Polygamy is a beautiful answer. Say you share your husband and your husband is a 
slave of Allah just like you, there is such a lot of women out there that need men, and 
they don‟t have the support of the man, so you can actually share your life with another 
woman. For instance, say that a woman is ill and her kids need looking after, I can take 
care of the kids [and] it can be one big happy family. I told [my] children also, I said “I 
gave daddy permission, so I don‟t want anybody to say anything”. I think it [polygyny] is 
there [for people] to be in a halal relationship and Allah knows that men are desirous, 
they just love women. A lot of the youngsters they are very perturbed that it is allowed. I 
say Allah would never allow anything that is detrimental. The mawlana told the young 
men in class “please, you are allowed by Allah, you people are the future, prepare your 
girls for that already”, he says, “you know in African countries it is the norm” but here 





Another respondent, Mansura explained:  
 
 
If it is a woman that needs a husband in order for her to not go astray and do the wrong 
thing, maybe I would like it to be somebody I know, rather than somebody I don‟t know. 
I wouldn‟t mind, he [husband] often talks about it, jokes about it. [So] if the need should 
arise, say for example I should be very sick and he needs to fulfil you know [his sexual 
needs], I would [agree] if it makes him happy. 
 
Mariam seems to suggest that women actually need men to provide (financial) stability and 
protection. Hence, the benefit-justification is employed as one of the important social functions 
of polygyny. At the same time, polygyny opens up possibilities for women to share domestic 
responsibilities, like taking care of their children. Interestingly, in a focus group that I arranged, 
some respondents also mentioned that they wished that their husband would take a second wife 
as they preferred to have more „me-time‟. For some of these respondents, who were in (or had 
been in) polygynous unions, the fact that their husband only spent fifty percent of his time with 
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them opened up potential avenues for engaging in activities that they would otherwise not have 
had time for due to their full-time wifely responsibilities.  
 
Although some of these respondents acknowledge and accept certain wifely responsibilities as a 
dominant norm, they are negotiating and manoeuvring this traditional structure by utilising 
another patriarchal norm, polygyny, in order to wedge open spaces for themselves within the 
norms that enable them to explore other possibilities for self-fulfilment. The kinds of 
contestations represented by these conceptualisations of relationship dynamics might be thought 
of as fairly problematic and conservative by many contemporary feminists. Nonetheless, we 
cannot make assumptions about what these forms of negotiations mean for women whose lives 
intersect with a number of religious discourses that they regard in varying degrees as 
authoritative.  
 
In both of the excerpts above, sexual need or lust is perceived as a justifiable reason for a 
husband to take another wife. Arguably, particular assumptions related to men‟s sexual nature 
and consequently, their need to be satisfied, are employed to support the practice of polygyny. 
Although none of the respondents explicitly articulated the relationship between men‟s sexual 
natures with the benefits of polygynous sexual satisfaction, it can be inferred from some of the 
narratives that men‟s sexual needs might necessitate having more than one wife. Nonetheless, in 
Mansura‟s narrative, she suggests that hypothetically, her incapacity to sexually satisfy her 
husband due to illness would be a valid reason for her husband‟s polygyny. This 
conceptualisation of the importance of sexual satisfaction in a marriage was stressed by a few 
respondents who argued that their level of sexual activity negated their husbands‟ need to take a 
second wife. For example, Bahira explained: 
 
I always said that I would never tolerate having a second wife in my life because there 
are very strict circumstances… and I had children, I was fit, I was sexually very very 
active, so you [husband] don‟t have to go sleep around.  
 
According to Bahira, particular conceptions of a wife‟s obligations in a marriage, and her ability 
to fulfil these obligations, determine whether it is acceptable for a husband to take a second wife. 













light of men‟s proclivities to commit adultery due to their active sexual natures – can also be 
employed within the context of polygyny. Nonetheless, in Mariam and Mansura‟s narratives, 
polygyny can also be seen as a deterrent for potential adulterous behaviour, both for men and 
women. Having outlined some background on the nature of Mariam‟s sexual relationship 
previously, her encouraging tone regarding her husband‟s potential polygyny might be related to 




Interestingly, Mariam is seemingly conscious of some of the stereotypes on polygyny operating 
in the community. Her decision to speak to her children, as well as particular normative 
perceptions on polygyny reflected in her account on the mawlana‟s speech to some of the 
youngsters in the community, highlight that social levels of acceptance of polygyny are often 
ambiguous. In particular, it seems that it is the younger generation which is more critical of the 
social justification of this practice. This noted ambivalence is in many ways brought up and 
foregrounded by the religious authority figure in Mariam‟s narrative, who is in some sense 
making a case for the need to increase the acceptance of polygyny in local Muslim communities. 
This mawlana seems to hold fairly conservative and patriarchal understanding of gender 
relationships, it is significant to note the potential influence this particular social engagement can 
have on generating tolerance for specific religious norms.  
 
Nonetheless, Mariam‟s most authoritative argument used to justify the acceptance of polygyny is 
undoubtedly the notion that God would not allow something that is potentially harmful. 
Respondents who had experiences with polygynous unions did not primarily characterise their 
experiences as positive. Arguably, this does not mean that polygyny was outright harmful to 
some of the women who articulated particularly negative experiences. Even so, harmfulness is a 
potentially ambiguous notion that lends itself to various understandings and interpretations.  
 
At the time of my interviews none of the respondents was in a polygynous union. However, six 
of the respondents had previously been in a polygynous marriage (see Table 3), in which three 
had become a second wife. Two of the three respondents who had entered into a polygynous 
union had done so with the consent of the first wife, whereas one respondent married without 
                                                 
93













knowing that her husband was already married. When the husband‟s first marriage became 
known to the respondent, she continued to stay in the polygynous union as the second wife. The 
other three respondents who had previously been in a polygynous marriage, were all first wives. 
In two of these three cases the respondent‟s husband divorced the second wife within less than 
three years, and in one instance the respondent divorced her husband. However, polygyny was 
not given as the main reason for why this respondent dissolved the marriage. One respondent is 
still married to her husband, and one respondent is widowed.  
 
Table 3: Polygynous unions among my respondents   
 
 











Entered the marriage 
with the consent of 
the first wife 
Current marital 
status  
Nurunisa Yes Yes - - Husband divorced 
the second wife: 
Nurunisa is still 
married 
Najla Yes Yes - - Husband divorced 
the second wife: 
Najla is widowed 
Rashieda Yes Yes - - Divorced her 
husband (not on the 
grounds of 
polygyny) 
Ghameeda - - Yes No* Husband deceased: 
Ghameeda is 
remarried 
Somayya - - Yes Yes Husband deceased: 
Somayya is currently 
single 
Fayrooz - - Yes Yes Divorced, currently 
single 
 















The majority of the women who had previously been in a polygynous union often characterised 
their experience as challenging and complex. However, the three women who became second 
wives did not express their experiences solely in negative terms. All three women who were first 
wives in the polygynous union stated that their husband had been involved in an affair with the 
woman who later came to be the second wife. In addition, in all of these three instances the 
respondent was unaware that her husband had taken a second wife until after the union was 
formally established. Similarly, two out of the three respondents who became second wives 
started their sexual relationship prior to getting married. However, as previously mentioned, one 
of the respondents did so without knowing that her intimate partner was already married. This 
resonates with Bangstad‟s (2007) findings and also echoes his argument that it is common that 
polygynous unions often are a result of a husband‟s extra-marital affairs.  
 
The three first wives were all situated in local contexts that could be characterised by poverty, 
drug abuse and alcoholism, violence and high levels of unemployment. These social dynamics 
influenced these three respondents in various ways. In addition to experiencing spousal infidelity 
in their marriages, two out of the three respondents also experienced sexual abuse and various 
forms of violence in their relationships. Also, for one of these respondents, the husband‟s drug 
abuse was a characterising feature of their marital relationship. Nurunisa explains: 
 
I was about 3 months pregnant, [and] he had a [sexual] fling the whole year before that, 
[because] I was pregnant I wasn‟t working, [and] I couldn‟t support him. Every time I 
don‟t support him he performs [has sexual liaisons and drugs]. So he got married to her 
because the drugs was free, she supported him in that, because now he can lie in bed and 
do the drugs, she don‟t mind. I felt less than a woman. I thought I gave him my all, that I 
was good in bed, very good in bed. But he took another wife, and I didn‟t know about it. 
It is the first time he does it, then ok, you know don‟t do it again. [You] don‟t just take 
another woman because that is when all these diseases come in, AIDS and all this. I did it 
[HIV-test] afterwards at work, because now sometimes…he stays away…if he can cheat 
on you once, he can cheat on you again, you know what I mean, and what do you do? 
Now I must go for a test, I did twice a test, because I had to protect myself. 
 
 
Another respondent, Najla said: 
 
 
She [mistress] became pregnant and then she converted [to Islam] and they got married 













went to her place one day because I didn‟t get support from him, she was in charge 
[now], and she said to me “I will show you what I can do, because I am in charge, if I 
want to give you support or not, that is entirely up to me, because I am in charge, he is 
my husband”. I said “excuse me, he is your husband but I am his first wife”, [then she 
said:] “I don‟t want you here” and then she locked me in the house and she left my child 
outside, and she made a whole commotion.  
 
 
These two narratives highlight particular dramatic and dysfunctional marital dynamics. Firstly, 
the secrecy with which husbands contract an additional marriage exposes first wives to potential 
life-threatening illnesses. In all three cases the husband did not use any kind of prophylactic to 
protect the first wife when engaging in sexual activity with another woman. In the case of 
Nurunisa, her increased awareness of HIV, and her decision to take HIV-tests, might be 
influenced by the fact that her husband also used drugs. Nonetheless, the actual taking of the first 
test took place after she found out about her husband‟s sexual transgression. However, the 
second time she got tested, it was in order to take preventative measures because she did not 
fully trust her husband‟s ability to remain faithful. It is noteworthy that Nurunisa did not once 
mention the possibility of using condoms in order to protect herself from potential diseases. 
When I raised the issue of whether she had ever asked her husband to use a condom in their 
intimate relationship she replied: “He don‟t believe in things like that, I did ask him and he said 
„no‟”. Nurunisa continued to explain that the principal reason for why her husband did not want 
to use condoms was because he thought that it was wrong and not allowed by Islam. Nurunisa‟s 
narrative forcefully illustrates particular normative beliefs regarding prophylactic usage that 
significantly makes salient women‟s vulnerability as well as men‟s powerful positions regarding 
intimate decision-making.   
 
Secondly, the level of secrecy surrounding polygynous unions also illustrates the ambiguity of 
the practice itself. The fact that none of the men involved in these three unions made their 
marriages public, speaks to varying levels of acceptance within the community and the potential 
of being exposed to unwanted criticism and stigmatisation from community members. Also, the 
fact that none of the men informed their current wives about their second marriage, and that the 
respondents had to find out for themselves, can indicate that some men see it as their right to take 
additional wives without having to inform their first wife. However, it can also imply that their 













men to keep the marriage a secret and rather deal with the consequences of their actions, and 
potential marital conflicts later, when the marriage became known.  
 
Thirdly, the manner in which a polygynous union is entered and the underlying reasons for why 
a husband takes a second wife, also places in question the role of the imams who seem to marry 
couples without much interrogation. In Najla‟s narrative, her husband‟s marriage to the second 
wife took place in order to legitimise the sexual union, as well as to ensure that the baby was not 
born out of wedlock. As Toefy suggests in his study (2001), the high levels of stigma related to 
illegitimate offspring, and the need to „make things right‟, are influential factors with regard to 
pregnancy-marriages. Although Toefy does not investigate the occurrences of shot-gun weddings 
in the context of polygyny, similar communal norms might be influential in motivating a couple 
to get married.  
 
Regarding the contexts of Nurunisa‟s and Najla‟s polygynous marriages, “lust” (as well as easy 
access to drugs) seem to be the underlying reasons for why these husbands wanted to take 
another wife. Since the sexual nature of their extramarital relationship was already taking place, 
the need to legitimise this union due to an awareness of the social „public‟ unacceptability of 
marital infidelity, or the fear of getting caught, might be a catalyst when making the decision to 
get married. Although the nature of the conversations that took place between husbands and 
imams remains unknown, it would appear that the imams sanctioning these polygynous unions 
blindly imbibe a particular traditional norm without any kind of critical reflexivity and 
consideration as to their contribution to potentially painful relationships for women affected by 
these decisions.  
 
In addition to these problematical marital dynamics, Nurunisa‟s description of being sexually 
active in her marriage – explicitly stating that she tried her best to sexually satisfy her husband – 
reflects some of the issues brought up previously. Her assertion “I felt less than a woman”, 
makes transparent her feelings of inadequacy and incompetence. Her statement might also 
suggest feelings of failure to fulfil her responsibilities as a wife, in particular related to sexual 














For the three women who became second wives, slightly different issues emerged with regard to 
their polygynous experiences. Although for one respondent the union was perceived as 
successful, judging by her description of the manner in which she entered the union as well as 
the involvement of the first wife in this decision-making process, the two other respondents 
described having quite difficult relationships with the first wife. It became clear in my interviews 
that quite different dynamics were at play amongst respondents who entered an already existing 
marriage, as opposed to being in a marriage and having to deal with the existence of a second 
wife. The two respondents who described their relationship with the first wife as difficult 
highlighted issues of jealousy, the strain experienced due to their limited time shared with their 
husband, and experiences of unjust treatment. Often, these issues came about as a result of the 
first wife‟s influence on the husband‟s time-management as well as particular privileges 
endowed upon the first wife in terms of financial support. In addition, the two respondents who 
became second wives were also exposed to stigma and various levels of verbal abuse from 
family members as well as from the broader community. For example, Ghameeda explained:  
 
When we got married none of his family was there… because do you know what, they 
blamed me. I was the dirty rag, I was stealing him away from his wife, and in the 
meantime I didn‟t even know [that he was already married]. I was very scared of her 
[first wife]. After he admitted to me he was married, she came one day to point a finger in 
my face and said to me that I was really the bad one because I stole him away and I 
messed up his life.  
 
Ghameeda‟s narrative describes some of the dynamics that can take place when entering a 
marriage – also for women who are unaware that their husband is already married. For many 
women, the stigma experienced is primarily directed at them, rendering the husband less 
accountable for the situation that he partially created. This dynamic reinforces the notion that it is 
women who are responsible, and morally accountable, for men‟s involvement with other women.  
 
The one respondent who described her polygynous marital relationship mainly in positive terms 
seems to be an exceptional case when contrasted with the experiences of other respondents. In 
Somayya‟s case, the polygynous union was negotiated to meet the needs of all three people that 
were involved in the relationship. For Somayya, the main reason for entering the marriage was 













Somayya‟s narrative there is a sense of a family union being built, and she was serving the need 
for family for the first wife and her husband. Somayya explains: 
 
He [husband] was currently married, and the reason for wanting to take another wife was 
the fact that there were no children in the marriage. [So] the union wasn‟t for lust or 
something else, it was mainly because he needed children in his life and that is why he 
pursued another marriage. It was with the full consent of the first wife, because she also 
wanted him to be a father and if she cannot give that to him then maybe there will be 
another person. [So] we were now two wives with one husband, but we just like had this 
mutual respect, so I would respect her and she would respect me, and then we will have 
harmony in both relationships. Equality was paramount, because although he had me, he 
still had to be responsible for both and keep both happy. It was one night, and one night 
[one night with first wife and one night with second wife], she made food on her days and 
I made food on my days. We are now his women so he will say „it is prayer time‟, and we 
will do the prayer together, and it will always be in her quarters, because of the fact that 
she is much older and you have to have a certain respect. 
  
Arguably, this narrative espouses a different kind of meaning system from what has been seen 
through the previous excerpts. The nature of this polygynous union seems to be qualitatively 
different from other respondents‟ experiences in that there is no secrecy involved, polygyny is 
not used in a duplicitous way so as to legitimise an already existing sexual relationship, consent 
from the first wife has been granted, and seemingly, the two wives have managed to develop a 
relationship based on mutual respect. Somayya also highlights the salience of fair treatment as a 
contributing factor for the success of this marriage.  
 
In our interview, Somayya stressed that the ability to share domestic responsibilities, such as 
preparing food and caring for the children (she conceived two boys from this marriage) was 
definitely one of the main advantages of being in a polygynous marriage. When her husband 
died, Somayya continued to live in the same house as the first wife, and she emphasised the 
benefits of having another caretaker for her children as she herself was employed full-time. 
Interestingly, Somayya does not mention whether the first wife actually wanted to have children. 
Rather, the first wife‟s need for children is mainly conceptualised through highlighting the fact 
that she was unable to give her husband children and that she would very much like for him to 
experience what it is like to be a father. Nonetheless, Somayya‟s narrative suggests that the first 













the two of them, the two wives, as the two mothers. Due to the fact that their husband passed 
away when the children were still young, the assistance she received from the first wife was 
essential in enabling her to manage her situation. In addition, it seemed that the wives gathered 
strength from each other when it came to dealing with the loss of their husband.  
 
 
The narratives included in this section illustrate some of the dynamics that operate in intimate 
relationships. Constructions of gender, as they relate to respondents‟ understandings of sexual 
nature and sexual behaviour in particular, were highlighted to address some of the dominant 
norms that influence relationship dynamics. In particular, assumptions related to sexual 
difference, in which men‟s higher levels of sexual needs/desires were intimately connected to 
their biology as males, were prevalent in some respondents‟ narratives. This view was also 
contrasted with respondents‟ perceptions of women‟s more emotional nature.  
 
The notion of sexual difference was also reflected in some of the respondents‟ perceptions of 
polygyny, as well as in some of the narratives where respondents described their experiences of 
being in a polygynous union. Clearly, some of the respondents‟ perceptions of polygyny as well 
as the manner in which polygynous unions were entered into, as experienced by a few 
respondents, have implications for the conceptualisation of contemporary sexual ethics. 
Nonetheless, a few of the narratives also show that there are many ways in which a polygynous 
union can function – ideally. Although only one respondent spoke about polygyny primarily in 
the positive, highlighting particular benefits of being in such a union, her experience does 
illuminate the potential of polygyny to be successful if based on particular relationship dynamics. 
Arguably, a process of consultation and negotiation with all partners concerned emerges as a 
significant factor. Also, the ethical principles that must be cultivated in this union, such as 
respect and tolerance, are salient for the success of this kind of marriage. Seemingly, polygyny 
serves many purposes. Nonetheless, the nature of the relationship is intrinsically dependent on 
the social actors and the relationship dynamics involved in creating this union.  
 
While many Islamic feminists highlight mutual ethics of consideration as a foundational 
principle that should guide the nature of marital dynamics, a number of dominant norms, beliefs 













with the ways in which my respondents negotiate sexual relationships. A salient tendency that 
emerged in many of my respondents‟ narratives is the multifaceted dimensions of religious 
norms when embodied in a social reality. Interestingly, many respondents create space for 
contestations within the boundaries of traditional discourses in ways that allow them to question 
particular forms of marital dynamics. Nonetheless, the existence of dominant assumptions 
conveying specific normative standards for male and female sexual behaviour also restricts in 
powerful ways some women‟s possibilities for intervention. Also, the manner in which some 
men utilise religiously sanctioned norms effectively masks other religious ideals such as 
mutuality and reciprocity. Nonetheless, as shown through some of the narratives in this section, 
women partake in the continuous construction of religious norms, by means of resisting, 
















Conclusion: Contemporary Islamic Sexual Ethics  
 
In the previous chapters I have presented a range of narratives that illustrate Muslim women‟s 
experiences in intimate relationships and the impact of broader social realities on self-definitions 
and relationship dynamics. I have paid particular attention to the various ways in which women 
think about the nature of sexual dynamics and the dominant discourses that inform their 
understandings and praxis. The narratives presented reveal that a number of prevalent 
perceptions and norms influence and give meaning to women‟s religious commitments, 
motivations and aspirations. Respondents‟ narratives also show that specific religious normative 
ideals are embodied in intimate relationships. In this final chapter I reflect on the ways in which 
diverse religious meaning systems and practices present a multifaceted and ambivalent 
contemporary Islamic sexual ethics. I also explore the notion of moral agency (khalifah), a 
theological construct advocated and embraced by many Islamic feminists, and examine possible 
resonances with forms of agency transpiring in my respondents‟ narratives.  
 
Respondents‟ conceptualisations of sexuality and sexual dynamics demonstrate a range of 
religious repertoires. On the one end of the continuum, respondents highlighted Islam as a sex-
positive religion and indicated the salience of religious ideals such as sexual reciprocity and 
mutuality, viewing sex as a form of spiritual connectedness and as an act of worship (ibadat). On 
the other end of the continuum, respondents spoke about the entrenched belief that a Muslim 
woman should be sexually available to her husband, the importance of satisfying one‟s husband 
sexually, and the possibility of receiving punishment from God if refusing to have sex.  
 
The ambiguous nature of these dominant constructs generates possibilities for Muslim women to 
occupy several and diverse subject positions within a religious framework. Many of the 
respondents‟ conceptions of sexuality and the relevant norms reveal a contemporary Islamic 
sexual ethics that is marked by tensions between patriarchal and egalitarian components. It is 


















9.1  Islam is a „Sex-Positive‟ Religion 
 
The notion that Islam is a sex-positive religion, a view held by many of my respondents, is 
reflected in Islamic feminist literature as well as in classical Islamic scholarship. This 
conceptualisation of sexuality appears at the outset to be a good thing; also, for my own feminist 
sensibilities this affirmative view of sexuality suggests constructive ways to engage questions of 
male and female sexuality within the Islamic framework. Similarly, perceiving sex as a form of 
religious worship (ibadat), a view also echoed by my respondents, stands out as an approach to 
sexuality that challenges body/spirit dualisms and generates fascinating and novel ways to 
conceive of sexual interaction. Nonetheless, what becomes clear through some of my 
respondents‟ narratives is the ways in which these positive notions of sexuality seamlessly 
interweave with more patriarchal ideas to produce very hierarchical religious conceptions of 
gender, which in fact collectively render such affirming notions of sexuality quite problematic.  
 
Positive and affirming views on the nature of heterosexual sexuality do not exist independently 
or in isolation. Rather, they function as particular threads in a complex web of intersecting and 
ambivalent narratives. To exemplify, one of the most dominant themes that came up in my 
interviews was the importance of a wife‟s sexual availability. Ideal notions of sex as positive, 
sexual reciprocity and the potential for spiritual connectedness in sexual encounters were often 
retained simultaneously with conceptions of sacralised male sexual access to their spouses. 
While these conceptualisations do not necessarily represent contrasting or opposing views on 
sexuality, in that a respondent‟s emphasis on her sexual availability does not revoke or negate the 
significance of sexual reciprocity in her marital relationship, what becomes quite transparent in 
many of my respondents‟ narratives is that patriarchal understandings of sexuality often are in 
relationship with positive religious ideals and that patriarchal norms sometimes gain impetus and 
potency from these positive notions of sexuality.  
                                                 
94













For example, for some respondents, the belief that you cannot say „no‟ to having sex with your 
husband is interconnected with the belief that sex is likened to the spiritually meritorious act of 
charity and that God will bless you for it. Hence, although sex potentially can take place 
regardless of whether you want to have sex or not, or whether the sexual interaction is 
experienced as pleasurable, it is believed that the act itself engenders blessings. Being available 
to one‟s husband (never saying „no‟ to sex) enables women (and men) to establish a distinct 
God/believer relationship that brings about blessings, a relationship that only can be realised (in 
the context of sex as charity) through sexual interaction. For some respondents, seeing sex as the 
performance of ibadat reinforced the belief of not being able to refuse one‟s husband sex. In 
other words, not being able to say no to sex is premised on the belief that one cannot say no to an 
act of ibadat. Likewise, many respondents who held the belief that sex is a gift given to believers 
by God also believed that they would be cursed by angels if they refused their husband sex. 
Seemingly, the strong emphasis on positive conceptions of sex tends to obscure important 
underlying gendered power dynamics: they mask male sexual privilege, while objectifying the 
woman‟s body.  
 
Consequently, many of these seemingly positive conceptions of sex mentioned above are 
significantly influenced by and interact with other dominant constructs of sexuality and sexual 
dynamics that are undoubtedly androcentric. Sometimes, these celebratory notions of sex subtly 
yet persuasively reinforce inegalitarian sexual dynamics. Notions of sex being pleasing in the eye 
of God and seeing sex as establishing a unique spiritual connection between the believer and 
God, might mask some of the patriarchal assumptions represented by the attendant discourse on 
women‟s sexual availability. Also, the fact that God is involved in sexual relationships presents 
interesting but problematic ways to think about the nature of the God/believer relationship.  
 
I contend that it is important to interrogate the aphorism that Islam is a „sex-positive‟ religion. It 
is not enough to accept that Islam is a sex-positive religion just because of the fact that my 
respondents, or that the literature on Islam and sexuality foregrounds Islam as a religion that 
celebrates sexuality. What are the Islamic discourses on sexuality, other than the affirmative 
view on sex, that generate the construct of Islam as „sex-positive‟? What are the powerful 













suggest that the notion of Islam as „sex-positive‟ must more critically engage other, at times 
gender-biased, Islamic discourses on sexuality that collectively inform Muslim understandings 
and sexual praxis. 
 
Consequently, if in fact we accept the notion of Islam as a sex-positive religion, we must also 
acknowledge that all the discourses on sexuality presented in the previous chapters constitute 
some of the components that make up this „sex-positive religion‟. Thus, „sex-positive‟ also 
includes male sexual privilege, a profoundly inegalitarian construct that clearly does not resonate 
with Islamic feminists, or other feminists‟ sensibilities when championing the notion of Islam as 
a sex-positive religion. Although male sexual privilege does not inevitably mean that sex is 
negative for women, it is still a construct that prioritises and give licence to male sexual needs 
and desires, sometimes at the expense of women‟s health and well-being – as clearly shown 
through some of my respondents‟ narratives.  
 
Despite these points of ambiguity raised in relation to viewing Islam as a „sex-positive‟ religion, 
the noted positive conceptions and ideals on sexuality also influenced and impacted upon some 
respondents in favourable and beneficial ways. For example, for a few respondents, these 
positive notions of sex embedded within Islamic discourses encouraged them to give full 
expression to their sexuality in their marital relationship. Also, for some respondents, positive 
constructs of sex featured in their marital relationships in ways that provided them the space to 
negotiate sexual reciprocity and mutuality.  
 
For other respondents, ideals such as sexual reciprocity and the spiritual potential of sexuality 
were rarely realised in their own intimate experiences. Nonetheless, these notions were often 
retained at the level of religious ideals. Furthermore, it was often respondents whose marital 
relationships were characterised by spousal abuse and infidelity that upheld these ideals. 
Arguably, for some of these respondents, positive imaginings on sexual dynamics were retained 
because they enabled respondents to cope with unmerciful marital relationships. Thus, particular 
religious ideals might operate as powerful resources, empowering women to persevere and 
survive destructive relationships. While this might be helpful in the short term, it can also be 













effective challenges to injustices. Although many of these respondents are now divorced and 
some have remarried, the considerable amount of years they remained married to abusive 
spouses might reflect the powerful influence of religious ideals.     
 
Positive ideals concerning sexuality might be helpful and empowering for some women. Even 
so, I contend that there is another layer of meaning regarding positive imaginings of sex that 
needs to be more thoroughly interrogated. For many of my respondents, the construct of sex as 
positive, and the promotion by Islam of this view, seemed to exert a certain form of authority. In 
other words, the fact that Islam tells women that sex is good might make it increasingly difficult 
for women to say „no‟ to sex or try to navigate their sexual relationship with their husband in 
egalitarian ways. Also, the existence of a number of seemingly positive discourses on sexuality 
generates particular expectations as to the ways in which sexual intimacy can be experienced. 
These positive preconceived notions of sex and sexual dynamics might translate into giving 
women very little space for sexual choices that allow them a level of personal fulfilment. 
 
For example, positive understandings of sex might imply that some women compel themselves 
to have sex with their husband because their religion conveys to them that sex is positive. Also, 
the perceptions of sex as an act of ibadat and charity might function in ways that take precedence 
over and suppress women‟s own expressions of sexuality and pleasure. The strong belief in sex 
as positive can obfuscate women‟s need to attend to the fact that they are being abused or that 
their marital relationship on the whole is not providing a space for mutuality or a space to 
negotiate mutuality. In addition, the notion that Islam „says‟ that sex is positive does not take 
cognisance of the fact that patriarchal ideals regarding women‟s sexual availability strongly 
function alongside with, or are imbricated with these sex-„positive‟ normative views.  
 
My respondents seldom spoke about personal sexual fulfilment. Rather, sex was often discussed 
in terms of satisfying husband‟s needs, being available, sex as ibadat and charity. Hence, sex 
was regularly spoken about in relation to something else, and in relation to someone other than 
oneself – mainly husband or God. The conception of Islam as a sex-positive religion begs the 
question of who is the centre, or the subject, of this discourse. I argue that the saying „Islam is a 













positive for men and women alike because the primary subject underlying this notion of a sex-
positive religion is profoundly gendered. Due to the fact that particular forms of male sexuality 
and discourses foregrounding women‟s availability intersect and intertwine with this notion of a 
sex-positive religion, the concept of a sex-positive religion ultimately ends up restricting spaces 
for women‟s sexual agency.  
 
The abovementioned religious meaning systems on sex and sexual dynamics provoke quite a few 
salient questions around conceptualisations of human nature and the God/believer relationship 
that Islamic feminists place at the centre of their discussions.  
 
9.2  Muslim Subjectivities: ‘abd-Allah and Khalifah  
 
One of the ways in which Islamic feminists debunk patriarchy is by foregrounding the 
God/believer relationship in a particular way. Within the Islamic tradition, two distinctive but 
interrelated subjectivities are offered to believers: „abd-Allah (servant of God) and khalifah 
(moral agent). Both subjectivities illustrate a distinct human relationship with God. They are 
equally important, constituting two parts of one whole, and function at the level of religious 
ideals. Hence, as a Muslim you should try your best to cultivate, embody and refine these 
religious ideals so as to fulfil your responsibilities and obligations to God.   
 
The „abd is a specific kind of posture and is always in a relationship to God. The „abd is 
receptive and obedient to God‟s commands through acts of worship and is completely beholden 
to God. Islamic feminists, as well as other Muslim thinkers reflecting on questions of ethics, 
believe that the implications of being „abd-Allah free people from other kinds of hierarchies. 
Nonetheless, one finds that particular worldly hierarchies that position men as intermediaries 
between women and God have existed in previous historical periods and continue to exist to 
various degrees in contemporary Muslim societies. It is the intertwining of „abd-Allah with 
patriarchy that might create potentially problematic interpersonal relationship dynamics that 














For example, ibadat (worship) constitutes a central part of being Muslim. In other words, the 
worship of God is contingent on and interrelated with fulfilling one‟s role and responsibility as 
„abd-Allah. By perceiving sexual interaction as a form of ibadat, a view that was expounded in 
many of my respondents‟ narratives, saying „yes‟ to sex can be understood to be a religious 
responsibility. Similarly, for respondents who believed that they would invoke God‟s 
punishment by refusing to have sex with their husbands, sexual encounters are arguably framed 
through the need to maintain a good relationship with God.  
 
It is noteworthy that many of my respondents seemed to assert a strong „abd-like subjectivity 
when presenting their views on sexual dynamics. Not only did their views reflect subservience to 
God, but in fact, the notion of being an „abd was also manifested through particular spousal 
dynamics – within which subservience to God can be expressed through one‟s willingness to 
have sex with one‟s husband. For example, when being exposed to husbands‟ invocation of the 
hadith that intimately links women‟s sexual readiness with God‟s satisfaction or dissatisfaction, 
many respondents asserted that they would rather have sex with their husband than be subjected 
to the curse of the angels, invoked if they refused to have sex.  
 
If sexual interaction is supposed to be something that is pleasing in the eyes of God, an act of 
ibadat as mentioned by some respondents, or a unique spiritual connectedness as mentioned by 
others, it is quite the paradox that men singularly have monopoly, in the context of this hadith for 
example, on limitless sexual access. Thus, the need for women to please God also translates into 
pleasing one‟s husband. The concomitant view that a husband who pleased his wife was also 
thereby pleasing God did not appear to have a powerful presence in their narratives. For many of 
my respondents, the construction of a distinct God/believer relationship was mediated through a 
sexual relationship with one‟s husband. This is one example of a distinct sexual dynamics within 
which an „abd-like subjectivity becomes imbricated and imbibed in male sexual privilege. This 
renders a gender-biased ethics of sexual engagement premised on a husband‟s sexual need and a 
wife‟s readiness, espousing particular parameters for when and where ibadat can take place, 














Consequently, these views of ibadat operate within certain kinds of social relationships and are 
influenced by particular relationship dynamics. The questions outlined in Chapter Seven of this 
dissertation raised a few central concerns regarding seeing sex as ibadat if simultaneously 
coupled with difficult experiences, like sexual coercion or various forms of abuse in one‟s 
marital relationship.
95
 The possibilities for contesting these inegalitarian marital dynamics are 
dependent on the various subject positions available to women within the discursive field of 
Muslim sexualities. 
 
Islamic feminists have provided a stringent critique regarding the various social constructions, 
religious norms, and relations of power that limit women‟s potential for the full expression of the 
God/believer relationship, a relationship that also should reflect women‟s khalifah.
96
 For 
example, the various ways in which men, even if only symbolically, exercise a certain form of 
control over women‟s sexuality, bodies and fertility management, as well as the economic 
injustices and the lack of educational opportunities that many Muslim women experience in 
different parts of the world, impinge on women‟s abilities to fulfil their religious responsibility 
of moral agency. Seemingly, some of my respondents‟ clear emphasis on „abd-Allah (servant of 
God)  at the level of normative perceptions on sexual dynamics might echo some of the tensions 
regarding women‟s opportunities to express and enact the religious subjectivity of khalifah 
(moral agent), pointed out by Islamic feminists. 
 
For many Islamic feminist scholars, the notion of khalifah incorporates an individual spiritual 
responsibility to work towards social justice, including gender justice. The ideal moral agent 
should aim at employing her/his moral responsibility in a way that mirrors the Qur‟anic 
principles of social justice. By extension, the importance of asserting and embracing this 
particular subjectivity is supported by and arguably harmonised through the notion of 
mu‟amalat, social relations. It is salient that individuals work towards cultivating moral values in 
interpersonal relationships so that principles of social justice can flow from the personal into the 
communal. These types of moral capacities are highlighted by Islamic feminists, Sadiyya Shaikh 
and Amina Wadud. Shaikh (2009) suggests the integral relationship between spiritual refinement 
                                                 
95
 See Chapter 7, page 156-157. 
96













and justice-based relationships, while Wadud asserts that “personal spiritual development forms 
the cornerstone of one‟s activities in both the public and the private realm of society” (Wadud, 
2006:36).  
 
The salience for women to assert moral agency, as advocated by Islamic feminists, can be seen 
as one way of being in this world; more so, it is one way of being Muslim. Nonetheless, there is 
not just one way of being a khalifah – just as there is not just one way in which one can work 
towards social justice. For many Islamic feminists, the responsibility of khalifah might be 
reflected through their scholarly endeavours. As we have seen previously, Islamic feminists‟ 
critical and creative engagements with reinterpreting religious texts can provide women with 
empowering egalitarian textual legacies that emerge organically from the religious canon. 
Particularly scholars like Wadud (2006) and Khaled Abou El Fadl (2001) have introduced 
powerful responses on how to engage with potentially unjust meanings embedded in religious 
texts. The earlier discussed notion of Wadud‟s suggestion of saying „no‟ to the application of the 
literal meaning of verse 4:34, can be seen as one way of negotiating scriptural authority and 
constitutes one way of employing one‟s responsibility as God‟s khalifah. Likewise, Abou El 
Fadl‟s concept of a “conscientious-pause” illustrates a creative and self-reflective engagement 
with texts such that human capacities for critical awareness and ethical consciousness are 
foregrounded, thus taking seriously the dynamic responsibility of khalifah in changing social 
contexts.  
 
While these scholars engage with religious texts and provide alternative responses to the 
difficulties that believers might encounter when reading religious texts, these kinds of 
contestations of religious meanings are also found in the lives of everyday lay people. I contend 
that many of my respondents embody a conscientious-pause and enact their right to say „no‟ 
when experiencing the invocation of Qur‟anic verses and ahadith in their intimate relationships 
or in other situations that engender a sense of discomfort or disturb their sensibilities and moral 
compass. Although women‟s choices for moral agency might be limited since the fulfilment of 
khalifah is dependent on a number of social relationships, women‟s moral interventions are 














The excerpts presented in the previous chapters illustrate that my respondents function within 
various social structures in ways that are creative and that resist particular religious norms. 
Moreover, the tensions and ambiguities embedded within prevalent frameworks of understanding 
create possibilities for working the system in constructive ways. Nonetheless, distinctive 
relations of power, for example, women‟s experiences with spousal abuse and sexual violence, 
sometimes limit their potential for negotiation. In these situations, women often make pragmatic 
decisions in order to maintain peace in the home and enable some degree of self-preservation.  
 
As I have noted earlier, for many of my respondents, religion is a source of strength and 
empowerment. In particular, belief in a merciful and compassionate God was expressed by many 
respondents and often seemed to inform their agentival capacity, to use Mahmood‟s (2001) 
terminology. Often, the strong invocation of God‟s mercy seemed to realign and dislodge 
normative constructs espousing male sexual privilege. For example, some respondents‟ 
engagements illustrate that they enacted their right to say „no‟ to sex through utilising alternative 
narratives of God as primary in their lives, effectively thwarting the powerful discourse of a 
wife‟s sexual availability. Also, the belief in the mercy of God provided many respondents with 
a profound sense of endurance and perseverance in difficult times. Simultaneously, their strong 
religious commitment enabled ingenuity and resourcefulness when having to deal actively with 
brutal relationships and unmerciful social conditions. Respondents also employed the notion of 
God‟s mercy as a way of challenging and resisting abusive spousal behaviour and inegalitarian 
sexual dynamics. Consequently, by employing empowering characteristics of God, a few 
respondents in fact shifted the balance of power in their relationships by locating religious 
authority at the centre of their embodied experiences.  
 
In addition, some respondents, although not contesting the legitimacy of discourses that 
demanded their sexual availability, enacted their right to refuse their husband sex due to the 
nature of their marital relationship. Thus, even if this particular „wifely ideal‟ of sexual 
availability is rhetorically retained, the construct itself might be precarious in a lived social 
context. These particular engagements clearly demonstrate the different ways in which certain 
kinds of agency get enacted in society, and echo some of the forms of contestations theorised by 













Within the context of being exposed to their husbands‟ invocation of the hadith that suggests that 
a woman will be cursed by the angels if she refuses to have sex with her husband, participants‟ 
responses ranged from resistance and abrogation to acceptance and reiteration. For example, as 
noted earlier, for some respondents the possibility of being cursed clearly provided a sufficient 
motivation for having sex with their husband whenever he requested it. By contrast, many 
respondents‟ active and critical engagement with this hadith is reflective of a need to make sense 
of its religious meaning in ways that pertain to contemporary context and experiences. For 
example, the reality of HIV/AIDS in South Africa coupled with personal experiences of 
infidelity generated various levels of discomfort for some respondents when being confronted 
with the patriarchal meaning systems embedded within this hadith. The various responses 
articulated by my respondents demonstrate how this hadith constitutes a site for the contestation 
of power, also in a contemporary society – and also by women whose lives are being adversely 
affected by the directives implicit in this hadith.  
 
My respondents‟ narratives suggest that religious meaning systems concerning sexuality clearly 
form part of a contemporary social text. In other words, particular dominant religious mores do 
not only exist at the level of text but are frequently invoked, contemplated and experienced by 
women in local contexts. I find Shaikh‟s discussion on a “tafsir of praxis” (2007) extremely 
useful when examining the various ways in which my respondents embody texts in their intimate 
relationships. As a novel hermeneutical lens through which to challenge elitist scholarly 
production of religious meaning, women‟s “embodied tafsir” as suggested by Shaikh, can be 
seen as one way of rendering women‟s experiences essential when investigating what constitutes 
a contemporary Islamic sexual ethics.  
 
By utilising this feminist lens, what becomes clear is that contestations of religious meanings 
come in different forms. The paradoxes and ambiguities implicit in dominant contemporary 
epistemologies – constituting part of this context-specific social text – are largely contested 
through women‟s lived engagements. For example, as noted in my chapter dealing with 
polygyny, although this particular religious construct might be accepted theoretically, it is 
increasingly challenged at the level of women‟s experience. I contend that this kind of 













Also, the kinds of reflections articulated by my respondents when thinking about how to make 
particular choices in life related to marital relationships and their own wellbeing, fundamentally 
contribute to how one can think about what it means to be a moral agent.  
 
9.3  Towards a Contemporary Islamic Egalitarian Sexual Ethics 
 
Clearly, the emergence of the Islamic feminist discourse contributes with ingenious and creative 
ways to re-reading and rethinking the Islamic tradition in order to provide counter-narratives that 
are in accordance with the feminist ideal of gender justice. Not only do many Islamic feminists 
employ methodological strategies developed in the classical period to interpret religious texts, 
but they also develop novel hermeneutical methods that speak to the challenges in contemporary 
social contexts. Without a doubt, the continued development of Islamic feminism/s provides 
useful gender-sensitive approaches that increasingly can inform contemporary Islamic sexual 
ethics. Nonetheless, even as they excavate the egalitarian resources in the Islamic tradition, what 
becomes clear through my respondents‟ narratives is the continued existence of dominant 
discourses on sexuality underpinned by patriarchal epistemologies. Also, the multifaceted and 
sometimes paradoxical meaning systems of particular normative ideals on sexuality emerge as a 
salient theme in many narratives.  
 
I contend that a contemporary Islamic sexual ethics is expressed both through understandings 
and experiences. By paying particular attention to the latter, the narratives presented in this 
dissertation present one way of exploring the theoretical construct of a tafsir of praxis, posited by 
Shaikh (2007). By taking into account the interplay between experiences, religiosity, dominant 
religious norms and ideals, and a particular local context, this tafsir of praxis foregrounds the 
various ways in which lived engagements contribute to the understanding and creation of a 
contemporary sexual ethics. My respondents‟ narratives represent diverse articulations of an 
ambiguous contemporary Islamic sexual ethics that is lived and continuously being produced by 
women in a particular South African context.  
 
It is increasingly important that feminist scholars, and we as researchers, pay attention to the fact 













making. Sexual ethical ideals and norms do not exist only at the level of texts but are lived out 
through a social text that is embodied and experienced, hence always changing. There seem to be 
significant levels of dissonance between particular Islamic feminist notions and many of my 
respondents‟ lived realities. Simultaneously, there also seem to be some levels of incongruence 
between several of my respondents‟ conceptualisations of sexuality and their experiences of 
marital relationships. Some of the realities within which my respondents were situated reveal that 
particular contextual factors such as HIV/AIDS, infidelity and gender violence intersect with 
religious norms and ideals, sometimes in very problematic ways. We must continue to ask 
critical questions related to the ways in which religious norms and dominant discourses on 
sexuality intersect with some of these context-specific realities.   
 
My empirical research revealed that there were moments when my respondents were subdued by 
and complied with the parameters set out by dominant religious norms, yet other times they were 
resisting these very boundaries. Sometimes they just did what they needed to get done in order to 
get out of harmful relationships, without conceiving of this type of agency as resisting a 
dominant discourse. Sometimes structures were negotiated rather ambivalently and particular 
patriarchal ideals retained. Other times, my respondents clearly resisted and contested religious 
norms and practices that unsettled their sensibilities and capacities as engaged Muslims.  
 
So what is the way towards establishing a contemporary Islamic egalitarian sexual ethics? I 
contend that more careful attention must be given to empirical studies that foreground women‟s 
experiences so as to examine and reveal the multiple and nuanced discourses that function and 
inform women‟s lives. In order to work towards a sexual ethics that prioritises gender justice, 
women‟s voices and experiences need to be heard and acknowledged as essential components of 
contemporary knowledge production. Within the context of South Africa, Faghmeda Miller, the 
first Muslim woman who publicly revealed that she was HIV-positive, stirred up much 
controversy and public debate with regard to the risk of HIV in Muslim communities. The fact 
that the first woman who came forward had been infected by the man she was married to, 
brought the topic of HIV to the fore in ways that foregrounded particular marital dynamics. 
Simultaneously, this debate opened the way for interrogating normative religious ideals 













engagement, Faghmeda Miller was part of spearheading an organisation called Positive Muslims, 
now situated in Cape Town, whose purpose is to raise the awareness of HIV in Muslim 
communities. This example shows the importance of giving voice to particular experiences and 
also the possibilities for further action as a consequence of raising public awareness.  
 
I contend that the first step in any feminist empirical research is to examine what is actually 
happening in women‟s lives. The next step in feminist projects is to make an effort to contest 
particular norms and behaviours that negatively impact upon women. There are a number of 
ways in which one can undertake this endeavour. The next phase of this particular project is to 
share some of my empirical findings with the women who generously participated in this study 
as well as with organisations and scholars that work within the field of gender and Islam.  
 
I propose that the varying ways in which feminists are theorising the different relationships 
between subjectivities and power contribute to productive ambiguities that might open up spaces 
for more pluralistic expressions of feminism. I argue that Islamic feminism/s underscore 
important dimensions of women‟s experience that pay particular attention to the construction of 
religious subjectivities. Islamic feminism/s encourages reflections on the nature of women‟s 
discursive religious affiliations that influence their perceptions, ideas of self, and male-female 
dynamics. By viewing religious meaning systems as constituting a powerful source of authority, 
affecting women both positively and negatively, Islamic feminism/s highlight the various 
possibilities for subjective interaction with the continuous production of religious meaning. 
 
This dissertation foreground localised accounts of women‟s narratives where religion constitutes 
an influential framework through which subjectivities are produced. I propose that this 
dissertation contributes to the field of local empirical studies firstly, in that it highlights voices 
that have previously been marginalised. Secondly, I contend that this study adds important 
insights to the studies already undertaken in South Africa in that it elaborately points out 
particular structural dynamics that need to be contested within the South African landscape.  
 
I note that this brief account of some of the existing perceptions, understandings and experiences 













or experiences within Muslim communities in Cape Town, nor is it representative for all Muslim 
women‟s attitudes or reflections regarding this issue. I also acknowledge that my interpretation 
of the research material is a particular understanding amongst numerous potential interpretations. 
In addition, I would like to point out that the interview space is a temporary space. Thus, the 
subject positions expressed by respondents are always processual and dependent on the context 
and relationship dynamics that develop during the interview encounter. Respondents express 
their understandings and experiences in dialogue with the researcher, and thus narrations are 
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Awrah: lit. nakedness, referring to aspects of the self that should be publicly concealed. It 
includes a range of referents from the „genitals‟ or „pudendum‟ for men and 
women alike in some perspectives; to women‟s hands, face, and voice in the view 
of others.  
Burqa: an enveloping outer garment worn by some Muslim women for the purpose of 
cloaking the entire body, including the face     
Dhikr: plural, adhkar: Lit remembrance (of God). Might refer to recitation of religious 
texts, repetition of certain words of formulas in praise of Allah 
Din:  religion, faith  
Du‟a: plural, ad‟iya: invocation of God, supplication, prayer asking God for something 
(e.g. asking God for forgiveness, cure you from disease, or to grant you children)  
Fasakh: a divorce granted the wife by a judge  
Fiqh:  Islamic Jurisprudence  
Fitna:  lit. „temptation,‟ „trial‟; commonly used to indicate chaos  
Hadith:  plural, ahadith: detailed narratives reporting on the life and praxis of the Prophet, 
i.e. sayings and doings of the Prophet  
Hajj: pilgrimage to Mecca, held annually and prescribed for all Muslims at least once in 
a lifetime    
Halal:  legal term indicating that which is permitted, lawful, allowable, contrary to haram  













Hijab: in popular literature; a headscarf or a veil that some Muslim women wear. The 
word hijab has been interpreted differently by various Islamic scholars, 
sometimes referring to dress, yet other times to seclusion, separation in space 
(domestic/public, men/women), and/or protection  
Ibadat: lit. acts of devotion, religious observance, worship. Prescribed activities of 
worship 
Ijtihad: lit. „effort,‟ „exerting oneself‟; independent investigation of religious sources 
Imam:  prayer leader 
Isha:  the last prayer to be recited before the sun ascends again  
Jahiliyyah: „time of ignorance‟, a Qur‟anic term, applied by Muslim theologians to the period 
of paganism prior to the advent of Islam  
 
Jihad: lit. „striving,‟ „exertion,‟ or „effort in the direction of a certain goal.‟ There is a 
basic distinction between two forms of jihad: the „great‟ jihad and the „small‟ 
jihad. The „great‟ jihad denotes an effort imposed upon oneself to achieve moral 
and religious perfection, whereas the „small‟ jihad refers to the duty to do battle 
against an outside enemy.  
Khalifah: moral agent, moral agency 
Khutba: Friday sermon 
Mahr: dower or nuptial gift promised by a prospective husband in a marriage contract  
Mawlana: form of address to a religious leader. Here: religious scholar with training from 
institutes of higher religious education in India or Pakistan, or from institutes of 
Indo-Pak provenance in South Africa 
Minaret: tower of a mosque 
Miswak: twig used as a toothbrush 













Ni„ma:  blessing 
Niqab: a face veil covering the lower part of the face (up to the eyes) worn by some 
Muslim women 
Niyat:  the intention one evokes in one‟s heart to do an act for the sake of Allah  
 
Qiyamat: Day of Judgment 
 
Sabr:  patience  
 
Sahih:  plural, sihah: sound, authentic, with reference to ahadith  
Salah:  Islamic daily ritual prayer  
Shaitan: Satan   
Shari‟a: lit. „the path that leads to the source‟. In modern usage, „Revealed Law‟ or 
„Islamic Law‟ 
Sheikh: plural, shuyukh: an elder, teacher, a learned, pious man, master of an order, title of 
scholar 
Sukun:  love, deep intimacy  
Sunna: lit. „trodden path‟; customary practices; when capitalised refers to the Prophet‟s 
practices   
Tafasir: interpretations of the Qur‟an 
Talaq: a divorce formula that can only be pronounced by a husband and will have 














Tarawih: during Ramadan the Tarawih prayer proceeds after the „Isha prayer, which is the 
last prayer to be recited before the sun ascends again   
Tawhid: the doctrine of Allah‟s oneness, uniqueness  



































































      
 
South African Muslim Women: Sexuality, Marriage and Reproductive Choices 
 
You have been asked to participate in this study because you are a Muslim woman. We appreciate your 
participation. You are under no obligation to participate and are free to decline to participate if you choose 
to do so.  
 
If you agree to participate, please answer the questions on this questionnaire. Your answers will remain 
anonymous and confidential.  
 
PLEASE DO NOT PUT YOUR NAME ON THIS QUESTIONNAIRE. 
 
There is no way to link your responses on this questionnaire to you. This is an anonymous 
questionnaire.  
 
The questions are of a personal nature. Please answer as honestly and truthfully as you can. Your honest 
responses will help us understand the experiences of Muslim women and their attitudes towards marriage 
and sexuality. The information you provide will help us develop ways to empower Muslim women and help 
address the challenges they face. 
 
Some questions are of a highly personal and sexual nature including questions on sexual abuse. These 
might be quite difficult for people who have experienced sexual abuse. We have included these questions 
as it appears to occur in some Muslim families but is not spoken about publicly. By including these 
questions we hope to understand the extent to which sexual abuse is a problem in our communities. 
 
All of the information we collect will be kept confidential and no one will see it except for research staff at 
the Universities of Cape Town and Stellenbosch. All questionnaires will be kept locked up at the University 
of Cape Town. No one else will see your responses to the questions.  
 
Please make an X in the corresponding box if you are either a married, divorced or widowed Muslim 
woman: □ 
 
If you are not a Muslim woman, please do not proceed with this questionnaire. 

















Please write today’s date here: ____________________ 
 
1.  Please write your age here:  _______   
 
2.  Please make an X in the box(s) that best describes your current marital status: 
 
 Marital status Number of years 
married 
Widowed   
Seperated   
Divorced * (see below)   
Married   
Remarried * (see below)   
 






3.  Please make an X in the box that best describes your current living situation: 
 
Live alone  
Live with husband, no children  
Live with husband and children  
Live with other adult(s), no children   
Live with other adults and children   
Live with children   
Live in a retirement home/home for the elderly   
Live in an institution   
 
 
4.  Please indicate the highest level of education that you have completed: 
 
No formal education   
Completed primary school   
Attended high school but did not complete matric   
Completed matric   
Attended university, college or technikon but did not graduate   
Currently studying at a university, college or technikon  
Graduated from university, college or technikon   














5.  Please indicate which race/cultural group you are identified with. We need this to understand 
difference among population groups. Please do not state that you are Muslim – you have been 
included in this study because we know you are Muslim:  
 
Indian   
Malay   
African   
White   
Other (please specify)  
 
6.  What is your current work situation? Please make a cross in the box(s) that best describes your 
employment situation: 
 
Employed full time   
Employed part time   
Student  
Unemployed  
Disabled   
Housewife  
Unable to work due to medical problem  
Retired  
Volunteer work  
 
7.  Which of the following best describes your approximate yearly family income from all sources, 
before taxes?  
 
Less than R10 000  
R10 001-R40 000  
R40 001-R80 000  
R80 001-R110 000   
R110 001-R170 000  
R170 001-R240 000  
R240 001 and above  
Don’t know  
 
8.  Please indicate whether you or anyone in your home owns any of the following items:  
 
 Yes No 
Television set   
Radio   
Motor car   
Microwave oven   
DSTV   
DVD player   













9.  How do you get around most of the time? Please make an X in the most appropriate box: 
 
I get around mostly with my own car  
I get around mostly with someone else’s car  
I get around mostly by taxi  
I get around mostly by bus  
I get around mostly by train  
I get around mostly by walking  
Other (please state)  
 
10.  Where were you born? 
 
Name of suburb/area  
Name of city  
Name of rural area (if applicable)  
    
11.  What is your first language?  
12. Which other languages do you speak?  
13.  Please state in which area you currently live:  
 
 
EXPERIENCES OF MUSLIM WOMEN 
 
The following questions ask about your experiences with your husband and family. Please choose the 
answer that best applies to your experience. Please choose only ONE answer per question. 
 
14.    When I got married the decision about whom I would marry was entirely mine 
          When I got married I had a say in choosing my husband 
  When I got married my family decided whom I would marry 
 
For the following question - If you do NOT have children please, tick this box  and then 
answer the following two questions by IMAGINING how you and your husband would have 
made these decisions and respond accordingly. 
 
15.   My husband was the one who decided we would or would not have children 
         I was the one who decided that we would or would not have children 
  Both my husband and I were involved in the decision to have or not have children 
  Having children was unplanned 
 
16.    In my marriage taking care of the children is mainly my responsibility  
   In my marriage taking care of the children is mainly my husband’s responsibility  
 Taking care of the children is a task that is equally shared by my husband and I 
  While my husband and I both take care of the children, I have more childcare  
      responsibilities than my husband 
  While my husband and I both take care of the children, my husband has more childcare 













17.   In my marriage doing housework is mainly my responsibility  
  In my marriage doing housework is mainly my husband’s responsibility  
  In my marriage whatever housework needs to be done is equally shared by my husband  
      and I 
  In my marriage most of the housework is done by a domestic worker 
  
18.    My husband is the only one who earns money for the household 
  My husband pays much more towards the household expenses than I do 
  My husband and I pay equally towards the household expenses 
  I pay much more towards the household expenses than my husband 
  I am the only one who earns money for the household 
 
19.   My husband is the head of the household and makes all the major decisions for the family 
  I am the head of the household and make all the major decisions for the family 
  Both my husband and I generally make decisions that relate to the family together 
  My husband makes some decisions for the family and I make other decisions for the          
      family** (if you tick this box, see below) 
 












The following questions have to do with whether or not you use contraception. Please mark the answer that 
best applies to you: 
 
 
20.    I have never used contraception 
  I sometimes use contraception 
  I often use contraception 
  I regularly use contraception 
 
21. How did you decide on the contraceptive method: 
  I decided myself 
  I decided after talking to a nurse/doctor 
  My husband and I decided together 














22.        I use contraceptives without my husband’s knowledge:  
 
Not at all Sometimes Often All the time 
 
23. If you do use contraception without your husband’s knowledge, please write in the space below       






24.       If I thought it was necessary, I would feel comfortable asking my husband to use a condom when 
we have sex: 
 
Not at all Sometimes Often All the time 
 
25.  If I thought it was necessary I would feel comfortable asking my husband to practice withdrawal 
during sex (that is, remove his penis from my vagina before he ejaculates): 
 











Please mark the answer that best applies to you: 
 
 Not at all Some time Often All the time 
26. My husband and I have good 
communication 
    
27. I feel free to ask for sex with my husband 
any time I want 
    
28. I am able to say no to sex when I don’t 
want to have sex 
    
29. I am generally happy in my marriage 
 
    
30. I am sexually satisfied in my marriage 
 
    
31. My husband forces me to have sex 
against my will 
    
 
32.   Please mark the answer that best applies to you: 
  My husband has never hit me for as long as we have been married 
  My husband has hit me once but has never done so again 
  My husband has hit me on a few occasions 
  My husband beats me  













Please mark the answer that best applies to you: 
 
33. My husband hits our children in a way that I do not like:  
 
Not at all Once in a while Sometimes Often  All the time 
 
34. I am afraid of my husband:  
 
Not at all A little  Quite a bit  Very much Extremely 
 
35. My husband forces me to do things that I would prefer not to do:  
 
Not at all Sometimes Often All the time 
 
36. My husband is emotionally abusive: 
 
Not at all Sometimes Often All the time 
 
37. My husband is verbally abusive: 
 
Not at all Sometimes Often All the time 
 
38.   My husband had extra-marital sex while he was married to me:  
 Yes 
 No 
 I can’t say with certainty 
 








Please answer the following questions whether or not your husband has another wife. We are interested 
in your opinions rather than your actual experiences. 
 
41.  If my husband wished to take a second wife, I would feel:  
 
















42.  If my husband wished to take a second wife, I would:  
 






43.  If my husband actually did take a second wife, I would:  
 
Remain married to him Separate from him Divorce him 
 
44.   Please indicate by making a cross on the line below the extent to which you think you are at risk of 
becoming HIV positive:  
 
Low risk    Medium risk     High risk 
 
 









For the next questions please consider what you would do if your husband were HIV positive: 
 
46.  If my husband were HIV positive, I would ask him to wear a condom during sex:  
 Yes 
 Not sure 
 No 
 I would not have sex with him at all 
 
47.   How aware were you of HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) before you had 
your first sexual relationship: 
  Very aware 
  A little bit aware 
  Not very aware  
  Not aware at all 
 


















49.   Did you discuss the risks of HIV/Aids and sexually transmitted diseases with your husband before 





WOMEN’S UNDERSTANDINGS OF ISLAM  
 
The following questions concern women’s understandings of Islam in terms of marriage, and sexual and 
reproductive choices. Please answer the following questions as best you can. If you feel that you do not 
know the answer, please take your best guess, according to your understanding of Islam. THERE IS NO 










51.   According to my understanding of Islam, whether I have children or not is:  
  For me to decide alone 
  For me to decide mostly  
  For my husband and I to decide together 
  For my husband to decide mostly 
  For my husband to decide alone 
 
52.   According to my understanding of Islam, taking care of the children is/would be: 
  My responsibility alone 
  My responsibility mainly 
  Equally my husband and my responsibility 
  My husband’s responsibility mainly 
  My husband’s responsibility alone 
 
53.   According to my understanding of Islam, taking care of the housework is:  
  My responsibility alone 
  My responsibility mainly 
  Equally my husband and my responsibility 
  My husband’s responsibility mainly 














54.   According to my understanding of Islam, providing money and taking care of the household 
financially is:  
  My responsibility alone 
  My responsibility mainly 
  Equally my husband and my responsibility 
  My husband’s responsibility mainly 
  My husband’s responsibility alone 
 
55.   According to my understanding of Islam, I am allowed to work for money outside of the home.  
  Whenever I want to 
  Only when it is absolutely necessary 
  Never under any circumstances 
  Only with my husband’s permission 
  Preferably after discussing it with my husband 
 
56.   According to my understanding of Islam, 
 
  The husband is the head of the household and makes all the major decisions for the     
      family 
  The role of head of the household is to be shared by both the husband and wife and all      
      major decisions are made together. 
  The wife is the head of the household and makes all the major decisions for the family 
  Islam has no fixed teaching about who should be the head of the household 
 
 
57.   According to my understanding of Islam:  
 
  A Muslim marriage is based on obedience of the wife to the husband 
  A Muslim marriage is based on mutual consultation between a husband and a wife 
  A Muslim marriage is based on mutual consultation between a husband and wife, but the 
      husband has the final say  
 
 
58.   According to my understanding of Islam, my husband is allowed to hit me: 
 
  Any time he is displeased with me 
  Under no circumstances whatsoever 
  Under extreme circumstances (If you made a cross next to this question, please write in the  




















Sexual matters  
 
 




  Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
59. According to my understanding of Islam, my husband 
can have sex with me anytime he wants to because 
he has paid maskawi/ mahr/ dowry 
1 2 3 4 
60. According to my understanding of Islam, I must 
agree to have sex with my husband whenever he 
wants to. 
1 2 3 4 
61. According to my understanding of Islam, my husband 
must agree to have sex with me whenever I want to   
1 2 3 4 
62. According to my understanding of Islam, it is 
important for a woman to be a virgin when she gets 
married for the first time 
1 2 3 4 
63. According to my understanding of Islam, it is 
important for a man to be a virgin when he gets 
married for the first time 
1 2 3 4 
64. According to my understanding of Islam, it is 
acceptable for a woman to ask for sex with her 
husband any time she wants 
1 2 3 4 
65. According to my understanding of Islam, I have a 
right to have sexual pleasure with my husband 
1 2 3 4 
66. According to my understanding of Islam, my husband 
can force me to have sex with him 
1 2 3 4 
 
 
For the following questions please mark as many of the statements that apply to you:  
 
67.   According to my understanding of Islam:  
 
  Sex is a gift from Allah to be enjoyed 
  Sex is only a duty that I owe to my husband 
  Sex is a burden for women 
  Sex is most importantly a way to have children 
  Sex is something that one should not really enjoy too much 
  Sex is a way to satisfy your natural appetites so that you can get on with other more  
      important parts of life  
















Please indicate the extent to which the following statements are true for you: 
 
  Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
68. According to my understanding of Islam women are 
rewarded by Allah for having sex with their husbands 
1 2 3 4 
69. According to my understanding of Islam men are 
rewarded by Allah for having sex with their wives  
1 2 3 4 
70. According to my understanding of Islam Allah is 
displeased with a woman who refuses to have sex with 
her husband 
1 2 3 4 
71. According to my understanding of Islam, Allah is 
displeased with a man who refuses to have sex with his 
wife 
1 2 3 4 
 
Please mark the statement that best applies to you.  
 
72.   I think that: 
  Men have stronger sexual urges than women 
  Women have stronger sexual urges than men 
  Men and women have equal levels of sexual desire 
  Levels of sexual desire are not determined by gender 
 
Please indicate the extent to which the following statements are true for you: 
 








73. According to my understanding, Islam allows people to 
use contraception 
1 2 3 4 
74. According to my understanding of Islam, it is 
acceptable for me to ask my husband to use a 
condom when we have sex 
1 2 3 4 
75. According to my understanding of Islam, it is 
acceptable for me to ask my husband to practice 
withdrawal (that is, remove his penis from my vagina 
before he ejaculates) 
1 2 3 4 
 
76.   According to Islam, abortion is:     
  Never permitted under any circumstances 
  Permitted any time before the ruh (spirit) enters into the fetus (120 days) for whatever  
      reason a women may have  
  Permitted before the ruh (spirit) enters into the fetus (120 days) only in particular  
circumstances (If you made a cross next to this question, please write in the space below ALL 
















Please indicate the extent to which the following statements are true for you: 
 






77. According to my understanding, Islam allows single 
men to masturbate (that is, touch their own private 
parts sexually) 
1 2 3 4 
78. According to my understanding, Islam allows 
married men to masturbate (that is, touch their own 
private parts sexually) 
1 2 3 4 
79. According to my understanding, Islam allows single 
women to masturbate (that is, touch their own 
private parts sexually) 
1 2 3 4 
80. According to my understanding, Islam allows 
married women to masturbate (that is, touch their 
own private parts sexually) 
1 2 3 4 
 
 
ROLE OF RELIGION 
 
The next several questions ask about the role that religion plays in your life. Please indicate the extent to 
which the following statements are true for you:  
 
  Strongly 
Disagree  




81. I consider my religious faith to play an 
important role in my life 
1 2 3 4 5 
82. I get comfort and strength from my religion 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
  Yes  No 
83. I belong to an Islamic organization 
 
  




  Not at all Sometimes Often 
85. I attend religious events such as Taleems, 
Mouloud, Thikr, Gajat’s 
   
86. I am active in the Muslim community  
 
   
87. I take time for Salah/Namaz, meditation or 
contemplation during the course of my day 
   
88. I pray outside of usual Salah/Namaz times 
 
   
89. I give charity 
 













90.  How religious would you say you are?  Please circle the most appropriate response. 
 
Not religious at all Not very religious Somewhat 
religious 
Very religious  Extremely religious 
 
 
91.  On average, how many times do you pray (make salaah/namaz) each day? Please make a tick in 
the most correct box. 
  
  5 times a day 
  1 to 4 times a day 
  At least once a month 
  On big nights only and/or during Ramadan only  
  At least once a year 
  Never 
  
92.  On average, how many days do you typically fast during Ramadan? Please write the number of 
days here: ____________ 
 
93.  On average, how many days are you physically able to fast during Ramadan? Please write the 
number of days here: ____________ 
 
94.  On average, how often do you fast outside of the month of Ramadan? Please write the number of 
days a year that you fast outside Ramadan: ____________ 
 
95.  How often do you give Zakat? 
 Every year without fail 
 As often as I can 






























THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE OF A HIGHLY PERSONAL AND SEXUAL NATURE 
INCLUDING SENSITIVE QUESTIONS ON SEXUAL ABUSE. THESE MIGHT OFFEND 
SOME PEOPLE OR BE QUITE DIFFICULT TO ANSWER FOR SOME PEOPLE WHO 




AS RESEARCHERS WE DO NOT MEAN TO BE OFFENSIVE OR INSENSITIVE BUT 





IF YOU ARE OFFENDED OR DISTURBED BY THESE QUESTIONS, PLEASE FEEL 

























































100.   If yes, please mark the answer that best applies: 
 (1) I had an unwanted pregnancy but chose not to have an abortion  
 (2) I had an unwanted pregnancy and chose to have an abortion  
 
101.   Please answer the following question ONLY if you answered (1) above.  
I chose not to have an abortion because: 
 I don’t think that abortion is the right thing to do 
 My husband stopped me from having an abortion 
 Abortion is wrong Islamically 











103.   My husband was a virgin when he got married for the first time: 
 Yes 
 No 
  I don’t know 
 

















105.   If yes, why do you masturbate (that is, touch you private parts sexually)? 
 I enjoy it 
 My husband does not give me sexual pleasure 
 My husband is absent 
 I am no longer married 
 
Has any of the following ever happened to you outside of your marriage with someone who was not your 
husband? Please make an X in the appropriate box(s). 
 
  No Yes If yes, what was your age at 
the time? 
106. Someone touched my private parts (e.g. 
breasts, vagina, or anus) when I did not 
want them to 
   
107. Someone inserted an object into my 
private parts when I did not want them to 
   
108. Someone inserted their penis into my 
private parts when I did not want them to 
   
109. Someone put their mouth on my private 
parts when I did not want them to 
   
110. Someone forced me to touch or lick their 
private parts when I did not want to 
   
111. Someone fondled my private parts when I 
did not want them to 
   
112. Someone other than my husband tried to 
rape me but did not succeed 
   
113. Someone other than my husband raped 
me 
   
 
 
If you answered no to all of the above, please stop here. 
 
114.   If you answered yes to any of the above items, please indicate how regularly it happened: 
 Once  
 A few times  
 Continuously for several months 
 Continuously for several years 
 





































































University of Cape Town 
Sa’diyya Shaikh, Ph.D., Principal Investigator 
Department of Religious Studies, UCT 
Telephone Number: 021 650-3462 
Ashraf Kagee, Ph.D., Co-Principal Investigator 
Department of Psychology, Stellenbosch University 
Telephone Number: 021 808-3446 
 
INFORMATION SHEET 
Title of Study: South African Muslim Women: Sexuality, Marriage and 
Reproductive Choices 
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE 
You are being asked to participate in this research study because you are a Muslim 
women living in South Africa.  
PURPOSE 
The aim of this study is to explore the experiences and attitudes of Muslim women in 
relation to marriage, sexuality and reproductive choices. We believe that in order to 
develop community initiatives for women’s empowerment, it is important for 
researchers to be aware of the realities, expectations and challenges faced by Muslim 
women. We hope that this research will help us to develop ways to empower Muslim 
women from within their religious communities and from within a gender-sensitive 
Islamic framework.  
 
The primary researchers in this project are Dr Sa’diyya Shaikh of the Department of 
Religious Studies at the University of Cape Town (UCT), and Prof. Ashraf Kagee of the 
Department of Psychology at Stellenbosch University (SU). Ms. Nina Hoel, a doctoral 
student at the University of Cape Town, is the research manager of the study.   
PROCEDURES  
As a participant, you will be asked to answer a questionnaire about your experiences 
and attitudes to sexuality, marriage and reproductive practices. As the questionnaire 
will be anonymous, you will not be asked to put your name on it. However, in order for 













consent form that is entirely separate from the questionnaire. We will collect the consent 
form before you begin to fill in the questionnaire. There will be no way to link your 
completed questionnaire to your consent form. Your responses will remain completely 
anonymous and confidential.  
RISKS  
Since we are studying marriage, sexuality and reproductive issues, many of the 
questions you will be asked to answer are very personal. Some people may be sensitive 
to these questions.  
 
In the last section of the questionnaire there are questions that relate to sexual abuse 
and other sexually sensitive issues. Before you get to this section we let you know you 
have reached this section and that for some people answering these questions may be 
difficult.  
 
We have included these questions because sexual abuse appears to occur in some 
Muslim families but is not spoken about publicly. By including these questions we hope 
to understand how big of a problem sexual abuse is in the Muslim community. If at 




All of the information we collect will be kept confidential. The completed 
questionnaires and consent forms will be locked up at the University of Cape Town. 
The only people that will have direct access to the questionnaires are the primary 
investigators. No one will see this information except for research staff at the 
Universities of Cape Town and Stellenbosch for genuine research purposes. All access 
to information is subject to our commitments of confidentiality and anonymity to all 
research participants. The research will be used for academic publications, and possibly 
contribute to an education workshop manual written for Muslim women. In all cases 
and for any possible publication, your confidentiality, anonymity and the security of the 
original documents will always be protected. You cannot and will not be identified by 
name at any point.  
COSTS  















There is no guarantee that you will benefit directly from the study. However, the 
investigators believe that this research will help to make an important contribution to 
research addressing the challenges faced by Muslim women. As such there is a potential 
benefit that this research might have on developing strategies to empower Muslim 
women in their local communities. 
 
COMPENSATION 
You will not receive any compensation for participating in this study. 
 
SUBJECT RIGHTS 
If you have any questions pertaining to your participation in this research study, you 





































In the event that you have been sexually abused in any way and experience distress 
during/after answering this questionnaire, you might want to contact one of the 
following free counselling centres: 
 
Cape Town City - LifeLine/Childline Western Cape 
 
LifeLine offers a 24-hour crisis telephone counselling service, 365 days of the year. 
Trained counsellors are available to talk to you and confidentiality is assured. 
LifeLine/Childline Western Cape also offers a face-to-face counselling service from most 
of their centres. Individuals are able to have four free one-hour counselling sessions 
with a trained LifeLine counsellor, after which time the counsellor will refer the 
individual to a therapist or specialist counsellor if there is a need for further 
consultation. 
Call 021 461 1113 to find out more information or to make an appointment. 
Telephone support: 
LifeLine counselling line: +27 021 461 1111 
Childline counselling line: +27 021 461 1114 
Childline toll free counselling number: 08000 55 555 
National Women’s Helpline: 0800 150 150 
Counselling: 08000 55 555 
Rape Crisis Cape Town Trust (RCCTT) 
 
RCCTT provides counselling and support to thousands of rape survivors and their 
family and friends.  
 
Telephone support: 
Observatory - 27 (0)21 447 1467 
Counselling line - +27 (0)21 447 9762 
Manenberg - +27 (0)21 633 5287 
Counselling line - +27 (0)21 633 9229 
Khayelitsha - +27 (0)21 361 9228 















University of Cape Town 
Consent Form 
  
Title of research project: 
South African Muslim Women: Sexuality, Marriage and Reproductive 
Choices 
 
Names of principal researchers: 
Dr Sa’diyya Shaikh and Prof Shaheen Ashraf Kagee 
 
Department/research group address: 
Department of Religious Studies (UCT) 
Department of Psychology (Stellenbosch University) 
 
 I have read and understood the information sheet on this questionnaire. I have been 
fully informed about the research project.  
 I agree to participate in this research project. 
 I agree to my responses being used for education and research on condition my 
privacy is respected and my responses are kept anonymous.  
 I understand that I am under no obligation to take part in this project. 
 I understand I have the right to withdraw from this project at any stage. 
 
Signature of Participant     Name of Participant   
 




Signatures of principal researchers:  
 
a) ______________________________ (Dr. Sa’diyya Shaikh) 
  

















Form of Consent 
 




Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. You have been asked to participate in this 
study because you are a Muslim woman.  
 
This study seeks to explore Muslim women‟s experiences and views on questions around 
sexuality, reproductive rights (abortion and contraceptives), and HIV/AIDS. Through 
investigating Muslim women‟s understanding(s) of Islam, this study will examine the 
relationship between the role of religion and Muslim women‟s decision-making power around 
matters of sexuality. At the same time the study will explore what factors other than religion that 
influence Muslim women‟s experiences around sexuality.  
 
This study will be anonymous; all the information collected during the interviews will be kept 
confidential by the researcher. The questions that you will be asked during the interview are of 
personal nature. Please answer as honestly and truthfully as you can. Your honest responses will 
help me understand the realities that Muslim women face and the attitudes of Muslim women 
towards matters of sexuality. The key focus of this study is your experiences. Ultimately your 
answers will be included in a research-report (Ph. D.). However, no one will be able to trace the 
information you gave out during the interview back to you. The Ph. D. thesis will use made-up 
names and will not include any descriptions that might identify you as the respondent. The Ph. 
D. thesis will be made publicly available at the University of Cape Town library in its final form. 














The interview will be audio-taped and the researcher will be taking notes during the course of the 
interview. Only the researcher and Dr. Shaikh will have access to this information. No one else 
will read (or hear) your responses to the interview questions. The data emerging from the 
research will be stored in a secure and appropriate manner. You can withdraw your consent at 
any time during the research and interview process.  
 
If you have any questions concerning this form of consent please ask the researcher before you 





Date:                                                                    Sign. 
 


























Please write today‟s date here: ___________________ 
 
 
1. Please write your age here: ______ 
 
 








Living with a significant other in an intimate 
relationship 
 
Remarried* (see below)  
 
 








3. Please make an X in the box that best describes your current living situation. 
 
Live alone  
Live with other adult(s), no children  
Live with other adult(s) and children  
Live with children  
Live in a retirement home  














4. Please indicate the highest level of education that you have completed: 
 
No formal education  
Completed primary school  
Attended high school but did not complete matric  
Completed matric  
Attended university, college or technikon but did not 
graduate 
 
Graduated from university, college or technikon  
Completed postgraduate degree  
No formal schooling but some adult education  
 







Other (please specify)  
 
6. What is your current work situation? Please make an X in the box(s) that best describes your 
employment situation. 
 
Employment full time  





Unable to work due to medical problem  
Retired  
Volunteer work  
 
7. Which of the following best describes your approximate annual family income from all 
sources, before taxes? 
 
Less than R10 000  
R10 001-R40 000  
R40 001-R80 000  
R80 001-R110 000  
R110 001-R170 000  
R170 001-R240 000  
R240 001 and above  













8. Please indicate whether you or anyone in your home owns any of the following items. 
 
 YES NO 
Television set   
Radio   
Motor car   
Microwave oven   
DSTV   
DVD player   
Video player (VHS)   
 
 
9. How do you get around most of the time? Please mark an X in the most appropriate box. 
 
I get around mostly with my own car  
I get around mostly with someone else‟s car  
I get around mostly by taxi  
I get around mostly by bus  
I get around mostly by train  
I get around mostly by walking  
Other (please specify)  
 
 
10. Where were you born? 
 
Name of suburb/area  
Name of city  
Name of rural area  
 
 
11. What is you first language?                             ______________ 
 
12. What is you partner/husband‟s first language                     ______________ 
 
13. Which other languages do you speak?                            ______________ 
 
14. Which other languages does your partner/husband speak? ______________  
 
15. Please state in which area you currently live:      ______________     
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